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CHRISTIAN SOCIOLOGY.

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CHRISTIAN SOCIOLOGY,

IN TWO PARTS,

BY

THE REV. JOHN PEDEN BELL,

MIDMAR.

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GEORGE & ROBERT KING, ST. NICHOLAS STREET;

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CHRISTIAN SOCIOLOGY.

To meet another's needs which that other cannot meet is what begets genuine affection, and affection so begotten is a power that disposes to meet all real need, and to meet need is God's way, and must be ours if we would walk humbly with God. To seek that our needs be met by others while we could meet our own, or, irrespective of the rights and needs of others, is against all that is divine, is what throws all into disorder, and is that which is attended with great moral personal degradation.

Acts xx. 35.

"It is more blessed to give than to receive."

Proverbs xxviii. 21.

"To have respect of persons is not good; for, for a piece of bread that man will transgress."

"It is more blessed to give than to receive." This, as an utterance of our Lord, regards that kind of giving which he was in the habit of urging, and which looks not at what return there may be to us, but at what good may be done to others. The whole is of that seeking to make others better and happier, which, while not regarding specially our own interest but specially their good, is yet that which most blesses us—is that which enriches us by its blessed and permanent results on our character and by enhancing in a live and abiding way our happiness,

and, in relation to conduct so truly rational in character, it is universally experienced, and may, in all ways, be clearly seen that "It is more blessed to give than to receive."

Giving and receiving are so inclusive of all that can well take place between man and man that his every act may be easily classified as under the one or as under the other. The principles also upon which they are everywhere ever at work may be truly seen as very powerful in moving and guiding human energies, and in so operating in all that is of man as to be no weak elements in the formation of all that is good or evil.—For it is needless to say, that all giving and receiving are not attended with blessing. It is only when they proceed upon such principles as become man, or upon such as God has set before us that both are beneficial, and when "to give"—which is so dreaded as what must impoverish—is that which truly enriches the giver by enriching his character, and permanently enhancing his happiness—these being the chief things in which man as man, or man as a rational creature, can really be truly rich.

Our own actions have a much greater influence upon ourselves than they can have upon any other.—With no other can they have such a close connexion, and many things may so intervene between them and others, as to neutralize their power whether for good or for evil; but with us there is nothing between our souls and them to impair their influence upon our minds—they leave us not, but lodge themselves within us in giving, according to their

character, a certain tone or tendency to all our powers. Hence, whether our actions be for good or for evil, their power for either is sure and much greater to ourselves than it can be to others. In such a view no action is lost—it may do neither good nor evil to others, still, it treasures itself up within us and makes *us* better or worse.—We have thus what we have done, and thus shall we ultimately receive all that we now do—*every one shall receive the things done in his body*—Our condition, as now made by our thoughts, words, and deeds, is the treasure of these, or, their indelible record. We may also here remark respecting the great power of action, as we shall do so now and again as we proceed.—The power of action is seen as greater than even that of nature—it operates upon and vitally affects all that we are—by it the natural is renovated or made more depraved—our parts, whatever they are, become better or worse, and are changed into good or bad, all, by the power of action. And it is in consequence of this power which our actions have, that in doing good or evil to others, we do sure and greater good or evil to ourselves.

Our actions in relation to others proceeding upon certain principles or grounds,—by reason of which, we regard one more, or, less than another,—are beneficial or hurtful to others, but chiefly to ourselves, as these grounds are righteous or unrighteous. In scripture, the ground of action which seems specially set in contrast to all that is just or righteous, is, “respect of persons”—which is what all, at once, feel to be unjust, as void of all that is rational whether in object

or impulse—is pernicious to all—even to those one would benefit, but chiefly to him who so acts—empoverishing his character and depriving him of all that can give real or rational happiness; for, in every bearing, “To have respect of persons is not good; for, for a piece of bread that man will transgress.”—We shall look more at this ground of action in another department of our subject, but in order to clear our way, we may meanwhile glance at it.

The qualities which regulate those who act upon such a ground, as “respect of persons,” are more the external or accidental—are such as belong to the personal appearance, condition or circumstances of others, and have nothing to do in regard to character as good or bad; nor can they actuate such action as is designed to make another better and happier. The qualities, as we look at them, are seen to be more such as regulate the irrational, and our so acting is to act upon a ground that is void of, and contrary to the rational—must be our treating one as meritorious and another as criminal all for what is neither—for what has nothing to do with character, and in so acting “we are partial and are become judges of evil thoughts”—what pleases or displeases us is what we set up as good or evil, and that in such a way as to set aside all as good or evil which God hath declared to be so.

In such cases our entire conduct is away from all rational ground of action, and while, disordering to all that is external, is also that which is very depraving to our own souls. In all conduct so actuated, our hatred and our love,

or our entire state of mind and mould of character are all moved and determined by influences which, as supreme, are unworthy of man and vitiate his entire moral being. Conduct so stimulated is, in its entirety, of that which is according to "the lust of the eye;" and soon gives a settled ascendancy to such tendencies and habits of mind, as cause us to be thoroughly governed, by what may yield the most trifling temporal advantage or slightest gratification. Conduct so stirred is void of all good—is but pregnant with evil to all whom it affects. It carries great evil in it *even* to those whom we would benefit. Its objects are such as may very soon be our distress; nor can they long yield us gratification. No such conduct can be ours without so acting upon us as to blind us more to all that is holy, just, and good—without blunting and destroying our sense of all that is good in itself and blessed in its results; and thus, verily, removing far from us all that can be our true and lasting pleasure.

In contrast to such, there are *two grounds* upon which more regard to one than to another is just and good, and which,—as divine and therefore sure,—render action rational or good in itself, and, while beneficial to all, is yet what specially enriches him that so acts;—these grounds are *Greater excellence of character in one than in another, and Greater need of aid which one has than another, by reason of his condition or circumstances*—which grounds are what God himself so regards as to encourage, foster, and mature the one; and to meet what is required in the

other, and thus the poor or destitute are the special objects of his divine care. It is to the latter of these that we now more especially turn our attention.

PART I.

To meet another's needs which that other cannot meet is what begets genuine affection. Affection so begotten is a power that disposes to meet all real need. To meet need is God's way and must be ours if we would walk humbly with God.

WHILE two grounds may be clearly specified as those upon which action is rational or good in itself, yet they may be viewed as constituting but one; for special regard to *greater excellence of character* is obviously the meeting of a most important need, and he that acts accordingly will not be guilty of dereliction in regard to the other ground of conduct; as the soul that is most alive to the true will always be found to have in greatest measure the spirit of the merciful.

The need in the case of greater excellence of character is of importance to the individual that has it, and is also of very great importance to the world. It is that which as possessed is in need of special countenance from others, or is always the better of being encouraged and fostered by special regard; and is generally that which must be acknowledged and met by others, or be as that which is not. And it is also that of which the world is most in need—is that which is most required in the world, as what would

meet or compensate for all its other wants, and is that without which all would but show great want, and even abundance everywhere would not be for benefit, but would be more the material of confusion. Hence to acknowledge and encourage *greater excellence of character*, in order to develope and bring it out to usefulness, is, in a very emphatic sense, to meet no ordinary need.

In harmony with these *two grounds* of action viewed as one—one in spirit and also in reward—he that is ever attracted by *greater excellence of character* will not be unmoved by *greater need of aid*, and the mental results to him that is so attracted, or that so acts, are very analogous to those which will be shown as springing from meeting special need, or want as in condition or circumstances.

There can be nothing more hurtful to all than to crush, by discountenance, superior excellence of character; and there is, at the sametime, nothing more blighting to any excellence one may himself possess than so to act—nothing more deadens in one the spirit of all excellence or more drives it as out of himself. But, on the other hand, there is nothing more expressive of a noble soul, and which makes it still more noble,—filling it anew and inspiring it afresh with the true spirit of all excellence—than a readiness and a pleasure in acknowledging and in encouraging superior excellence by whomsoever possessed.—Such a one augments what he has, adorns it with the spirit and bloom of vigour, and enjoying more his own, enjoys also what is another's in making it greater to that other. He

that truly regards another, because more honest, more industrious, more righteous, more fitted for any special department or better in what really constitutes character, will stir in himself greater affection to all so regarded; and excellence itself as an object will more and more command the consideration of his whole soul. We now, however, proceed to illustrate, in their order, the *positions* already specified.

SECTION II.

To meet another's need which that other cannot meet is what begets
genuine affection.

THE divine arrangements for exciting special regard or affection in one to another, would seem to present themselves in what may be characterized as an *apparatus* of *wants and power of supply*.—Each has needs he cannot himself meet, but which others related to him can, or, each has needs he cannot meet, but which others, as under special obligations, have chiefly a right to meet, and which, as met, stir that regard or affection to the person whose needs are met, which makes the right enjoyed as a privilege, or the duty performed felt as a great and healthful pleasure. Hence, as we are set to meet the needs of others which they cannot themselves meet, and, in proportion as we meet such, so special regard or affection is seen springing up and so connecting us with them as to make their interests, their joys, and their sorrows as one with our own. This renders the duties so incumbent upon us felt, not as burdens, but as pleasures.

Here, as in all else, duty cannot be entered upon without itself opening as a fountain to refresh, invigorate, and enliven for all that it requires, or as a rich treasure to bind us in love to itself as our joy, pleasure, and health.

In regard to affection as springing from meeting needs, we could not advance a more admirable and illustrative instance than that of the fond mother in relation to her helpless babe.—She is most immediately connected with it, has above all others the right to look to its wants, and is most fitted to meet its immediate needs.—And how as these are met does its image come to beam in her every feature! as these are met, her every glance is more an affectionate embrace which feels its every need, and its every lisp and motion become as of her own sensations, and command the immediate outgoing of her whole soul. Nor, while *it* is so much her whole, does she yet forget the others of her beloved family; yea, it is as she so loves her helpless babe that she can and does love the others well, and has all due regard and promptness in action for them according to their years and several needs.

It may be said, however, that affection is more what stirs all this than what grows from it, but, to us, it seems so to grow from this, that, without it, there could be no affection such as that with which the world is blessed.

It may be difficult to set clearly in light what, in all cases, is the *starting point* of affection, but in the case before us it seems, manifestly, the *immediate sense* of *special connection—and special dependence*, which must

be in the mother towards her child at the very moment of birth.—This is obviously what at once makes her own child dearer to her than any other, and, as obviously, could you remove this, it would at once be no more to her than any other child; also, keep this from being exercised in meeting the immediate needs of the child, then—as may be shown from history, and as we may well conclude—all affection is either weakened or destroyed.

We might advance much to illustrate what we so affirm, and to show also, that, from the meeting of need, apart from any other connexion, affection is ever apt to spring up as from that to which it is indigenous.—All life would seem the illustration of this, but we confine our selves to such as the following:—

1st, It is well known that a mother will much more readily part with her child at birth than afterwards—she may do so reluctantly as soon as it is born, and *reluctantly*, because, from the sense of special connexion with her, and dependence upon her, it is more to her than any other; but soon as this has been put into exercise, or soon as she begins to meet its needs, what can induce her to part with it! How, as she presses it to her breast it becomes bound in love to her heart! and this can be done for no long time ere it is so entwined in affection with every feeling of her soul as to make its life dear to her as her own, and that with which she will no more part than with her own. On the other hand, could the history of those be set in light that have most filled our *Foundling Hospitals*, it

would be seen that many a mother constrained to give up her first born, though with great reluctance, yet from having given it up with whatever reluctance, all power of affection became destroyed, and after this she has parted even cheerfully with all the rest.—The natural and immediate sense of special connexion and special dependence not being put into proper exercise or being so immediately and rudely crushed, all affection which would naturally arise, dies at the root.

2d, It is also well known that a nurse becomes bound in true affection to those whose needs she meets.—In meeting the needs of a child a maternal regard is soon stirred and matured, and that, independently of any other connexion or relation. In this, as in many other cases, affection is seen springing up from the mere meeting of needs.

3d, It would seem to be from this principle that the youngest of a family is so apt to be the longest an object of special regard.—The youngest does not in general naturally require longer attention than the eldest, but, being the youngest, there is not another whose need is greater; hence, quite naturally, such a one is for a longer time viewed and treated as most helpless or as most in need, and is, in consequence of this, naturally longer an object of special regard or of tender affection.

4th, It is also from this principle that the more helpless or unfortunate of families engage so universally the special affection of all that have a true parent's heart.—As their needs are more numerous, heavier, and of longer

continuance, so affection, moved and maintained in meeting such needs, gives pleasure as there is ability, and lasts as with them. And for parents not to have special regard to their more helpless children will invariably be found to be connected more with "respect of persons" than with true affection, or, more that which looks at what is merely accidental, and neither of character nor of need, and which renders unworthy as a parent—Hence, those of the same family with one more unfortunate should rejoice in a parent's special regard to such, as in this they see that they are blessed with a true parent, or with a parent that will be true to them in all that is truly parental.

5th, According to this principle parental affection should be always stronger than filial affection, and we need not prove that it is so; nor do we require to show that the greater need for its greater strength is made the sure means for producing that greater strength—arising not from any more immediate connexion with the existence of their children, but from the needs of their children having been first upon them, always nearest them and duly met by them—remove this and the affection would not be so great. It is from this principle that many upon whom children have been thrown for support have had begotten in them all the regard of a parent. And it is also from this principle that children, who faithfully support their infirm parents, come to view even their own parents with a kind of parental regard.

6th, It is also from this principle that friends or relations,

who more come within the sphere of our aid, are more regarded by us than those more closely or more nearly connected, and that have not been so helped;—Even those that are in no way connected with us, but who may have been truly helped by us, are generally more regarded than those nearly connected. “He that delicately bringeth up his servant from a child shall have him become his son at the length,” which is stated as what naturally results, and not so much as that which is reprobated. In all cases, as in harmony with this, once extend a helping hand to any in real need, such a degree of affection at once springs up as henceforth makes his happiness more our interest, and more an element of our own.

7th, So powerful is this principle that, once begin in fact to meet the needs of any creature, and that whether of our own or another species, whether rational or irrational, a species of attachment at once gets birth and growth—a true species as of the species of the creature whose needs have been met—Hence many seem to have more regard and affection and real sympathy for their horses and their dogs, or for horses and dogs, than they have for any rational creature, and all because they have had a more lively interest in meeting the needs of such, than they have ever had either in the need or in the weal of any human being.

8th, In order to see the thoroughness of this principle, we shall now look at how affection operates as *needs* are *not required to be met, as they cannot be met, and as they are met.*

What is said about parents either in the highest or in the lowest classes of society being less affectionate to their children than parents in the middle class of society, quite suits our purpose. And while the whole of such is in all ways a strong illustration of our principle; our principle on the other hand sets clearly in light what seems the real cause.

Those amid affluence require not to concern themselves respecting their children's wants. They are not so necessitated to live merely for their children, or to exercise themselves in so lively and thorough a way in relation to their children's needs, and thus the sensibilities of their hearts are not so stirred and kept so constantly in live action in regard to their children, or, so much in continuous purpose and life about them; and in this, the ground on which affection is stirred into life and maintained and promoted in vigour, is seen to be wanting. How is this want increased by some that deem the lady too high to be the mother, or are too noble to be the nurses of their own children!—which, when incapacity is the cause, will have ample compensation in something else; but, when unwillingness is the cause, all must be hardening and without compensation. In the light of all this, we wonder not at the apathy which so frequently subsists between such and their offspring, nor at the indifference with which they can part from each other, nor at the small points of honour of which they make so much as if to show how little they can regard each other.

The *very poor*, on the other hand, cannot meet their children's needs, and continued inability to meet such soul-touching needs soon depresses the heart—tends to render careless about the needs—is very apt to make them feel their children more as burdens than blessings, and who sees not that affection in such a case must frequently be blighted—must languish and die ! The very poor are as driven from that ground which the affluent are not necessitated to occupy, and hence in both, the want of live affection is much the same.

Though there are many rich and poor adorned as with affection, yet, generally, it has been more deadened than quickened, and anything like true benevolence, which so enriches character, can have no place within them ; for benevolence can have no existence in a soul that is destitute of live, and commanding affection to those with whom God has most closely connected us. In this view neither great wealth nor deep poverty would seem favourable to the best part of our nature—would seem equally calculated to make us poor in real character, and hence, in all that can give true and continuous, and growing pleasure ; and that those in the *middle classes* of society are generally the more affectionate, would seem to arise altogether from the fact, that, while able to meet the needs of their children, they have yet to exercise themselves so as to be able—hence as the sensibilities of their hearts are thus in constant action, or are thus healthfully stirred in regard to their children, and as these sensibilities are not crushed from day to day by inability

to meet such soul moving wants, but are rather constantly gratified, and thus constantly strengthened, by the exquisite pleasure, of seeing all that is needed well met; so, in consequence, they have the full advantage of the divine moving ground of true regard or of strong genuine affection.

It is by reason of the above, that, to be neither rich nor poor, seems the state which is best calculated to enrich character and yield greatest pleasure, or permanent, or, self-possessed happiness. It would seem also by reason of the above that those of the largest heart for the good of others, belong so generally to the middle classes. We cannot, indeed, deny such either to the highest or to the lowest classes, yet, wherever they are found, we doubt not but their history would show, as in the case of Howard, that they have been formed from live contact in some way or other with that principle which the state of the middle classes seems best calculated to quicken and mature within us.

Where there is not strong affection for the few with whom we are most immediately connected, universal benevolence cannot exist within us, and the general coldness and lifelessness with which the needs of others are regarded by those of the highest and lowest classes, clearly attest that all sense but what regards self is wanting.—The haughty scorn of those in the highest circles, which, but shows their own sad destitution—their own real want of true soul, and which blights and disfigures most their own forms. And the recklessness, and not unfrequently

the great cruelty of those in the lowest classes in relation to the needs and distresses of others, exhibit equal depravity, and show cause for commiserating the condition of the one as much as that of the other, as equally destitute of what enriches character and makes life happy in all.

In looking at the whole, we feel as with new force that the apostolic declaration, "But if any provide not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel," regards not anything merely external as in propriety, but regards living and all potent influences which are essential to the constituting of sound and vigorous character—which is the true foundation as well as living power of all sound order and true pleasure, whether as in the church or as in the world—is that without which all that is true and good must be as dead.

To provide for one's own, and specially for those of his own house, should be regarded as a great privilege—as all duty is—and none should be disposed or induced to surrender in any sense or in any way, what is such a blessing to him, and what—as taken from him or as surrendered—cannot be such a blessing to any other. Those that neglect this fundamental duty bereave themselves of a great blessing—a neglect so great is what must sadly impoverish their entire character, and their conduct—in all its bearings, and results—is a palpable denial of the faith—is worse than that of infidels, as such a neglect, of what is

so important a duty, cannot be charged against them as a class. The spirited discharge of the duty, here urged, is essential to all excellence of character, and carries in itself its own rich reward. Though many that seem to discharge it with spirit appear not better than others, yet what would they be were they to abandon it! or if they had it not to discharge! In how many instances may it be seen as that which inspires, and which upholds, and invigorates, when all else would crush and deaden! And sad indeed would be the condition of the world did we want that true and strong sympathy for all in need, or for all in distress, which springs from this; or which is matured in parents, or in all, as they meet the needs of another which that other cannot meet. To which let us now turn attention.

SECTION II.

Affection so begotten is a power that disposes to meet all real need.

As placed in this world we are necessarily more allied to some than to others, and the needs of those with whom we are more closely connected are what more immediately press upon us than upon others; and we would but create disorder, spread weakness, and be wanting in duty to all, should we overlook the needs of those nearest us in extending aid to the more remote. Our duty to the whole is best done by special regard to all that specially depend upon us, and that so depend upon no other. When what is nearest is duly met, then a helping hand may be bene-

ficially extended to the more remote, or to those that depend not so specially upon us, but may be in special need.

Looking at how we are thus set in relation to each other—looking at how we must thus have more regard for some than for others, it may be truly asked, *can we have anything but “respect of persons?”*—is not our nature—is not our position—are not our circumstances, all such necessities to it as cannot well be resisted? So at first sight, it may appear, as we see families, relations, friends, and neighbours, all as circles within circles, and each as isolating itself from all the others, or drawing round itself a close or selfish-like circumference. Yet these are the very conditions or circumstances that train us up *not* “to have respect of persons,” that are most of all calculated to root all “respect of persons” out of us, and to train up universal benevolence in us, which must have genuine affection as its moving and upholding element. In this, as in all else, the wisdom and goodness of God are infinite though we should not so see them, or, though what we do see should seem against all such wisdom and goodness.

As it is through such conditions or circumstances, as those just specified, that we are brought more under the *live* operation of what belongs to need, or are brought more into quickening or immediate and constant contact with need as an object than we would otherwise be; so, we are in this way better trained, than we could otherwise be, to feel in regard to the wants of others, or to have a fellow-

feeling with others in regard to their needs. And in regard to what else are we to feel for each other?—if we feel not for each other as in need, what else will make us feel?

And faithfulness in regard to the needs of those whom God has placed nearest us, is what trains to this—is what makes the sensibilities of our souls live and commanding in relation to need as *need*. And while we see, how, in this lively way *need* can so become the object of the sensibilities of the heart, as to be rendered capable of affecting them—much as sound does the ear—and that wherever it is; we, on the other hand, feel constrained to infer, or can well realise, that but for the lively ties which so connect families, relations and friends, we could not well live together even as neighbours—that there could be few indeed with a heart susceptible of those kindlier emotions, which are so much in all that is true happiness to any,—in what makes us feel well in relation to each other, and in what stirs those deeds which uphold society, and are for the good of the world.

As we are thus set more in connection with some than with others, faithfulness in regard to the needs of those so connected with us, or that most depend upon us, trains our hearts to feel in regard to need as *need*. Need as thus made the object of the sensibilities of our hearts moves these sensibilities wherever seen, or by whomsoever felt—thus making us regard need as *need*—another's as much as our own; yea, in some instances, as even more than our own. In this view, the power with

which God would so connect us, is, as well as His command, *that we love our neighbour as ourselves.*

In accordance with the above, it will be found, that the most benevolent to all, are such as are the most affectionate and faithful to those who most depend upon them. That wherever there is strong affection to those who so depend, there also sympathy is ever alive to need by whomsoever it may be felt. Could the lives of all the most benevolent or philanthropic of mankind be set in view—could the chambers, the domestic scenes, the family circles of them that have really lived for the good of others, be set in light, what a beauteous sight would appear!—The whole would be a brilliant illustration in regard to the most compassionate to all—who are most moved by another's wants, and extend most the helping hand to all that are in need—as those who are the most affectionate to their own families, relations, or friends, or the most faithful and zealous in regard to the needs of those who most depend upon them.

We all know that parents who most love their own children, have the least “respect of persons,” either as *among* their own children, or in regard to others, and are the very persons that can most love all, and be most loved by all that in any way depend upon them—are the most affectionate and blessed as partners, the most considerate and kind as masters, the most faithful as servants—are those whom we cannot distrust, but in whom, as by instinct, we at once place our confidence. In all such cases, their souls have been made

too sensitive in relation to need—have been too thoroughly formed by the cares and struggles, by the joys and strong gratifications connected with meeting need, not to be moved by need, whenever, as an object, it is before them ; or not to make them shrink from occasioning need, or disappointment, or distress to any ; for such cannot be of their sports, but must be their own deep grief.

It requires not to be shown that the opposite of this will, all but invariably, be found, where there is a thorough want of all such genuine affection.—True affection for all, universal benevolence, all that is truly benignant in mind or soul, has such a connexion with great affection for the few with whom we are in some way or other more closely connected, that without it as its spring, it seems incapable of having a place within us. Genuine affection even for one, stirs in us a kindly feeling towards all mankind. As God is supremely loved, so we regard in a right way all parts of creation, and love our neighbours as ourselves.—The order according to which God has set us, the love which he requires from us, and that to which the Cross redeems us, all show that the law of our being is the pleasant law of love—that the law which is for us, is the ever fresh, the ever varied, and the all boundless delight, of each having love towards all, and joy, and gratification, and true bliss in all.

Though we have kept very mainly by the parental, in the illustration of this portion of our subject, yet the susceptibilities there seen, are common to all, and any position that brings us into vital contact with

need,—that may even as by accident move our sympathies and engage our energies so as to meet want, has a tendency to beget in us the same spirit and yield the same pure, healthful, soul-expending pleasure. That we have kept mainly by the parental, is manifestly because it is so common, so much at the root of all ; and hence, in the growth of all, and is evidently designed to be so. And lamentable would be the cold, iron, and heartless state of our world in relation to all the finer, nobler, and more elevating emotions and conditions of mind, but for the benignity, the benevolence, the live and commanding sympathies and sensibilities which are stirred by, and matured amid our domestic relations. And as in particular, the parental sympathies are of such importance to all that is excellent in character, and blessed in regard to all human interests ; so, any system of life, which excludes the parental, must be hurtful to all affection, benignity, benevolence, or genuine sympathy. In all such cases, these noble and ennobling states must either be as eradicated from the soul, or must be weak and lifeless—This is amply attested by the general CHARACTER OF THE ROMISH PRIESTS AS INDUCED BY THEIR CELIBACY.

Many of that priesthood are as truly energetic in all that is philanthropic as those of any other class—and there cannot well be such a host without some that have had their souls stirred and formed in some way, by duly and affectionately caring for others—yet, take them as a class, all affection, benevolence, and live sympathy are, as blighted, withered, and gone, and in their stead are the

selfish, the unfeeling, and the cruel. Much might be advanced in proof of this, but we content ourselves with the following extract, from the Oration of Father Gavazzi, on the Inquisition, delivered in Aberdeen, on 13th Sept. 1852.

“ The Romish priesthood have no affection, because they are a bachelor priesthood. It was a fact that could be proved from history, that on the days of the public executions of victims to the Inquisition, priests, friars, and bishops, feasted joyously in the face of such spectacles. These were the Christian brethren ; this was the Christian feeling of the Romish priests ; Caligula, Nero, and Tiberius, were justly execrated as monsters ; but they had been exceeded in cruelty by the Christian, peaceable, charitable priesthood, who had invented no fewer than fourteen different species of torture.”

Mournful as such a picture is, still, it is quite the condition which celibacy, as with them, is calculated to produce, which—as not so much of their will, nor as circumstances may show it their duty, but as of their system, is such an outrage against nature, as is quite fitted to render them “without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful” as a class—three sad conditions of mind which grow together. Their ecclesiastical titles, which stirred such a commotion, are as *wind* compared with this, which is truly as a monster, both in what it makes them, and

also, in the consequent influences which it has in all that is civil and religious, wherever Romish priests have any sway.

Truly, but for the parental, as with us, or, but for the benign or sympathetic,—which arises on all sides, through the parental bringing into such close and vital contact with need, as to make need *itself* so extensively a commanding object of the soul,—a moral chaos would settle upon the world ; progress in character would be gone, and *progress in character gone*, what could then be in all else, but an ungovernable and all disastrous retrogression ?—There could well be no vigorous good—nothing anywhere but the oppressions, the dreads, the barbarities, and the monsters of an *Italian Inquisition*.

In relation to all this we cannot estimate too highly the blessed influences of the parental, as with us ; for, as corrected and purified by the truth, it may well be seen as what enriches character in all the relations of life, and as one of the strongest bulwarks of our liberty—as that, without which, we could neither advance, nor hold what we have. And well may we clearly see in this, as in all which the truth affects, corrects, and purifies, that the gospel attests its own divine character.

While, however, the parental is productive of such blessed consequences, still—as was seen under Section I.—the same mental states are stirred and matured in all, as engaged in meeting those needs of another which that other cannot himself meet.—As this is what seems a duty, all-incumbent upon each in some way or other—is that, and that

alone, by which all can be made feel good as in each other, or from each other—is that alone by which there can be any true progress among men, so, it is to each, the true treasure by which character can be enriched and life made happy.

No live part being acted in such a duty, then all is the sordid, the poor, and the unhappy as regards character and life ; but when engaged in such, whether in relation to those more immediately connected with us, or to the poor, the destitute or the infirm ; an ease, a pleasure, and a delight spring up even amid apparent drudgeries, which—for genuine, heart-felt and unfailing pleasure—far surpass all that those can experience who spend their time and life amid the gaities, the sports, and the luxuries of this world.

It would even appear impossible for a rational being to have anything like real joy in this world, apart from so living, in some way or other. Many, that—from seeking to live but to themselves—may rate their misery by their enormous fortunes, or, measure it as by the extent or value of their estates, could, at will, thus open mines of the purest, most gratifying, and growing delight, would they but extend a helping hand to those known to be in real need. --They would at once feel as in a new atmosphere, as in a more salubrious region, and would have an ease and a pleasure in themselves which no amount of mere wealth, nor honour, nor rank, can yield.

Would any one but analyse that which, at any time, gives him genuine and continuous satisfaction,—which, as

a tree of life withers not, but continues to gratify and strengthen; he would discover that what made him conscious of having truly aided some that stood in need, was most of all, if not altogether, that which constituted his joy and made it so undying. And, is there anything else in this world from which we can have real rational satisfaction? And, in having any such satisfaction or pleasure, not only is the consciousness of having so acted, the quickening and undying spirit of it; but also, it is in itself inseparable from a degree of special affection in us to those whom we may have aided, and inseparable, also, from a happier feeling in us in relation to all others, which still more disposes us for so acting.

According to our principle the varied relationships of life, such as brother, friend, and neighbour, must be estimated, according as they are true, and vigorous in regard to meeting need, and cannot well be estimated as anything unless they dispose to aid when in need.—Without this they must be as nothing. “A brother is born for adversity,” and *a friend is known as one is in need.*—As need is neglected, so all professions of brotherhood or friendship are seen as false.

Since meeting another's needs, which we from circumstances have chiefly a right to meet, is the mover and maturer of all true feeling in us in relation to each other; so, this principle may be well taken as a *touchstone* to prove what is genuine, and what is spurious in all corporate action, or, in all that is social.

I.—As all social relationships—even the most extensive or least comprehensive—must have this as their end, so our Lord shows that meeting need makes the *Neighbour*.

IN regard to those that we more especially know, or near whom we may reside ; our, and their interests generally so co-mingle by reason of such circumstances, that we are the more likely to know each other's needs, and, to be so at hand as to be more able than others, to give such aid as may be required. Nearness in place, however, is more the accidental in reckoning one our neighbour, while the essential, is, aid which may be required, and which we may be able and ready to give—Not to give such aid while near, is what—even by reason of nearness,—deprives altogether of the character of neighbour, or is what at once proves that we are *unneighbourly*. Aid, as needed and given, is what makes the neighbour, and nearness in place is our being within reach when another is in need—which seems precisely what our Lord illustrates by the parable of *the man that fell among the thieves*.

Neither the Priest nor the Levite looked at *his* need, while it was his need at which the good Samaritan looked, and which he so kindly met. The priest and the levite acted the part of “respect of persons”—Had he been known as a person of rank, power, or wealth, they would doubtless have been too much attracted by such accidental qualities to have so abandoned him to neglect. The good Samaritan acted the neighbour's part in looking at his need, and in giving the aid required irrespective of the person as known or un-

known, as rich or poor; and, in consequence of need met, the good Samaritan was *neighbour unto him that fell among the thieves*.

Could each of these have been followed to his own home, doubtless, the good Samaritan would have been found the kindest to all that specially depended upon him—would have been found the most affectionate and faithful in that *school* which brings our souls so in live contact with need as need, as to make *need itself* an object of the heart; and which is not meant to contract our sympathies; but, is, divinely designed and fitted to move, quicken, and mature the sensibilities of the heart, in order to make them stirred by need as their object wherever it is seen, or by whomsoever felt—in order that we may be instigated, amid all circumstances, to aid all whose need our aid may meet.

II.—We may apply our principle to much that regards the Church or
Church-Communion.

1st, The true vigour of a Communion must depend much upon the members giving special countenance to each other in all departments of life.

Such special countenance to each other in all departments of life, in preference to all others, can only be expected when all other things are equal—such as relationship, enterprize, or ability—for, otherwise, it would be vicious—it would discourage skill, industry, and the like in one, while it would injure another by encouraging in-

dolence, faithlessness, or other evils of a like character. When, however, all other things are equal, special countenance to the members of the same communion, is righteous, and must be attended with happy results.

That we are members of the same communion is itself the declaration that we believe in its views, or opinions, and order as more in harmony with the truth than those of any other. And, as we must have special regard for what, we believe, more accords with the truth, so, obviously, our very regard for the truth, will constrain us, to have more respect for those that hold the same views with us, than for those that do not; and, what is this but that which is a true distinction in regard to character?—In all that men can feel as truth, or, as specially true, they and we are more as one than what others and we are; and as well affirm that children of the same parents ought not to have special regard to each other's well-being, and success in all their several vocations or departments of life, as that those should not, who are so bound together by what they feel as more in harmony with the truth, or—which is practically the same—by the truth itself.

Those of the same communion are also generally thrown into certain conditions in relation to all others, by reason of that communion, which not unfrequently make them more or less dependent upon each other for special countenance. And there is here another condition or ground, namely, *special need or special dependence*, and that so in relation

to the rest of the communion, as to be that which is more caused by them than by others—which would not so exist but for that communion of which they are members; and is such in relation to them, that, if not met by them, cannot be expected to be met by any other.—We may as well say that parents ought not to regard, in a special manner, the interests of their own children, as that persons so connected, ought not to regard, in a special way, the interests or the needs of each other.

But more.—We cannot regard the views which we profess to prefer as more in harmony with the truth, and not be solicitous to have them specially maintained. This will be true of us in proportion as we love the truth itself.—All love of the truth can but show itself on earth by our special maintenance of that which, we estimate, more accords with it; and the whole of this is incompatible with giving no more countenance and support to those that are engaged in the same cause with us than to those that are not—for, they are as necessary to its maintenance as we, and, unless themselves maintained in their several departments must be unable efficiently to uphold it.

All that we have been advocating is also among the things which even the world deems lovely.—When there is no special countenance among brethren of the same communion to each other, or care for each other, there cannot well exist any live conviction in others that there is truth among them—that they are drawn together by the truth, and are under its influence, and so made one. But when

special regard is in vigour among brethren of the same communion, then, so far from others being able to feel it as partial or unjust, all rather begin to feel and judge that there must be something of the truth among them,—that they are under its power, and therefore made one.

And how all this must promote the love of the brethren? For not only is all such special countenance the result of our regard to truth, and that which is essential to all such mutual regard as ought to subsist among those so connected, but it also quickens and promotes all mutual respect or love.—It operates much in the same way upon all in relation to each other, as the parental—in prompting to *to provide for those of his own house*—acts upon parents in quickening and invigorating still more their affection to their children. And where there is nothing of this, anything like true mutual regard can scarcely exist—must be more the dead than the living, or must want that vigour and life which, only can, make them truly feel as brethren. But where this is, there the love of the brethren must be vigorous—the relation is a living relation, or all is in the healthful action of life by a vital and invigorating principle.

Search communions as you may, what we so affirm will become abundantly manifest. You will invariably discover that those who do most for the communion to which they belong, are those that most love all in connection with it. And all, any way actively connected with communions, must feel it, as of their experience, that one has

but to begin to act in such a way in order, individually to feel that already a greater special regard has sprung up within him. It is in consequence of all this, or of the *live* elements involved in all such action, that none can be really felt as true and thorough members of a communion, till connected with it in some way or other by this lively principle. And, surely, what so maintains and promotes mutual respect or love among brethren, should have our special consideration, and is what should make us all feel, that unless we are disposed to act in so true and healthful a manner, we cannot well in any sense, either be brotherly or have brethren—we cannot in any sense be living as brethren, and must verily be far from *provoking one another to love and good works*.

2d, That is false liberality, which would range all as equal, or as on a level with those of one's own communion.

There is with many a much boasted liberality, which professing to become all things to all men, is yet so, in such a way as is beneficial to none.

The liberality of which we speak, is that which professes to regard those of one's own communion, no more than those of any other, and would promote the schemes and the interests of the latter, as readily as those of the former. This kind of liberality is a great weakness in any church, is strength to none, is beneficial to none; is what tends to confound all distinctions, which in this world cannot well be confounded without giving error the pre-eminence and

sway. And such liberality, of which many boast, is not so very much the opposite of "respect of persons" or the thoroughly liberal in principle, as those that so act would seem to imagine.

If profession of any class of views is to be taken as meaning anything, it must be taken as our declaration of preferring such a class to all others. And if what we prefer in relation to the truth is not to get our special countenance, then, manifestly, such a thing as living truth can have no existence, nor can there be any idea of what is to guide rational creatures. As, however, the profession of one is his declaration of preference—so the preference is what lays him under special claims to support what he so prefers as he would support the truth itself—as none can in any other way regard and maintain the truth—and should he deem such special support neither his privilege nor his duty, and act accordingly, all that is truth, or all that is principle, must be held as exerting no manner of due influence over him. And his conduct as analysed, will be found to be void of principle, and to contain all such elements and tendencies as peculiarly belong to "respect of persons"—and very obviously if preference in regard to principle, as professed, can give his conduct no special bearing, little, but "respect of persons" can act upon him.

Nor can those that so act plead—as they would seem at times to do—the example of the *illustriously* liberal; for all history will show and experience prove, that in order to be anything for all, one must be special in something.

The most liberal have always had their own special convictions, which, amid all, they chiefly defended, maintained, and sought to advance. And it was, doubtless, because they had special convictions for the maintenance and advancement of which they so laboured, that they could respect others as truly having convictions also, and were drawn out to act freely in the same field with them, as with men of truth, or as with upright and honourable men.

It is much the same in liberality as in benevolence ; for as one cannot well have genuine benevolence or true regard for any, unless he has special affection for his own, so one cannot well have genuine liberality, or true respect for the convictions of any unless he has special respect for such convictions as are his own. And no more can respect for the convictions of others, induce a man to surrender special regard for his own, than benevolence can induce parents to surrender affection for their own children. To give up special affection for one's own, would itself destroy benevolence—would dry up its spring or fountain ; and so, also, to forego the manifestations of special regard for one's own convictions will invariably be found attended with less and less respect for those of any other. And much as those that have no real affection for any one, are ever shifting in relation to the objects of their regard—as all is passion and nothing principle, so those that have no special regard for convictions *as more* their own, will be found to have no such steady respect for the convictions of others, as can be trusted or calculated upon.

Those that act according to such a liberality beget indifference in themselves to all, rather than regard to any—will in all cases be found cold as brethren, and chilling in relation to their communion. All this is quite a natural result from not living according to the principle on hand, which, as a fundamental principle, cannot be violated with impunity. It is a principle of such vital social importance, as all communions would do well to respect.

3d, That is false liberality which would seek another to range us as equal, or as on a level with all of his own communion.

This other kind of liberality is what induces those that have it to classify all among the illiberal, who do not countenance, and in some way support their church and its schemes. And that also, while they themselves—even with high notions of their own liberality, treat with disrespect or scorn that of every other.

The part acted by such is in much analagous to that of many, who, ever complaining about the unkindliness of others never seem to suspect that they are worse to others than others are to them, and that it is by reason of their own coldness and selfish reliance upon others, that they can neither get the same amount of true kindness which others generally enjoy, nor would be satisfied even with such an amount. And in much the same way as such, but declare their own coldness and selfishness in complaining of the unkindliness of others, so those of whom we speak but pro-

claim their own illiberality in characterising others as the illiberal.

Those of such a class would seem to forget that the first thing necessary, is to convince others by some intelligent means of their views as the best, ere countenance can be desired—for manifestly the excellence of any person for all life, and above all for the church, depends much upon, and is much formed by giving his countenance to that which he meanwhile regards as the preferable. Induce him to act otherwise, and you damage his moral nature, and render him useless for every good cause. And those that would even wish such in regard to another, cannot much regard his good, or be themselves inspired by principle.

We would not say that all those who so speak of the illiberality of others, act so lightly and disrespectfully in regard to the convictions of others, because they know little of that labour of mind and soul which is necessary, ere one can well feel that he has convictions, or be able to keep hold of them. The mind of one so exercised is enabled to see and feel how others, even in the strong honesty of their hearts, may seriously differ from him. And as such labour or action of mind, is what begets true regard for one's own convictions, and also induces to respect and honour what may be the convictions of others, so where there is a total want of such mental results, we are somewhat constrained, in tracing effects back to their causes, to believe that there must be rather a want of vital mental action in regard to principle—there being such disregard for another's con-

victions. And in harmony with this, when any class of persons affirm *that their views are unquestionably the right, and that it cannot be denied by others, that they are most in accordance with the truth*, the only feeling that can arise in an intelligent mind, is, that such expressions belong not to a soul in live and heathful action by the true spirit of principle, but, that either there must be much of blind selfishness, and little of true conviction in those that so affirm, or that they *worship they know not what*. Among such we may indeed have many good people, but good as many such may be, the more they are known it will generally be the more discovered, that, they have been connected by accident rather than by principle with their present class; also, that a good deal of pride, or vanity, or stolidity, is in what they call their conscience. And in strict accordance with our principle, their want of *live* action in regard to real convictions is the cause of their incapability of respect for those of others.

III.—The principle we have on hand, shows the *Superiority of Voluntaryism*.

It is a common yet not less true saying that *we care little for what costs us nothing*. It is common because it so accords with universal experience, and our principle shows how it does so. And, from the same principle, that which costs us care, toil, and expense, has generally a value to us, beyond what it has to any other. This so obtains in regard to everything, that let one, even in the erection of a house, or

a church, have his will, his anxieties, his exertions, and his means or money engaged, then there is as built into or lodged in the very walls, a power that draws his special regard to that house or church; and ever afterwards a greater interest, and a kindlier state of mind and soul would seem to possess him in relation to it, than can well possess him in relation to any other. And so is it in regard to every cause in which we can be so engaged—once connected with it in such a lively way, we have ever afterwards a greater interest in it; and it is in this we see the real *Superiority of Voluntaryism* in regard to the support of the gospel, as that which is the most calculated to beget, to maintain, and to promote true interest and life.

Those that so support the gospel have thus their will, their cares, their anxieties, and their sensibilities naturally quickened into life respecting it. And, in the same way as the sensibilities of parents which are moved in meeting the needs of their family but give life and strength to their affection, or keep their minds more in constant contact with, and in growing interest for their children; so, the sensibilities moved in maintaining the gospel, stir and promote greater interest in regard to it, move and strengthen affection in all to each other, make all more lively in relation to each other, and to the cause which they mutually sustain. All this will be experienced as a natural or invariable result, as each deems it his duty and his privilege to maintain the ordinances of the gospel as God prospers him. And we cannot but look at those as suffering a great privation, who

want what so essentially gives the mind a wholesome impulse in regard to interests so important—in regard to each other, to the truth and to all whose interest it is, by being freed from all cares and efforts in the way of maintaining the gospel. That the *Voluntary* support of the gospel is calculated to stir and promote the life of which we have been speaking, is, what has been seen, and borne witness to even by those who hate all that savours of Voluntaryism. The fact has thus been attested, though we cannot conceive that the real cause was seen, or possibly the fact would never have been so attested. In proof of what we affirm, we shall extract a paragraph from a sermon of the Rev. Charles Hope of Wandell and Lamington, (Scottish Pulpit, Vol. V. page 462.)

“ In urging you, my brethren, to avoid all strife, contention and evil speaking among yourselves, you may as members of the Establishment, be reminded, that a good lesson in this respect may be learned even from your enemies—the sectarians around you! How bitter soever *they* may be against the *Church* and all *Church going people*, yet they surpass Churchmen in this, namely, in charity and forbearance towards those of their own particular communion! But rarely, if ever, to their credit be it spoken, will you hear a seceder from the Establishment, or a dissenter of any description whatever, give way in public to an ill-natured remark or severe comment either upon the conduct or the qualifications of his minister, and almost equally

rare is it, for him to assail with severity the character of *any* whom he once knows to belong to his own limited sect or particular denomination."

This extract shows its author as observant of the fact, while the principle we have on hand, shows that fact to be a natural result of the condemned system, and cannot well but be in connexion with the voluntary support of the gospel. The account is rather flattering to appearance, yet, flattering as it may seem, it will be found not to exceed the truth wherever there is any conscientiousness in the maintaining of the gospel; and what is, where there is no such conscientiousness, is that which under no circumstances will be held as affecting the soundness of our principle.

The mind naturally grows in interest and liveliness respecting that which is the object of its cares and anxieties, and for the maintenance of which we willingly bear our part. And it as naturally becomes more and more listless in regard to that about the maintenance of which it has to exercise no care, nor put forth any exertion. And hence in accordance with what is so natural, there is nothing that history more clearly shows, than that so to endow religion, as to remove it from that action of the heart, induced by cares, anxieties, and willing exertions for its maintenance, is what tends to make less and less solicitous respecting it. Not more will parents be rendered somewhat indifferent about their children, by being freed from the quickening solitudes and heart-moving exertions in regard to their up-bringing

and education, than Christians will be rendered indifferent about religion, by being freed from all the quickening cares and life-giving interests, exertions and movements which are connected with the voluntary support of the gospel.

Looking at the whole as essentially connected with all that is vital, we are constrained to say.—Endow *Poper*y or error as you may—endow it till you have suppressed and dissipated every possible care regarding its maintenance—remove it as thoroughly, and as far as possible from this vital action of the heart ; so, that the heart may be made as dead as possible in relation to it, but let the truth be free, let it have all connexion with the vital movements of the soul which it possibly can ; for, it is worthy of all that can be moved by that spontaneity of exertion which in all cases, is what most stirs the mind, and makes the mind as one with that which so moves—To such the truth's greatest conquests in all ages must be ascribed ; and it is only by such as thus secures the vital and vigorous action of the heart, that, as living truth it can well succeed, or, really in the world “ have free course and be glorified.”

The changes which have been attempted of late in the Establishments of religion in our country, have all been less or more attempts to make the life and self-moving power of the voluntary system compatible with State-Endowments, but as well may they maintain the circulation of the blood, by staying the action of the heart which propels it, as thus secure that vitality in regard to religion which is so intimately connected with the heart, and which

is moved and maintained and constantly invigorated by those very cares, and anxieties and spontaneous exertions which they would still stay. And though much may be said about the *Unity of belief which must necessarily subsist between the members of bodies so drawn together as those of Voluntary Churches*, as what conduces to their vitality, yet, we believe, that this itself would rather induce apathy, were you to remove the great quickening power of Voluntaryism by putting an endowment in its stead; which history shows—which our Statesmen seem to know, and which our principle exhibits as that which must so arrest the action of the heart, so still the heart's emotions or sensibilities as to beget and mature the most thorough indifference.

Much might be advanced as precisely agreeing with this.—as showing that the invariable tendency of all such Endowments is to deaden in regard to religion. This is the testimony of all that is connected with the Christian Church, and so invariably has this been the result, and so long has now been the trial, that it truly seems time we were benefited by the lesson. But instead of ranging much at large amid what is so ample, we rather hasten to look at what is titled, “The final verdict of Dr Chalmers on Voluntaryism”—as found in his Memoir, Vol. IV. p. 489.

“We had better not say too much on the pretensions or powers of Voluntaryism, till we have made some progress in reclaiming the wastes of ignorance, and irreligion, and

profligacy, which so overspread our land, or, till we see whether the congregational selfishness which so predominates everywhere can be prevailed upon to make large sacrifices for the Christian good of our general population. Should their degeneracy increase to the demolition, at length of the present frame-work of society, and this in spite of all that the most zealous Voluntaryism can do to withstand it, it will form a most striking experimental demonstration of the vast importance of Christian governments for the Christian good of the world."

Rather than feeling the above as an Oracle, it more makes us feel that this truly noble man was, like all such, teachable by experience—had become somewhat shaken, in his former strong convictions, respecting the need of an Establishment, ere any extensive Christian good could be effected. This, "the striking experimental demonstration," in favour of Voluntaryism in the case of the Free Church, was fitted to do. A "final verdict," so mild, would not have been uttered, but for that in which he had acted so great and efficient a part.

"The wastes of ignorance and irreligion and profligacy" of which he speaks, are "wastes" not to be reclaimed by a Church, however extensive, that has within it the spirit of apathy. Nothing is so calculated to increase such "wastes" as apathy in the Church. Of this we have had an abundance of "experimental demonstration." And that such "wastes" abound not to a greater extent—that

vital religion has any vigorous predominance or prevalence in our land, is, under God, more to be ascribed to the vital instrumentality of dissenting Churches than to an Establishment; and better have a living Church here and there, than our land well encompassed with such Churches as would be like the arms of apathy and slumber embracing it.

“The Congregational selfishness” of which he speaks is the very thing which is necessary, and is what must be, to a great extent, wherever there is vigour—is what must exist ere we can have anything else. This is that seed without which there could be no fruit. It has already yielded well, all things considered, and is calculated to yield much more abundantly; and is certainly not to be destroyed because, meanwhile, its increase is not all that could be desired. Nor can it, with propriety, be styled “selfishness,” as well so characterize the special affection which parents have towards their own children.

Congregations, like all else, must be able to maintain themselves ere they can help others, and must exercise special regard in relation to their own vigorous maintenance if ever they would be really beneficial to others. This may, at times, be carried too far, or to the culpable neglect of others, still something of it is needful not only to make them able, but also to make them *willing* to aid others. As matters are—in the fact of an existing Establishment—such “Congregational selfishness” must be, more than it would otherwise be, from the necessary position of antagonism and self-defence which each voluntary congregation

must assume ; and also, from the chilling and enfeebling influences that emanate from an existing Establishment. But our land, once freed from such an Establishment—and this seems hastening on—then, whatever “demolition” may be, we believe that there is in the inherent life, or in the heart-action of voluntaryism, that which, soon as so unfettered, will burst forth and far exceed in range and power all that the most sanguine ever expected from an Establishment ; and which will stir the heart-exciting question, “Who is she that looketh forth as the morning, fair as the moon, clear as the sun, and terrible as an army with banners.”

In such circumstances *Kings and Queens* will be more able to be her *nursing fathers* and *nursing mothers*, not in laws respecting, but in princely maintenance of, and in the power of Christian example as belonging to the Church. And then in a pure sense—such as voluntaryism alone can maintain—when nothing will be recognised between Christ and his Church—when his Church will lean upon him both for guidance and maintenance, and, when each of these will but make strong in the other—then, truly, in the purest or clearest sense, shall Christ be held as *set King by God upon his holy hill of Zion*—then shall “the mountain of the Lord’s house” be in a fitter condition to be “established in the tops of the mountains,” or, for having supreme influence. This seems that which is not destined to be, so long as Church and State are connected as with us ; for, in all such cases, it would seem essential that the

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State be "established in the tops of the mountains," or have supreme sway.

If ever we are to have a *Second Reformation*, we look for it to the severance of the Church from the State, which shall deliver her from that thralldom which, meanwhile, destroys her independence and power—we look for it to that freedom which will best yield to her an independent and powerful authority in regard to every possible interest, or, to her freedom from all such prostrating trammels or debasing and weakening influences as seem essentially involved in her connection with the State.

There is, at times, much said about ministerial security as essential to ministerial efficiency, and the apparent want of this among dissenting Churches is occasionally assumed as an argument against voluntaryism. But we all know that mutual dependence upon each other is a law of God, and none can well infer that the impulses which spring from it are unhealthy; but all may rather infer that, upon the whole, it is not best for a person so related to others, as a minister, to be quite independent of them—We know the fidelity which mutual dependence stirs in all other departments, and can well realise that such independence in relation to each other, as ministers of the Establishment have in regard to their people, would not be healthful in any other department—would destroy much of that energy of character, of that spirit of enterprise, and of that live action of heart in one for the interests of another

to which we are indebted for so much good, and which are moved on all sides by mutual dependence. And it must be said that the very momentousness of the interests of the truth rather requires that nothing in any way be set aside which would tend to stir, maintain, and promote ministerial energy.

It has also been said that dependence upon the people for maintenance has a tendency to make the minister obsequious. This, however, must rather be an inference from the above than from the facts of the case; for the facts show that it is rather the opposite. And we cannot see how a system, which is so calculated to move lively interest in each other, can be in want of a living power, all competent to throw off all that is so pernicious, and that, even more than in what is the opposite. It is a fact that obsequiousness in a minister can pass with impunity much more in an Establishment than among dissenters. In an Establishment a minister may act as it pleases him, in obsequiousness to the more wealthy or influential, but, such in a minister among dissenters, would at once undermine his influence, and speedily have its due and healthful punishment in the want of general support. And, upon the whole, no ministers have acted a more independent part in all things than those who depend upon the people for their maintenance. And from all that experience furnishes, as well as from the mutual interest in each other's well-being which—as shown by our principle—such mainten-

ance is naturally calculated to bestir and perpetuate, we are constrained to conclude that no system seems so admirably fitted as Voluntaryism, for conducting both to sound preaching and also to sound hearing.

Another remark, and we leave this subject. It seems essential to the very existence of a State-Church, that the law of the State, and not the law of Christ, be regarded as supreme, which, exclusive of every other consideration, proves its unsoundness. So far as the law of Christ and that of the State agree, this may not be so very apparent, and the abettors of an Establishment may, for the time, vaunt aloud of its excellence, but an ignominious silence must seize them as soon as the one law is found to disagree with the other—for, whatever be the law of Christ, that of the State must be obeyed. Such an alternative is not an exception which can affect no general rule; but is altogether that which demonstrates what must, in all cases, be regarded as supreme. Is it not the consciousness of this which excites such alarm and indignation whenever there is danger of the law of the State being compared with that of Christ? It is needless to affirm that the spirit of such an institution must ever tend to leaven all connected with it—especially when there exists no necessity to keep so connected. Nor is it necessary to prove that where the law of the State is supreme, all must be Civil in its character. Thus, Church privileges or ordinances, such as Communion and Baptism, are but civil rights, to which

we can lay claim more by Civil than by Christian qualification.

Whatever be our views respecting the above as demonstrative in regard to the superiority of Voluntaryism, still, the principle by which we have endeavoured to illustrate that superiority is the same. To us it seems demonstrative of the superiority of Voluntaryism in regard to the support of the gospel; yet, to those to whom it seems otherwise, the principle (that meeting another's real needs is what gives soundness to all, and is the sure way to get personal comfort and happiness) cannot thereby seem injuriously affected. This principle is intimately connected with all that is orderly and progressive in the world, and with all true personal happiness—is in so far as it is honoured, that alone which destroys ill-will to all in producing thorough good-will to any. And it is in proportion as we have ill-will even but to one, that we are incapable of having real good-will to any, and are thereby incapacitated to possess anything like genuine happiness. It is in the same way that *thorough good-will to any*, even but to one, stirs a kindly state of mind to all, and tends to make us happy towards all existence. In this principle, as in all else, we see that what is truly the right, is that, and only that, which is thoroughly the best in regard to every possible interest; and nothing can be more the short-sighted, or the blind than to deem that anything wrong in itself can in any sense be for good. The wrong is hurtful to all others,

empoverishes our own character, and destroys our own happiness, whereas, the right is beneficial to all; and is that which most blesses ourselves, by enriching our own character, and augmenting, in every way, our own true and lasting comfort. Before leaving this department of our subject, we may look, in its light, at the disinterested character of all genuine affection.

IV.—The thorough unselfishness of affection.

Moralists would seem to have erred in nothing more than in running up all special regard or affection to selfishness, whereas, according to the principle which we have been illustrating, nothing can well be more the thorough, or the entirely unselfish, than true regard or genuine affection. That which we understand as selfishness is what depends upon, is what looks to others, as well for what we need not, as for what we do need—is what would live upon others, and cares not whether another may have greater need or a better claim—is what so looks to self as either not to see another's needs, or to deaden and blind in relation to another's claims. It is well for the world that such is not the sole impulse of actions, or else there could never have been any of those noble deeds which have been the blessings of the world, and have cheered and refreshed and invigorated the hearts of all, as the rain and the sunshine do the earth. All that belongs to affection stands in thorough and clear contrast to all such, and is truly repulsive of it.—The strongest affection, such as that of pa-

rents, springs from being altogether depended upon; and in no relation can we have an idea of affection as existing, unless as that which in all cases seeks to *give* rather than to *receive*, or which seeks to please another irrespective of self, or which is most pleased, as it can best please and most benefit another. What does not so actuate is that which, in no sense, can be understood as affection.

This is the character of all action which springs from affection—even from that of children as well as from that of parents; for, though it is more the children's part to receive than to give, still, so far as affection operates, it is known and manifested in children, by a readiness to surrender their own will to the will of the parent—as expert and zealous in that, and best gratified with that, which will most please the parent—Without such there can be no affection, and every violation of this blights it—while so acting, affection is in life, and has vigorous growth. Even in relation to the most High there can be no love unless a similar part be acted by us towards Him as our God and Father; but in so acting, our affections and desires *go out after him*. “Whosoever keepeth his word, in him verily is the love of God perfected.” “If any man will do his will, he will know of the doctrine whether it be of God.” And it is in such a blessed mental result, as well as in other blessed results, that, *in keeping of the Lord's statutes* “there is a great reward.”

This character of all action that springs from affection is essential also to all that can be called the benevolent, the

philanthropic, or the patriotic; and one or all of these are but applauded as being what is professed, in proportion as they are believed to induce one rather to sacrifice his own good for the good of others, than as impulses in any way merely for his own benefit.

It may also be said that the uniform and universal judgment of mankind is in harmony with such a view; hence, history is full of admiration and eulogium in regard to all disinterested action. And however vile or profligate a person may have been, still, if but one disinterested deed—one action by which he sought not his own good, or by which he rather sacrificed his own good for that of others—can be set in light, it at once, assuages wrath, calms rage, and stifles all aspersion—it at once, shakes the judgment of the world, and constrains all to infer that one, capable of such actions as peculiarly belong to the good could not have been so bad as had been concluded, or as is generally represented—that withal his good tendencies must have been strong.

And, in harmony with all this, we are unable to understand how any one can estimate that he has affection, benevolence or anything of real regard in relation to others, unless in so far as he seeks the good of others, and that irrespective of his own. And, in no possible sense can we have an idea of an action as benevolent, or as Christian, which is impelled by the love of self and not by the love of others, or which is not so impelled by the love of others as to be done for their good.

This is the doctrine of Scripture, and this is the spirit of what the Apostle declares in saying—"Though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing"—In which he speaks not of *different kinds of faith* but of the *greatest*—that of *removing mountains*—and greatest as inclusive of all faith. In accordance with this, he speaks of the greatest deeds which love could urge ; or deeds which no urgency or power of love could make one exceed—*bestowing all his goods to feed the poor, and giving his body to be burned*—and which as the greatest possible, are inclusive of all such deeds as can possibly be stirred by love.

What the Apostle affirms is that though he could exercise the greatest possible power of faith, or do all that can possibly be done by the power of faith ; and though he could, or should perform all such deeds as love can possibly urge, *even to the giving up of his all and his life*, still, had he not love—did love not inspire all such, or did a commanding regard to the good of others not stimulate him in all such, he would be *nothing* in regard to the whole—nothing of the whole would be of benefit to him. He does not even affirm, that such deeds as so done by him, would do no good to others ; but, as he himself meant no good to others, so whatever good they might thus achieve, he could have no credit for it, no connexion with it, nor could it have any beneficial influence upon his character.

The whole having sprung from no such moral quality in him as designed good to others, so, whatever might be the amount of benefit thereby accruing to others, he could have no share in such as *good* done by him—in regard to the whole he would be *nothing*, or in no sense would there be benefit to him—"I am nothing." "It profiteth me nothing."

The greatest possible deeds done without a regard to the good of others may be of benefit to others, but for any good we meant, all might have been the opposite. This is not our way of doing good—is the way of no living creature, not to speak of rational creatures—and whatever good may be so effected *we are nothing, it profiteth us nothing*—all might have been evil to others for anything we cared; and as this is the way of doing evil, so the whole, even as regards others, must be as evil done by us.

Nor can we so act and not be damaged. For in so acting some such unheavenly or irrational conditions of mind as pride, ambition, or obstinacy must actuate us; and we cannot be so stimulated without having great moral injury inflicted upon our souls or characters. In acting under the sway of such states we give them greater strength, and become, still more, the victims of their depraving power—Hence, though in such a way we could convert a world, still, since thereby we ourselves would become more unfit for heaven, what share could we have in any good so done, what would it profit us, if thereby we had but become more opposed in heart and character to God! The

good done in us is the greatest good done to us, while, the evil done in us, is the greatest evil done to us; and the whole in so depraving us would be damage to us, as if we had destroyed and not benefited a world.

Without purposing good to others irrespective of self, no one can have any solid satisfaction as having done good. It is the intention which leads us in the way of good, and unless *it* be good, nothing can be viewed or estimated as good in relation to us. But for good intention no good could exist on earth; and it is in this that all good actions have their power and their charm. What inspired prophets and apostles, and made them superior to every drag or impediment of self-interest but the good, or the pressing needs of others!—Had they looked to themselves more than to others, their way would have become shut up on all sides as by insuperable barricades, or they would have been driven from their way by appalling terrors; but looking in the pure light of the great needs, and the great good of others, was what dispersed these from view, as the morning sun the shadows of the night—this was what made their path itself “as that of the shining light which shineth more and more unto the perfect day.”

The whole Christian system, in all its bearings and objects is, throughout, that which regards another's good, and to surrender to its spirit is to surrender all that is selfish, and to become filled and governed with desires for the good of others. But for this, apostles and missions would

have been impossible. It was this which made the apostles felt as men of God—this is as the Spirit of God, and as persons or systems are felt to have this as their end, so they are felt to have in them the Spirit of the living God, that which is truly from heaven. And, it can only be as this is fundamental in all that has the Christian name, that Christian truth can well prevail and bring the world under its blissful sway.

This must be understood, and felt pre-eminently as the one great end of the gospel-ministry, ere the labours of any gospel-minister can be attended with success. His power must be that of love, or all must be weakness. His all is God's glory and man's salvation, and these two cannot be separated, but must always exist together. To one so engaged nothing can yield comfort, unless his one aim be the greatest good of others. Where this is, all will tend to yield comfort, and will grow in power ; but nothing of this, then, no learning, no celebrity, no revenues, nor pomp can make his work prosper or give any pleasure to himself but what is pregnant with disorder. Nor can any shift for the social good of men give that quietude to conscience for which it may be sought—the kingdom of heaven embraces all—all such are comprehended in its own immeasurable magnitude and unparalleled interests—which must be held as infinitely paramount to all other interests, and if so, good of the best kind for every interest is accomplished.

Should any one, as a gospel-minister, not have the eter-

nal good of others as his one grand aim, then truly *none* may more shun with shame—as cowardly, and as false, and most unmanly—the society of the intelligent and honest. And, truly, in such a case there is none who more treat that stern reality, *life*, as a hollow farce, and every principle as a mockery, which is essential to all good and to all consummate bliss. But when *his* great object is the one great and supremely noble, and momentous object of the gospel, then, as none can have a nobler cause and a nobler end, so none can well have more pleasure in his work. His pleasure must be in proportion as all is entire devotion of self to the good of others, or as he has yielded himself a *living sacrifice unto God*, and while none can well have greater cares, more fears, greater perplexing and humiliating anxieties and deep prostrations, yet none can well have purer and loftier enjoyments, or a nobler cause to give freedom and power to his entire character.

It is not merely in what is more sacred, but it is also in all, in which we can possibly be engaged, that the need and the weal of others constitute our duty, and form that from which our purest and greatest pleasures come. These are in all, and most in that which is greatest. To follow these is to follow that way in which all religion would lead us, and which, in all aspects, is the true way of rectitude and that in which man's bliss lies. It is the way of God, or that according to which the Most High acts in relation to men—the way in which He would have us walk and in

which our bliss lies. It is that blessed way which is God's own. Hence let us now look at it in this aspect.

SECTION III.

To meet need is God's way, and must be ours, if we would walk humbly with God, or act our proper part and reap our allotted enjoyment.

WHAT we have been illustrating shows itself as a fundamental, or leading principle as seen in the Divine procedure towards man.

I. To meet need is God's way.

All that is declared of God in regard to his righteous and gracious dealings with man, is the declaration of inflexible righteousness and of infinite mercy—righteousness in regard to *character*, and mercy in regard to *need*. “The Lord is just and merciful.” “All the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth.” “Justice and judgment are the habitation of thy throne, mercy and truth shall go before thy face.” And it is by reason of all this that, while God is inflexibly righteous, and hence “no respecter of persons”—“Who, without respect of persons, judgeth according to every man's work,”—He yet hath in relation to men, as the objects of his mercy, a special regard to some as in contrast to others—to those that are more excellent in character, and to those more in need, or to those more in want.

1st, *He is just in regard to character.*—As just in regard to character, or to greater excellence of charac-

ter, God had respect unto Abel and to his sacrifice, to Enoch, to Noah, and to Abraham and his faith. In the same way he has a special regard to his church, or to those that love the Lord Jesus. It may be said that it is to their faith he has regard, but can anything on earth more thoroughly distinguish between one person and another in the righteous view of God, than belief in what he hath declared as in contradistinction to disbelief in all that he hath made known? and is there anything in the world which so contains all that enriches character, and that enriches it so, both for time and eternity! All else is what rather depraves; this alone is what purifies, adorns, and exalts; and, hence, "without faith it is impossible to please God." And it is but as we walk in the light of faith, or in that light in which God is, that we please him, that we have his special love, that "he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness;" and, unless our faith be thus a living faith, it can be of no account or estimate.

2d, He is merciful in regard to those more in need or want—As God in his righteousness has, according to his mercy, special regard to those among men that are more excellent in character; so in his mercy, according to his righteousness, he has special regard to those in special need. Hence, "The Lord heareth the poor." "He shall judge the poor of the people." "The poor committeth himself unto Thee, Thou art the helper of the fatherless."

The poor, the weak, and the lowly ; the widow, the fatherless, or all that can do less for themselves than others, and that have fewer to help them than others, are all the peculiar objects of God's care.—Hence his special curse is upon all that wrong or oppress the poor, the weak, the destitute. “ Woe unto them that decree unrighteous decrees and that write grievousness which they have prescribed. To turn aside the needy from judgment, and to take away the right from the poor of my people, that widows may be their prey, and that they may rob the fatherless.” “ Behold the hire of the labourers, who have reaped down your fields, which is of you kept back by fraud, crieth, and the cries of them which have reaped are entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.” Thus every oppressive or fraudulent act, is itself as a *cry* which has entered the ears of the Lord of Hosts, or is what truly and specially stirs the wrath of the Omnipotent.

As the frown of the Lord is upon those who wrong and oppress the poor and the destitute, so his rich smile is upon those who wrong and oppress them not, but who help and defend them. And hence, “ Blessed is he that considereth the poor, the Lord will deliver him in time of trouble.” “ He that hath pity upon the poor lendeth unto the Lord, and that which he hath given will he pay him again.” Truly in this “ It is more blessed to give than to receive.” And what could more show that *to meet need is God's way*.—His way whether we regard character, or condition, or circumstances ! And his special regard in

relation to character, or to greater excellence in character, may well be gratefully felt, as meeting one of the greatest needs in the world—that without which all would be disaster. And how are both made as *one* in his view! for unless we specially regard that need which God specially regards, as in condition or circumstances, there can be nothing of such excellence seen in us as gains his smile.

It is, however, the CROSS which is pre-eminently the illustration of this principle. This principle, like every principle which is fundamental in regard to character, has its great, or divinely gracious manifestation in the Cross of our Lord and Saviour; and as we come under the saving power of the Cross, so we come under the regenerating influences of this principle. In the Cross, what is seen but our need as sinners? What but that need which we had incurred, and which *is there* graciously met! What was it but our great need, which neither we nor any other creature could meet, that called forth the special compassion of the Most High! *There was no eye to pity nor hand to help, therefore his eye pitied and his arm brought salvation.*

As God hates sin as all opposed to his own character, as the ruin of ours, and as what sinks in endless degradation, so he commiserated us as sunk in sin—as all lost in character and helpless in ruin. It was our need, our greatest need, and that for our entire existence, or for both time and eternity, which excited and drew forth his compassion, and

thus "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life."

Our need is in the eternal purposes of God, our need was as the Saviour's way from heaven to earth, our need led him to the cross,—*He, the just One, died for the unjust, that he might bring us back to God. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins.*—Herein is love, or what manifests love, true or divine in kind. It is not such love as abounds in the world, but is true love, compared with which all other love is false, or depraving, as belonging to man. *Herein is love.* It is not the love merely of friends; but, it is the love of enemies, and that which—in greatest personal sacrifice—meets their greatest want, and labours for their greatest good. This is true love—that of God and heaven; and no one can say that he has love, or that anything but depraved passion sways him, unless his love be in kind what is "herein" shown us. This is love divine or true in character, and is that which becomes established in us as we live unto Him who so loved us.

Thus the principle which we have been illustrating is conspicuous in all that is of God. It runs as a vital and primary element, through the order according to which God has set us, and cannot be violated with impunity. It manifests itself throughout the divine procedure towards man; and is that which beams with Divine lustre in the Cross of our Lord and Saviour.

The principles which are worthy of our imitation, and which are essential to all right and bliss, are those, which so appear in God, or in all that is divine. The principles which so appear must have sway over us ere any divine beauty can adorn us, or ere any divine bliss can be enjoyed by us; and the principle which we have had under consideration is essential to all such—is what must have sway over us if we are swayed by aught that is divine.

II.—God's way must be ours if we would walk humbly with God, or act our proper part and reap our allotted enjoyment.

It is only as we live in this way that we can be just as God is just, merciful as God is merciful, or perfect as our Father in Heaven is perfect; and unless we have something of his moral character we can have nothing of his bliss. It is only in this way of God that we can become rich in character—rich in ourselves as having “the true riches” treasured up in our *own being*; and which, thus truly possessed, make us “rich towards God;” and are what the world can neither give nor take away—are what make us happy in time, and survive time in bliss eternal.

So much is this the one way for us upon earth in relation to each other that our first duty, upon returning to God, is in seeking this way in order to live in it. Nor can there be a return to God—a near approach to him, or anything but distance from, and opposition to him, unless we so seek this way of the Most High in order to live in it. “Break off thy sins by righteousness, and thine

iniquities by showing mercy to the poor." "Learn to do well, seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow"—In all of which, or in all that is in repentance or in return to God, we have *justice* and *mercy* set before us as what must henceforth characterise our conduct, or a commanding regard to all that is right in judgment and in character; and to all that are more in need, such as "the oppressed," "the fatherless," "the widow," and "the poor."

As nothing less in righteousness could be required from us—upon our return to God—than that we henceforth refrain from destroying our own character, or from depraving our own souls, and that we henceforth refrain from stirring disorder and misery where peace and joy might reign; so, nothing greater in grace to us and in mercy to all could be urged upon us.

That God would have us walk in his own way is not because our so living or walking would enrich what is peculiarly his; but it is because our own way is ruin to all who are in it, whereas, his is life and bliss in itself. "He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good, and what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God." In which the good that is so shown us and so urged upon us is God's own way—"to do justly and to love mercy"—and is, as set before us, that which we must follow in relation to all, if we would walk humbly with God, or enjoy anything of that divine good which, while the supreme good, is, at the same

time, the only real good that is for rational beings. How truly has the world never got anything but disaster and woe from refraining "to do justly and to love mercy;" and none has ever so refrained without increasing his own depravity and wretchedness.

In living as is here enjoined, we live in that which is good—in that without which all is evil. So to live is to live in God's blessed way—in that way which is essential to bliss, from which bliss essentially springs, and which so acts upon us as to capacitate us for enjoying all that can be reckoned good. It is that way of life in which there can be no death, and while in it nothing can well harm us, but all has some benefit which it imparts to us. Hence God's great love to us is shown in giving "His only-begotten Son," in order to open this way anew unto us, or in order to redeem or reclaim us to his own way—to that which is so eternally and infinitely good and blessed.

As divine grace has this great end for us, so, as the Cross has saving power over us, we are thus brought back to God—made dead to sin and alive to righteousness—are so affected or so changed in heart as to have delight in his law. This effected, then, we seek to "walk humbly with God," to "walk even as Jesus also walked"—to act in relation to all as God, in righteousness and mercy, acts towards all. This testifies that the mercy of God hath saving power over us—is that by which we become *perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect*, which consists in being "*just as he is just*, and in being *merciful as he is merciful* ; and

“pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this—to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world.” Thus, throughout Scripture, these two—mercy and righteousness, or “to do justly and to love mercy,” or supreme regard to the just and to those more in need—are connected, and in the connexion there is a divine light which shows how truly that is God’s word which we possess.

As these two are so connected, so they are as one in regard to right action. To overlook the one must be of the mind and of the course which will overlook the other. Justice and mercy—right and need, are so met together—righteousness and peace have so kissed each other that both must have equal and commanding ascendancy over us, or we can have regard for neither.

Thus God’s blessed and gracious way of righteousness and mercy—the way in which he acts towards all men is that in which we are to act in relation to all. It is that good which the Lord hath shown us—in which all our good is, and in which, also, is all the true and possible good that can be effected for others. And so truly is the whole but one way that *not* “to do justly,” or prefer in all cases that which is the greater right, can but comport with *not* “to love mercy,” or to prefer in all cases that which is greater need. In regard alike to mind and principle, both are of the same spirit and law, indeed, the spirit of the one is also that of the other.

As in all cases, we must prefer that which has greater right to that which has less, ere we can walk with God, or be just as he is just; so, in all cases, we must prefer that which has greater need to that which has less, ere we can walk with God, or be merciful as he is merciful; and to violate in regard to the one is as violating in regard to the other.

Our giving must not be to those who have no need, for they require not our aid; and while it can do them no good, it is calculated to damage both them and us. It has a great tendency to make us disregard need, and it may deprave those to whom it is given by inducing them to do less for themselves, or to depend upon others instead of capacitating themselves to help others. Our giving must not be to those who can return our gifts; for as they are not needed, so they are as thrown away, and our giving tends to make us more selfish in looking for a return—none are benefited, that is lost which might have done good to others, and we ourselves are injured. Our giving must be to such as are really in need—to those who are in greater need in preference to those in less need; and also, in proportion as they may have special claims upon us.

Our acting in this way will regulate itself. Our seeking the real object will yield to *right* itself the sway—*right* has all power to give us ample light and strength, would we but give all our power to right. "The integrity of the upright shall guide them."

SECTION IV.

The relation or specific power of actions.

As many points of interest came up in the course of the preceding illustration, which are closely connected with our subject, and which could not be discussed as they occurred or were suggested ; so we shall now look at two or three of them.

I.—The duties of any one relation must both *devolve* upon one, and must also be *discharged* by him, ere he can well have the feelings or mental states proper to it.

Meeting the need of another which that other cannot meet begets and matures genuine affection, and that of the strongest and most enduring character. In this we see what constitutes the parent, the sister, the brother, the friend, and the neighbour.

The parental is not merely in that which, by nature, most closely connects parents with their children, but is chiefly in that strong and enduring affection which has been stirred and matured through such a close connexion, or by the needs of their children having been first upon them, always nearest them, and zealously met by them.

Since affection is so intimately and vitally connected with the discharge of such duties as regard the needs of others, so any indifference or dereliction on the part of parents in relation to their peculiar duties must be fatal to parental

affection. As the dereliction must beget want in affection, so the one must increase the other. And as nearness in place, but shows that one is unneighbourly, when needed aid which he could give is withheld ; so where there is indifference on the part of a parent as regards his peculiar duties, that he is a parent, but the more manifests that he wants the parental—the very closeness of the connexion or nearness of relationship, but the more indicates that he has nothing of a parent's spirit. It is so in all other cases—nearness of relationship makes us feel the unmotherly or unfatherly in some, and the unbrotherly or unfriendly in others, but remove the relationship, and you remove the feeling, or that which is felt.

Looking in this light at our ties of flesh and blood, these ties are seen rather to dissociate us in spirit, unless at work in the discharge of the appropriate duties of our several relations. There are possibly none who are more “hateful and hating one another,” than those nearly connected, who regard not the duties of their relations to each other. When, however, these ties of nature are at work in the discharge of appropriate duty, they are blessedly subservient to so important an end, and are greatly instrumental in connecting soul with soul in affection and love.

The ties of nature point to the duties involved in our several relations so constituted—their end is the duties, and they can effect nothing in genuine affection unless through the discharge of the functions to which they point. The power of stirring affection is not in them, but in that

performance of duty for which they are naturally fitted to engage us. So much is the whole power of stirring affection in the discharge of appropriate duty, that should the duties of any relation devolve properly upon us, and be faithfully discharged, a due affection is at once begotten and matured within us; and that independently of all ties of nature. Hence many upon whom children are thrown for maintenance, acquire in supporting them, all the affection of parents; and that apart from all special connexion; while others intrusted with children—nearly related to them but for whom ample provision has been otherwise made—fail in the parental. This is not because the persons are different, but arises from the workings of the principle on hand—the same persons in different circumstances, would become as different persons.

The performance of the duties of a relation is more powerful in stirring the states of mind proper to it than anything that is of the ties of nature. The ties of nature which so closely connect us with each other, tend to engage us in the discharge of special duties in regard to each other; still it is not such ties, but the duties as discharged which affect the mind, and so reach the soul as to stir special affection—or such affection as is proper to the relation to which the duties belong. In this, as in all else, we see how truly all good is as lodged in the discharge of duty, or so connected with it that it becomes ours as we are in the discharge of our appropriate duties.

Since it is duties as discharged which beget and mature

in one the states of mind proper to a relation ; so we have the motherly, the fatherly, the brotherly, and the like thus begotten and matured.—These are begotten and matured on all sides, not from any original or natural congeniality drawing together, but from a congeniality begotten and matured by kind offices—by the discharge of special duties to which circumstances the most accidental may have led or have devolved upon us.—All action begets and confirms in us its own spirit, or moves and moulds our minds according to its own special character. And thus in all cases the discharge of duty is more powerful than nature—has, indeed, power over our nature ; not to discharge duty, destroys what we should naturally have—to discharge any special duty begets in us what we cannot well naturally have.

It is in consequence of this that nothing is more common than the most affectionate parents to become comparatively indifferent about those of their children who are not reared by themselves but by some near relative. Thus also, parents destroy all live affection in regard to their children by any continual abandonment of their maintenance, and so become unfit for the discharge of any parental duty—even the most affectionate when deprived of this privilege become more callous in relation to those whose well-being may have formerly been as their own—they lose the real parental or the mental states proper to the parental relation in giving up, or in having taken from them the quickening duties of the parent. As we must have what moves, maintains, and promotes the parental spirit, or what con-

stitutes a parent ere there can be the true *parental states of mind*, or capacity to act the parent, so we may well ask,
CAN A KING BE THE FATHER OF A NATION?

It is needless to say that the King is as much the child of the nation, in being sprung from it, as any other. This extends even to his existence as King.—The nation is not of him, but he is of it, and could be a nation without him as King, while he could not be a King without the nation. Then, in support or maintenance, the nation depends not upon him, but he upon the nation, and has to look to it for the meeting of his every need. Now, nothing of all such is calculated to beget in a king the spirit of the parent in regard to the nation—the power of the whole is more what is calculated to beget and promote the spirit of the child than that which can in any way stir the spirit of the parent.

Such a power, however, might be neutralized, and the states of mind peculiar to the parental relation both stirred and matured in him had he, as King, any active part to perform, such as in the defence of the nation; but, since, in regard to all such he is more the defended, than the protecting and defending, so even in this, as in all other views—such as the above—his position is more that of a child than that of the parent in relation to the nation. In all views the real parental functions are thoroughly wanting, and in consequence there cannot well be anything of the father in him. And to assign him a relation, the elements of which are not in him, is but to yield him a power for which he can

have no capacity, and which the vast majority would exercise, as it generally has been exercised—more to oppress and enslave than to elevate and make free.

It seems evident that no good can spring from assigning him the full power in any way of a relation for which he must want the proper mental states. To wield the parental well, in such circumstances, Kings would require to be superior to men in being perfect, or in having no need of the influences which arise from the discharge of duty. A good king may not sadly abuse such a power, still he cannot have its appropriate sense, and hence cannot well know how to exercise it; and its very possession is calculated to make a good man a bad king.

In harmony with this view of a King's position, as *now* more that of a child, in relation to the nation, than that of a parent, experience is attesting that to assign him a power, which is more analogous to that of a child in relation to the nation, is the best for himself and for all others—is the only way by which a king can be safe in a free nation; and by which a free nation can get on with a king. The power is that of expressing a wish or a complaint, which is not to control but which the nation may respect—as parents that of their children—which, however, must be hushed if the nation as parent determine otherwise.

The mental states also of the nation towards a good sovereign are more the parental than his can well be towards the nation—the nation, as proud of its child in such cases,

becomes active and united in strong affection, and is moved at heart, as a parent, by all that in any way affects him and that belongs to his maintenance.

As matters are, we cannot but feel that it would be attended with no small disaster to us as a nation to disturb the present stability of the throne as with us, still, we believe that it is one of the things which progress will supersede and wear away—that as nations become so fit for self-rule, or so strong in the representative part of Government as to engross all its functions, the more hereditary—as not needed, and as rather an impediment—will, in course, be gradually abolished.

So far do matters seem to have advanced in this direction with us as a nation, that it appears very questionable—characteristically loyal as we are, and more especially when blessed with a good sovereign—whether we would, as a nation, bear even another Elizabeth. And we feel constrained to infer that Kings will become rare upon earth, as “the kingdoms of this world become *the kingdoms* of our Lord and of his Christ,” or *as His Kingdom shall break in pieces and consume all other kingdoms.*

II.—The duties of those in one relation must be discharged ere they can well expect the proper feelings, or states of mind, to be stirred and matured in those who stand in co-relation.

In whatever way related to others—whether as parents or as children, as masters, or as servants, or in whatever

way connected with others—we cannot expect others to have towards us those feelings proper to their relation to us, unless we act duly towards them, or discharge faithfully those duties involved in our relation to them. Duty, a discharged, is the best and only legitimate power for stirring in them the mental states proper to their relation to us—is our right use of that instrument, divinely given us, whereby to act properly on the minds of others; and all else is what disorders or destroys. Hence faithless parents cannot expect to have affectionate children; faithless children cannot expect to have affectionate parents; and so faithless masters cannot expect to have faithful servants; nor can indifferent servants expect to have kind and faithful masters.

In all such cases there is a want of that on the one side which is most calculated to stir and mature the desirable on the other. In whatever relation we may be situated, the most effectual way to make all kind and faithful to us, is to be kind and faithful to all according to the relation in which we stand to them—this is the most legitimate means we can use, as well as the most potent, for stirring affection; and it is the most powerful weapon we can wield for securing fidelity. And very generally it will, truly, be found that those who complain most about the unfaithfulness of others in regard to them, have themselves to blame in having destroyed—by their own conduct—the very capacity of fidelity in those of whom they complain. Thus those who love not are not loved—the unfriendly have

few friends—unfaithful masters generally get bad servants, and reckless servants cannot get good masters—thus, profligate children have generally cruel parents, and the un-neighbourly have seldom good neighbours. And so commonly is it so that whenever we hear a complaint of one against another, we immediately suspect that the complainer is himself the real cause.

We shall confine ourselves to one very important relation — THE PARENTAL—which, as trifled with, seriously affects every other interest and relation.

If the parental duties are either superseded or not discharged ; or if the parental element be not a very extensive and lively part in the education of the young, the affection which is peculiar to children, and which has so much power in forming them for all that is good and blessed, cannot well be stirred and matured ; and nothing would seem so designed and fitted for this as the entire parental with its strong self-guiding affection, or its love which exhausts not in meeting needs ; but is rather quickened as depended upon—tires not by its unceasing cares and labours, but rather thus grows as by its food. -

In all cases, love to those who in any way depend upon us, and which shows itself by live interest in their well-being, is the most potent power in making them what we would have them. It is what most affects and penetrates the heart. As so acting, it becomes as *seed* in the heart and yields fruit after its kind—making the selfish and

cruel, loving, kind, and disinterested ; the faithless, faithful and zealous.

It is in this way that God deals with sinners, and this is that without which the Cross would have no might in changing sinners. It is the infinite love there manifested which makes the gospel the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth." And but for this, no belief as in threatenings could destroy the enmity of the sinner's heart or move it in any way but to render it more inveterate. Such is the divine and gracious method for destroying hostility in the sinner in relation to Himself, and for changing from the love of sin to the love of holiness ; and verily his way is the true way in regard to all. In all cases nothing is comparable to the power of love in changing and in reforming those upon whom we would act. And as nothing is comparable to it in changing even the most obdurate and stubborn, so truly it is that which is above all price, all value, all comparison, in forming character, and as nothing can exceed the parental in this, so nothing can compensate for any want in it as bearing upon the character of the young, or as stirring within them all those kindlier feelings and strong sensibilities which are so important in character.

In regard to the filial or all that affection which is peculiar to children, and which forms them for life, nothing would seem so much the soil and atmosphere of such as the entire parental, and anything defective or noxious here is what stunts its growth or proves sadly fatal.

The confidence in regard to needs, and the rest in regard to all distractions, which children have in parents—the constant consciousness of their good or evil being in the smiles or in the frowns of parents—the peculiar interests and emotions which crowd every moment, would truly all appear as the implanting of implicit reliance, or as the stirrers of the affections of the heart, and for which no relation is so adapted as the parental. The affections of the heart are thus stirred, and fixed upon parents as dearer to children than all others—as their home and their all, is what brings into vigorous play those sympathies which are essential to all excellence in character—which seems to suffer wherever there is any interruption or want as regards what is peculiarly the parental. Of this many may have a partial experience in the case of such children as are now and again at home, and now and again with some near relative, or who have two or three homes. Children so circumstanced have seldom the same affection for their parents that others have—are seldom as of the family or so kindly, and can no more be expected to be so than a plant can be expected to grow like the rest of its kind which is ever now and again transplanted.

Nothing can well compensate for the want of any parental element, and no mistake can be so grievous as removing children from under parental care, sympathy, and authority, where by possibility it could be avoided—God's plan cannot be mended—and whatever be the excellence of an education—secular or religious—which you otherwise

give, still that is a way which God has meant for the heart, and it cannot but deteriorate character. Hence such grievous failures so generally attend all attempts where the parental is in any way removed, as may well show that it cannot be tampered with, without peril to all interests, both temporal and eternal, or without very serious damage to all that is of character.

THAT HOSPITALS FOR THE EDUCATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE YOUNG are not attended with the success which might otherwise be expected, seems attributable to their defect as regards this first principle. The care with which they are managed, and the thoroughness in the several departments of a good education might induce us to expect happy results; but want or defect in what is so fundamental is like building without regard to the foundation, and is what must tend to give a perverse turn to all else.

That parents who are able to *provide for those of their own house*, should be induced on any ground, to surrender the duty or privilege of maintaining and educating their own children, or to free themselves by placing their children in such hospitals, is what must be lamented. It gives a too public manifestation of undue estimate as regards the sacredness of the parental relation, and is what must be hurtful both to themselves and their children.

In such a case, children are removed at that critical age when affection to parents, to sisters, and to brothers must

either get root, or be for ever blasted. The very fact of parents being glad to rid themselves of their education and maintenance—making them also feel that they owe neither to their parents—must itself be deadening in its influence. And as well expect the blossoms of the orchard amid the chilling frosts of winter, as expect the kindlier; and the most precious emotions and impulses of affection to grow in that cold region, which removes from all the genial influences of the kind solicitude, affectionate care, and the love-strengthened and love-swayed authority of parents; and which also, is a void as to all the domestic joys, sorrows, sentiments, and interests, which—as sacred to every home—are unknown to all else, and which so make all hearts as one. *Yea*, in such a case you blight the blossom in spring. And we are not amazed that so many thus educated come to care for none—have *their hand against every man, and every man's hand against them*—become, in fact, the pests of society.

Looking at the whole, we rather wonder that it is not so to a much greater extent. And feel that those not so destroyed must owe it not to the system, but to some cause more powerful for good than the system is for evil.

Even granting that these Institutions were exclusively for orphans, or for all the really destitute young, while the evil would be less—while it would be better than to have them shut out by those who are not so destitute, or than that they should be altogether uncared for, still there seems

a mighty evil in the system. The destitute so put together, would appear more as forlornness itself multiplied, and as rather calculated to act oppressively on each than adapted to meet the real need of any.

Children dealt with so much in the mass must feel themselves as herds, and each must feel as *one* for whose real good no one specially cares, which is a sad want—a want which has no mean influence in forming the character of the young—which is a gap as regards all that mellowing tenderness and heart-affecting suavity which belong as to the very breath and glance of one whose soul is felt as caring for us, and as having an affectionate interest in our well-being; and which is so vitally important as regards the young.

From an education which thoroughly wants all this, little good can be expected. The education may be excellent in all other departments; yet, wanting that part which so knits their hearts in affection to some one as to make *his* will their choice, his smiles and frowns as the potent spells which sway from evil to good, and which is so essential in moving those kindlier sympathies that have such power in moulding character—in want of what is so important *it* must still be characterized as vitious. And we may talk of principle in regard to the young as we may, but all must be chilling which is not after the divine pattern, or after the vital principle of knitting them by affection with persons, which as God's way is what seems indispensable to all that is excellent in children, and is that by which all

other principles get most easily into their hearts, and there take firm root.

We speak of cause and effect in all else, but such a system of education looks as if we expected that all excellence in character should causeless come. The matter is also of the most serious character, and pregnant with results most fatal to those so educated and hurtful to all others.—The want of affection or sympathy, the deadness of the heart in regard to the kindlier feelings of our nature is very fatal in relation to all sense of right. Where the more commanding sensibilities of the heart are not educated, there can be little or no sympathy as regards the claims or rights of others. And hence nothing can be more serious in regard to the young, than the want of all that is naturally most calculated so to move their hearts: for soon as they grow up they must be condemned for the want of those sympathies and sensibilities which are essential to all due regard for what is another's, as well as for all that is good—and must be condemned, or society could not hold together, though they might as well be condemned for not being surgeons or lawyers, having never been taught.

Too often society makes the criminal and then condemns and severs him from society because he is criminal. And in regard to all such consequences *parents* might indeed be truly thankful when able to give their children a good domestic education; and truly all have cause to feel—who have been blessed with such—that it is not of themselves that they are not as the most wretched—have cause to ask “What then! are we better than they? No! in no wise.”

“But by the grace of God I am what I am”—And unless we are feeling so in regard to all for which we have cause to be thankful, our sympathies cannot be sound as regards either the distresses or rights of others; nor, can we well be feeling so in regard to the saving power of our Lord and Saviour.

It may be difficult to determine how the want of which we complain could be met in the Hospitals of which we speak—We know not whether the managers of these Institutions could have respectively a certain few after whose special interest each looked, and for whose advancement and good conduct he would manifest a special regard. This could not be done with spirit, without stirring those mental states which would give both pleasure in it, and also power for it—for God's way has but to be begun to make pleasure and power spring up. Nor do we know whether such would meet the want, or be compatible with the character of such Institutions.

As matters, however, are, there seems a void which cannot exist without great danger—which must act rather depravingly upon character, in deadening rather than quickening all that is most excellent in man, or all that most tends to make man well with man. An education with such a void must be ever apt to result in anything but good—must in many cases rather sharpen for crime, and thus tend to render our public charities, public calamities. Nothing can well compensate for the want of an element which is

so important in moving and in maturing those more powerful emotions or kindlier susceptibilities which are so much in all that is true and excellent as regards character ; and which, unless educated, can have little power in any to induce either what is holy, just, or good.

That orphans are so generally left to the care of our public charities is what gives no good idea in relation to the soundness of our social condition—is what seems to prove that vast multitudes are acting that part to others which they would abhor as acted either to themselves or theirs. Is there anything to prevent those capable of meeting more than the needs of their own families, taking to their homes, their hearths, their tables, and their domestic altars such as are more nearly connected with them either by the bonds of relationship, friendship, or locality ; or such as those whose need they could better meet. There could not well be any loss. God would bless, and all would rather be gain. The part acted would soon beget a parent's regard, and yield more than a parent's delight. Their own minds, not less active but in better tone, would give a felicitous impulse to Providence as in relation to them—their own families would rather become more endeared to them—would more rise to bless them ; and to be enriched by the fact as engrained in their characters, and to be blessed by its happy results in the world. This done more extensively would thin the ranks of the destitute, and would yield more ample provision, a happier state of public feel-

ing, and better management in regard to the few that remained. The good which we leave undone is not strength but weakness to all, and is what renders all evils so unmanageable—is what baffles all that is otherwise undertaken.

Were those really able to help the destitute in this way, doing it, we have no doubt but the system would be found so blessed that many, who deem themselves unable, would soon feel themselves well able, and would have all the decision which belongs to what is known or experienced as pleasurable, in taking under their care such as were destitute and that were more especially connected with them. In regard to this there is a palpable and open way for doing substantial good and reaping abundant satisfaction. And it is because we so shrink from the palpable as impracticable *in the circumstances*, that the reign of disorder is perpetuated, that all good becomes doubtful, and that what we choose as good, or as preferable, so becomes unsatisfactory, and shows, in the issue, that we have chosen evil for good.

The part generally acted in relation to the destitute young—as bearing not only upon them, but also upon us and ours—is “as if a man did flee from a lion and a bear met him, or went into his house and leaned his hand upon the wall, and a serpent bit him.” Our shunning in this a great good as an evil, is what entails great evil. The part so acted is what does not enrich the character of any, nor better his circumstances, nor make his family better, nor give him more pleasure in his family—is that which per-

petuates indifference in the world towards the destitute, and one so acting has little cause to complain about the world's hard-heartedness, while he himself thus sows it. It is thus that many leave families to a heartlessness which they have augmented, and which they have sown as for their own. Hence, as they cared not for the needs of others, however destitute and nearly connected, so others care not for the needs of theirs, whatever be their destitution and close relationship. It was doubtless from quite an opposite cause that the Psalmist could say, "I have been young, and now am old, yet have I not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging bread." All which was doubtless special fruit from special action, or from that lending unto the Lord which he never fails to repay, and that from generation to generation.

It would indeed be worth while to consider whether any that ever, in true spirit, welcomed any such destitute to their homes, their hearths, and their tables could ever have anything but the richest delight in so acting, or could ever view the fact without seeing and feeling itself a bright spot and a blessing in their lives. Do we not count those happy who so act, and feel that they have taken a substantial way to secure a blessing! We are unable to feel that they can become poorer for so acting; and to applaud others is but to condemn ourselves if we are as able and yet act not so. And what comfort must such yield, and that amid all the events of life, even amid distress, though ourselves denied the help we so kindly gave!

Enter the lowliest cells, and hear what comforts the most deserted and wretched sufferer. Though all comfort may have gone as regards this world, yet should any consciousness remain of having been, in any sense, *a help to the fatherless, eyes to the blind, or feet to the lame, that is what upholds him, is what makes his pillow feel softer, and his agony less distracting.* But should there be nothing of this, then there is little hope in regard to anything else, and in want of this, all wealth, and honour, and power must rather but trouble the mind, be a load to the soul, and add pangs to distress. And truly it is much because we live as if we had never to see distress, or as if we were never to die, that we so much shrink from that which would be joy in life and hope in dying.

It is well that so few can have a knowledge from experience of the sensations of real loneliness which thrill orphans and the fatherless, which all but agonize and drive them to despair, as they behold their own want in seeing all cared for but themselves, or as they feel how alone they are in this world in seeing all others with their wise, all-watchful and affectionate protectors, guides and sustainers. How it would enhance the power and bliss of affection in general, and gladden many a heart, could the bereft share, more extensively, in the parental regard of the near relatives or friends of deceased parents! How it would inspire many with enriching gratitude and make them spring up as new creatures, could they but share in what is so ample for

others ; and which, like truth itself, would not be lessened to others in being extended to them ! In being so extended it would rather be purified in character and augmented in strength to others. This is that of truth which it imparts to all that comes under its sway.

It is true that the expansiveness of affection depends upon its intensity or strength to those who are most nearly related to us and who most depend upon us, still, its strength is as fed by its expansion, or as duly extended to others, whereas, when compressed or confined but to our own, it is stifled and weakened to all.

As it is with the tree, which must have firm root ere it can spread forth its branches, yet, must spread forth its branches or die at root, so is it with affection. To seal affection up to all, but to those most nearly related to us—whom we are bound in honour to maintain—is to engrain it with the egotistical—is to debase it with the selfish—is to deprive it of its finer and most pleasurable impulses, and is what lessens it as a blessing to those who are its objects. Our greatest evils frequently rise from our shunning the greatest good, and the good which we have is little enjoyed because we treat it as evil.

It is *only* evil that should be kept from others, and in keeping good from others we, as regards them, treat it as evil. When we so cloister up good from others, that it may be enjoyed more abundantly by us and ours, we treat it so far as evil, and beget those states of mind, which render us unable to enjoy it as good. When, however, we ex-

tend it to others, we treat it in all respects as good, and its bliss is enhanced both to us and to ours. It is the false which contracts what is good and which weakens it to all in so contracting it : but the true is what expands good, and is what augments its strength and bliss to all in so expanding it. The work of sin is to compress and stifle the good ; but the work of truth is to expand it—to give it breath, life and vigour.

In regard to the whole it may be well said, that could men see the bliss which is suppressed—which they keep from maturing in themselves, from rendering their life blessed, and from abounding to theirs—in withholding a kind parental hand from those in need, they would recoil from, so generally, incasing themselves up with their families, as if contact with the more destitute would but contaminate, or, as if no power in the universe could ever render them or theirs destitute. And we doubt not but the time would soon dawn, when, instead of the bereft and indigent being expelled our homes—as beings that would mar our comfort, or blight our domestic bliss—the presence of an orphan at our tables, would be hailed as a comfort and a blessing.

Much more difficult achievements have been effected than what it would be *so* to impress or mould society, as to render it nearly as dishonourable for one to leave the orphan of a sister, a brother, or friend unheeded, as it now is, not to provide for those of his own house—much more difficult

achievements have been affected, than what it would be, to render it even of the respectable for families of means and standing, to have some destitute one cared for, or reared and educated much like one of the family. Till something of this be effected—something by which the parental will have all the prominence and efficiency of a primary element, little hope can be indulged as regards the destitute young.

As the parental, in all its bearings, is of the greatest importance in relation to character, so we may here glance at one aspect of it which is of no slight consideration in regard to character.

It would seem that man, as he is, must be moved to love by the love of another towards him ere he can well love, or come under a commanding sense of duty, or *love whether or not he is loved*. To love merely to the extent that we are loved is defective, and is what debases; still it seems necessary that we be made love because loved, ere we can well love whether or not loved, or ere what is right and good in regard to others can have the ascendancy over us. It is so in relation to God—we *love him because he first loved us*. The manifestation of his great love to us must move love to him—must so affect us as to stir love in us to him, ere we can love God. In being thus induced to love God, we are necessarily made love what he loves; and the action is such as awakens us to the perfect excellence of the truth; hence we love the truth by reason of its own eternal excel-

lence, and *willingly* become its blessed subjects. In man, as he is, the sense of duty would seem primarily stirred by no *abstract* beauty of truth but through personal connexion, or through the personal influences of another; and these influences seem necessary, in man as he is, as the media through which truth can so enter his soul as ultimately to gain ascendancy over him.

In the parental there is that divinely established at our natural birth, which is very analogous to that which is at our spiritual birth. In the parental we have love acting upon us—we are constrained to love because so loved, and the effects of this are soon seen in the confiding and loving souls of children towards their parents. This is what awakens the soul, and disposes it to please and make happy. We see in this that state produced which is susceptible of being moved by higher motives and improved by higher acts—that which must be ere one can love whether or not he is loved, or ere anything noble can exist in character.

As the parental occupies such an important place, so any system of education which excludes it cannot well yield good results. The education may be admirable in other respects, still a defect in what is so divine, in what is so indispensable in the case of others, and in what is so essential in regard to all root of excellence in character must be calculated to seal up the soul against all sense of right—a void so great and of such a character must tend to misdirect all else. Our objections may, to a considerable extent, be also applied to Boarding Schools.

III.—Should the duties of one relation be put upon those in another, all—whether *giving* or *receiving*,—but "gendereth to bondage."

When those in any one relation cannot well act, then their duties may, with advantage, be put upon those in some other relation. Thus children, with profit to themselves and all others, act in the room of parents when these parents are unable or have been removed by death; and so servants may act in the stead of masters when these masters are unable to act for themselves. In such and in all analogous cases, great good may be effected to all.

Should, however, the duties of those in one relation be systematically put upon or assumed by those in another relation, then nothing is of the character of due and beneficial aid, but all is in the hands and under the spirit of usurpation. It matters not whether such duties are imposed upon us or assumed by us, the usurpation is the same towards the person whose duties they are—and nothing but an evil spirit can be begotten in us, nor can anything but disorder result to others from our discharge of such duties. Should parents in this way act more as children and children more as parents, or masters more as servants and servants more as masters, then truly as "a servant when he reigneth," is *one of the things which disquiet the earth*, so as truly, all such assuming or discharging of the duties of those in one relation by those in another is what disquiets all families and disorders all societies.

In such as the above we have a wide and open field, with ample material for the illustration of this department of our subject. There is scarcely a domestic or social grievance but may, in some way, be seen as springing from this, and nothing but the disquieting and calamitous can spring from disorder *itself* so in action. We shall, however, confine our remarks to *Sustentation Funds*, or *Supplements*, as connected with Christian Churches; for the evils incidental to them appear traceable to a misunderstanding, or to an overlook in regard to this.

SUSTENTATION FUNDS OR SUPPLEMENTS.

In regard to denominations of Christians that maintain for themselves all the ordinances of religion, it may be assumed as clearly the law of scripture that the strong should support or aid the weak—that such congregations as are able to do more than maintain their own ordinances, should aid such as are unable to do this with efficiency.

Though this, however—as right or Christian in itself—must be attended with happy results when duly done; yet, that the whole be attended with the best results, it is necessary that it be *duly* done, or that the way of doing it be taken into consideration. It has a law of its own, which must be honoured if we would have its blessed results—which cannot well be secured by our acting as if it had no law of its own. In order to secure the best consequences, it is necessary that its own proper way be respected, as is done in the case of everything for whose success we are

solicitous, or there must be a distinct and respectful recognition of the real parties engaged in *giving* and *receiving*. This must be done in order to bring them as closely together in *giving* and in *receiving* as is practicable, so that duty, as discharged by the one, may be felt by the other and have its due power upon both.

That they be so brought together is necessary in order that what is so done may move as much as possible in its own relation, and beget and mature those mental states, between givers and receivers, which it is calculated to do, —which it cannot do unless so brought in live contact with each other. This is also necessary in order to make what is done move as little as possible in other relations so as not to stir and mature states of mind hurtful to all the interests of such relations, and inimical even to its own existence. This it is powerfully calculated to do, as all else is, when not moving in its own place or relation but in that of some other.

We can no more change moral laws, or those which are peculiarly of the mind, than we can change physical laws. Ours is to obey and be blessed, or to disobey and be punished.

In the same way as everything material throws all connected with it into disorder, when not moving in its own place but in that of some other, so as truly does all that is moral, or that in any way affects the mind. It is but disorder in action when not in its own place or relation, but in that of some other. In all such cases

the beneficial states of mind which it would have stirred—as well as happy social results—by moving in its own relation or place, are left dormant, and, by moving in that of another, it but interrupts and embroils the mental states proper to that other.

In so far as we have been viewing duty according to its relation, or so far as we have been viewing the specific power of actions, we have seen that action, or, the discharge of duty is even more powerful than that of nature. In a very emphatic sense it shapes and determines the whole soul—is powerful for good when right and as powerful for evil when wrong. Hence it must be of very great importance that the power be in exercise in its own place, that it be *order* and not *disorder* in action—that it do no harm but the greatest possible good, or that it be not in exercise where it ought not to be, and where the mental states which it begets are improper, and *even* destructive of those which are proper. In all such cases no good is effected where it ought to be, and nothing but evil where it is.

In order, however, to see how evils must spring up, should the *real parties that give and that receive*, not be brought as closely together as is practicable in giving and in receiving, or in the management of *Sustentation Funds or Supplements*, let us look at the relations which do subsist, and then at how what belongs to such relations is affected by the way in which aid is given.

1. *The relation which subsists between Congregations as Congregations.*

The relation which subsists between congregations as congregations is that of brethren. In regard to this relation the minister of one congregation stands no higher to other congregations than the members of his own; nor have the members of other congregations any higher relation to him than they have to the members of his, or of any other congregation.

A minister of one congregation has no relation as a minister to any but to those who have chosen him as such, or to any but to those of his own congregation. His relation to the denomination may be that of a preacher, still, in no sense is he a minister to any but to those with whom he is so connected. The relations between a minister and his people are but between them as brethren, and do not change or in any way affect their relations to others. He is minister but to his own, and not therefore higher in any relation as regards other congregations. Between him and others as brethren no such distinction has been created as that which subsists between him and his own people as brethren, and in regard to others the members of his own congregation are as closely related as he is.

2. *The relation which subsists between a congregation and their minister as constituted by their MAINTENANCE of him.*

Whatever relation the minister may have to his people

in what is spiritual, that does not destroy or in any way supersede their relation to him as constituted by the part which they have in the temporal, or by the temporal as it is in all denominations that maintain for themselves the ordinances of religion.

In all such cases, the relation of the people to their minister in the temporal, is the *co-ordinate* of his relation to them in the spiritual, and whatever be the great superiority of the spiritual to the temporal, yet, neither the superiority of the one as taken by itself, nor the inferiority of the other can affect this co-ordinateness of relation. It is not what anything in itself *is* which is what constitutes a relation, but it is entirely and exclusively the *object for which* we are engaged in it as regards others which is what constitutes relations, as that of serving, a servant ; as that of governing, a governor ; as that of supporting, a parent ; and so with all that can be specified.

In the church, however, there are no such relations as master, lord, or sovereign ; but a co-ordinateness of relation exists which harmonises with the one relation which is that of brethren.

As the minister, in what is spiritual, is—in the Lord—the servant of the people ; so the people, in what is temporal, are—in the Lord—the servants of the minister. That the minister is servant in the spiritual does not destroy the relation of the people as servants in the temporal ; nor does

the people's relation as servants in the temporal destroy that of the minister as servants in the spiritual—for it is not *that in which* they are respectively engaged which is *what constitutes the relation* but *the object for which* they are so engaged as in regard to each other. Servant in the one case has not master as its co-relative in the other : for though such may be of the world, yet in the church all are brethren. 'The one part, both of minister and people is—according to their respective positions—to meet the need and seek the well-being of each other, and is that which in no sense can admit the one to lord it over the other. "One is your master, *even* Christ, and all ye are brethren." "He that is greatest among you shall be your servant."—It is only when there is thus an end in the church to all those distractions which spring from the relations of the world that the church can truly be felt as a *rest* on earth, or *that peace can be within her walls and prosperity within her palaces*.

The relations of a minister to his congregation and the relations of a congregation to their minister are seen as *co-ordinate*, in whatever view we set the matter.

We have already said that as the minister is the servant of the people in what is spiritual, so the people are his servants in what is temporal—that such relations as sovereign, lord, or master, belong to no party in the church—that in the church each is set in a special way to meet the need and seek the good of the others. In whatever relation we

view the minister as engaged in the spiritual that cannot affect or supersede the relation which belongs to the people as arising from the object for which they are engaged in the temporal. We have no power to make relations, nor does any *article* of itself, whatever be its character, constitute a relation between one and another. But relations arise from the *object* for which we are engaged as regards others. It is so whatever be the character of that in which we are so engaged, and our wisdom is to recognise and honour relations as they thus arise; for they have a living power, and unless we assign that power its proper place it may prove useless for good and productive of much evil.

Should we, accordingly, view the minister's relation as analogous to that of the parental, by reason of the object for which he is engaged, in the spiritual; so, truly, we must also view the people's relation to their minister as partaking in the parental, and that by reason of the object for which they are engaged in the temporal. In the one case as much as in the other the *object*, for which they are respectively engaged, is the parental, or that of support.

No doubt such reasoning would be absurd did an *article* of itself constitute a relation between one and another, or were minister and people, as so related, engaged in the same matter, or, were they connected as minister and people are in a State-Endowed Church; but as it is the object

for which one is engaged in regard to another which constitutes his relation to that other; so it would be absurd to ascribe the parental to the minister, and to deny it to the people.

In a State-Endowed Church the people have no such relation to their minister, as they are not engaged in aught that regards his support; but among denominations of Christians that maintain their own ordinances, the people and minister, though differently engaged, or in different matters, are yet respectively engaged for the *parental object* of support as regards each other. It is this which makes the relation of the people as parental towards the minister as his is towards them.

In all views the parental in the temporal seems the real relation of the people, and should this relation fail to be recognised and respected in the workings of a congregation then disorder must result. The relation arises out of a law which we cannot change, and unless honoured all that we do, as regards it, must be out of its place or proper relation, and dormancy in one way and disaster in another must be the consequence. It is a living relation and must have its own place if it is to be healthful in itself, and healthful also in regard to all the relations or interests connected with it.

In self-sustaining congregations this parental relation of the people may not have its own name, still, in general it is fully respected and allowed its place without compres-

sion or check. It is in such cases that a name is nothing, or when the thing, without it, gets fully its proper place. In congregations, however, which are not self-sustaining, this relation, as well as others, would seem ever apt to be overlooked and violated *as helped* by others, or by the way in which aid is generally given. And consequently in regard to congregations that are aided the name is of importance as designating the real parties that are engaged in the temporal, whether in giving or in receiving aid—that have all the duties which belong to such and cannot be superseded in these duties without injury to the states of mind dependent upon the discharge of appropriate duty—that must be exclusively engaged in the temporal, and that whether, as regards *Sustentation Funds* or *Supplements*, if all relations would be well maintained and “all things done decently and in order, or, if what belongs to one relation would not be so entangled with what belongs to another, as to do nothing in its own place, and nothing in that other but perplex, disorder, and weaken the mental states proper to it.

3, *The relations which we have specified must be respected by the WAY in which aid is given and received if the power of the whole, as a corporate act, is to be efficient for good*

Since the relation between congregations as congregations is that of brethren; since the minister of one congregation has the relation of a minister to none but to his own—is no more to any other congregation than what the mem-

bers of his own are, nor the members of other congregations more to him than to any other member of the church; so, it requires not to be demonstrated, that in giving and in receiving aid, congregations are the real parties. In such giving and receiving it is not one congregation as in relation to the minister of another, nor is it ministers as in relation to ministers that are the real parties; but the real parties are congregations as in relation to congregations—It is to such that all the duties belong, and to such their performance, or discharge must be restricted if good is to result. And unless in the management of all such *giving* and *receiving*, ministers, in all ways, are as much as possible left out, and congregations engaged as thoroughly and exclusively as is practicable, there can be no great health either in giving or in receiving aid. Unless something of this be effected, all such action must rather tend to embroil the mental states proper to the relation of each—must tend to render them discordant, or powerless for good in one way, and powerful for evil in another. Much good must be kept dormant from the *power* of what is done not being at work in its own place, and much evil must be incurred by its being at work in a relation which belongs not to it, but which may belong to what is of much greater importance.

In the case of *aid-giving congregations*, it may be proper that a Board exist in order to act for them. This, however, dislodges, or removes the thing far enough out of its own place—is apt to separate those that give from that *live con-*

tact with the receivers which is naturally calculated to stir and promote affection, and heighten interest in the one towards the other, and thus tend to make the givers abound more in cheerful and in liberal giving.

It may, however, be somewhat impracticable for *aid-giving congregations* to act with efficiency in any other way than through a Board. It may be best in the circumstances that a Board act for them, still—even at best—it must act much as an embargo upon givers and receivers in regard to the vital power of action. It is one of those things which must rather tend to deaden the givers, and which cannot act healthfully upon the receivers. It is calculated on the one side to keep them from having the life which would be stirred if in more immediate contact with each other; and, on the other side, it is apt to necessitate, unpleasant, and at times, questionable impulses in order that giving may more largely abound.

But should—in addition to such a Board—the *aid*, which is given, be sent *over* the people, or *direct* to the minister, instead of *to* the people, or *through* them to the minister, a gap is at once created in regard to relations which is calculated to be attended with unhappy results.

It may be asked what difference there is between sending it direct to the minister, and sending it direct to the congregation. The minister must ultimately receive it, and why not send it to him at once! The whole might do well enough in what is more the civil or the commercial, in regard to which, it does not so much matter what right

states of mind are deadened, or what wrong ones are begotten by relations being overlooked, as "the law is open." It may also seem to work well enough in such as the Establishment, where the people have no such relation to their minister, as they have in denominations that maintain their own ordinances. But in regard to what so mainly depends upon proper states of mind for its very existence, and for its entire efficiency—as it is in all churches maintained by the voluntary support of the people—all that tends in the slightest to overlook any one's relations or to supersede any one in his functions—that tends in the slightest to deaden right states of mind, and stir wrong ones must be deprecated as a great evil. And it is in regard to all this—which bears alike upon the spiritual efficiency and the healthful brotherly condition of the whole—that the difference between sending the aid to the minister, and sending it to the congregation is seen as very great.

The congregation and not the minister is the real party. The entire parental in the temporal belongs but to those to whom he is minister, the functions of which they may be helped to discharge, but which as between them and their minister, can in no part be taken out of their hands, or assumed, in any way or on any pretext, by a third party, without injury both to his and to their mental states in regard to each other. Upon nothing does the health of their mutual states of mind so depend as upon the vigorous discharge of duty as regards each other—remove from either what tends to maintain this, a collapse must speedily result—the de-

pendent mental states must tend to rankle, and this can take place with neither, without issuing in damage to both. The parental in the temporal is wholly that of the congregation, and that however few in members, or weak in ability, as no other can have the relation which they have to their minister; and for the states of mind dependent upon this, its full discharge should be left in their hands—whatever may be the amount of aid which is given—or a minister should know none in his maintenance as a minister, but his own congregation.

All that we have said about the power which meeting need has to beget and mature affection, or all that we have seen in regard to the specific power of action, or the potent influences which the discharge of duty has upon his mind that so acts, and upon those towards whom he so acts, might be advanced in vindication of such a view as the proper; and as what must most tend to the health of the relation between a congregation and their minister.

As well take hold of the pulpit, or treat the parental in the spiritual, in a way analogous to that in which the parental in the temporal is taken from the people in relation to their minister, by aid being sent direct to the minister and not to the congregation. No more could the minister be so left out as regards the parental in the spiritual, without injury to the states of mind dependent upon it, than the people can be so left out as regards the parental in the temporal, without injury to the states of mind which depend upon it. It is entirely and exclusively theirs

in relation to their minister ; and their due states of mind, and hence the healthful harmony of the whole, are as dependent upon the full and vigorous discharge of appropriate duty, as the mental states of the minister. No good can possibly result from over-looking any one's relations, or from depriving him of his rights or proper functions—nothing so extensively unfits for the possession of rights ; and while no good can in any way result ; there is, at the sametime, a weakening and disorganizing influence at work in regard to all else.

The mental states which seem apt to be stirred by sending aid direct to the minister and not to the congregation, are not much dissimilar to those which would naturally be begotten—should one *brother* in helping *another* to maintain his family, send the aid direct to the children as the children would ultimately receive it.

Such a part acted would at once begin to break down that entire mental state which is so essential to the health of the parental and the filial. As parent and children, they could not be long subject to the action of mind naturally attendant upon such without great injury to all due feeling between them—the parent in being partly superseded in the functions of the parental, could not have, in such life, those states of mind which the parental functions, as discharged, quicken and maintain, and that even more than nature itself—superseded in such vitally affecting functions, there is a void in that which is naturally fitted to

stir, and promote strong and genuine affection. And the children habituated, in this way, to look beyond the parent for what should properly come by him or through him, could not well have nursed in them that affection to a parent which is essential to domestic comfort, and also essential to the sense of propriety in the deportment of children, and hence to excellence in their character. The whole action of mind would be disastrous in its natural tendency, both to the comfort and also to the character of the family.

There may indeed be great differences between a family so situated, and a congregation whose parental functions are in part superseded by aid being sent direct to the minister, because he would ultimately receive it, yet the disadvantages would seem to preponderate in regard to a congregation so situated or so treated.

As the connection of such is so purely mental—as there is nothing of the ties of nature or of mutual worldly interests, such as are in a family, to check or modify mental operations—as there are no state-bonds, such as are in an Establishment, to uphold independently of the people—as all strength of connection and efficiency in working so depend upon harmoniousness of sentiment—as all so hangs upon what is purely mental, and has nothing to check or modify what operates upon the mind, or the influence of action as out of its place—which also is purely mental—hence, in such circumstances, it must have greater power than in other cases. In such circumstances there is nothing to prevent, but everything to facilitate great injury.

We are too much in the habit of not taking mental results into account, as generally they are not so immediate, yet as they are among the most sure—as they are either *order* or *disorder* in action—and as they are the most powerful, and permanent when once developed, so, in what is to have any perpetuity, they cannot be disregarded with impunity—without tending to make that ultimately develop itself as the worst, which may meanwhile appear the better, because the more convenient, and apparently *as good as* that which is manifestly the right. Expedients, in all such cases—however near the truth, or however ingenious and suitable for the present—are still but man's creatures, and have in them future failure and disaster.

In treating this subject at greater length, we shall look at the proper mental states which are apt to be kept dormant as regards congregations; and, also, at the improper mental states, which are apt to be stirred in ministers by *aid* as it is generally given, or when *aid* so given is not sent to the real party.

4, *The proper mental states apt to be kept dormant as regards the congregation.*

The permanent efficiency of all such Schemes as Sustentation Funds or Supplements must depend not only upon the fact that they are right in principle, but must also depend upon the method as right in *itself* by which they are wrought, or as *that* fits them in their workings so to affect the mind of the people, as to secure mental states for themselves, and thus gain a self-sustaining power.

Everything that is to be upheld by voluntary support must thus work out a place for itself in the general mind ere it can be efficiently maintained. Should anything that so depends upon voluntary support not effect this, then nothing of rightness in principle, or greatness of advocacy can save it; nor can any enthusiasm with which it was begun and for a time carried on, do more than enhance—in general disappointment and growing dissatisfaction—its speedy decline and ultimate overthrow. Now it is in this power—which, all that is to be so maintained, must of necessity have—to work out for itself a place in the general mind that Sustentation Funds or Supplements, as presently managed, seem defective. As corporate action the whole is out of its own relation or place, and hence is powerless for good as regards its own place.

That they are so defective in the power, of which we speak, is seen in the fact that the discharge of their most important functions is, away from all immediate and vital contact with the very minds upon which their permanent efficiency depends. Much of this is at once seen in the way by which they affect or do *not* affect, aid-receiving congregations by the general method of sending *aid* to the wrong party, or to the minister instead of the congregation. And it is very obvious that if the receivers are not healthfully affected, decrepitude must seize the whole; for the receivers not healthfully affected, they must become more dependent, and consequently paralyze all vigour in those

that give. And it is in vain to expect the receivers to be healthfully affected by that which is given in such a way as overlooks their relation—as removes from them that discharge of appropriate duties or functions which has the greatest influence upon the mind; and which, in consequence, rather tends to render them insensible to the fact that they are the aided.

In aid passing over the people to the minister its course is away from them rather than through them; and to affirm that they must feel it as much the one way as the other is to ascribe to a congregation a greater superiority over the influence of the senses and a greater independence as regards the specific power of action, or of duty as discharged than can well exist, or than can even be desired; or than even minds of the most abstract character have ever attained. And, without doubt, the wisest and the most soundly invigorating for all states of mind and interests—and these hang on each other—is to make each one feel and see, in the most sensible manner, that which is his according to his relation. This is the most effectual manner even with the best, and it is that which, in this world, is indispensable with the many ere they can at all believe that anything so given is really theirs, or for them.

In aid passing over the congregation rather than through it, a blank is created in regard to the real party aided, and no good purpose is otherwise effected. It is to the congregation, yet is sent as if the people had no existence, or no share in it. And not coming in immediate contact with

them can move no such live sense as to make them feel truly and undeniably that it is for them. In consequence of having no duty to discharge as regards its reception, or in consequence of the power of the action not vitally affecting them, the states of mind which would be naturally stirred and matured, (by the aid moving as an object in its own place, or exercising power as an action in its own relation) are rather laid to sleep—the object not vitally felt which is calculated, as so felt, to stir them, they can well no more be than that there can be hearing without sound, or seeing without light.

In the aid being given to the congregation, or sent directly to the people as the real party, they would be made feel more sensibly how they had brethren, and that these brethren regarded their well-being. This would make them more vitally feel as connected with the whole church—would be *union itself* in action and engaging them in its own action—would naturally beget greater interest in all that affected the church; and would, in all its bearings, be of very great importance to the spirit and vigour of an isolated, weak and struggling congregation. But aid as presently given is what rather sacrifices all such. It brings not under the power of brotherly acts—the relation as brethren is more what is set aside than that which is made kindly and better felt. Aid as given to the real parties would materially tend to quicken the sense of such a relation, and to engage them in such duties as would purify and strengthen it; but as mean-

while given, it carries in it a disregard of so important a relation, and this, whether seen or not, is what acts upon the mind; and nothing of such a character can go on with impunity.

The tendency of aid, as meanwhile given, is to make the people rather feel that it is wholly to the minister; hence, quite naturally, the conviction arises, that, if gratitude is to exist anywhere, it must be in him and not in them. The congregation, at all events, cannot have the same amount of quickening gratitude which they would have in feeling more sensibly that they were the aided. And unless gratitude be stirred the tendency of the whole must rather be weakening—must be calculated to make aid-receiving congregations do as little as possible for themselves, or to make them feel freed from responsibility in regard to the maintenance of their minister. And in such circumstances—as those of an aid-receiving congregation—we can see no other power than that of gratitude towards brethren which can well have sufficient *moral* influence, so as to stimulate them rightly, to do something somewhat commensurate with their own ability—so as to stimulate them to be as little burdensome as possible to their brethren—to deserve well what they do get, and to be as serviceable as possible to the church which so regards them as brethren—with which they are so vitally connected and whose interests are their own.

So thoroughly are all such beneficial states of mind sacrificed by the present system of aiding, that though congre-

gations should be so aided for years, still, the general state of mind must be much as if they had never been aided, or rather much worse. Thus all the positive good or moral bearing—which should be seriously taken into consideration by the church in meeting all temporal ends—that such aid, as right in itself, and as moving in its own relations admirably calculated to exercise, is as thrown away. And in moving as it meanwhile does, it cannot acquire any self-sustaining power. It must rather require great and questionable impulses to keep it moving; and also, very great vigilance to keep it from doing great moral injury.

Not only is aid, as not given to the Congregation, calculated to make those that are really aided, feel not so healthfully towards the church with which they are connected, or towards their brethren by whom they are so aided; but it is also calculated to *create a gulf* in what seems essential to sound and lively states of mind on the part of the congregation in relation to their minister.

The functions or duties in which the congregation should be thoroughly engaged in relation to their own minister are in part taken from them, and which as co-ordinate to his in the spiritual, are as necessary for their due feelings towards him, as are his, for his due mental states in relation to them.

It will not do to shape or organize in this according to what is, or has been in a State-Endowed Church; for the

circumstances are altogether different. In a State-Endowed Church there is nothing of the living relation, in the parental, on the part of the people to their minister. This relation—as connected with denominations of christians that maintain their own ordinances—is what *springs from the very fact that they do maintain their own ordinances*, and is, as so springing, that which renders its functions, as discharged by the people, essential to the life and vigour of all interests. This, as an existing relation, must render all things more vigorous and healthful—must tend to unite and make all better and happier in relation to each other, when its duties are properly discharged, than what they can well be where it exists not ; but should the duties not be properly discharged, then instead of being beneficial it must be hurtful—must, as a living power, be calculated to throw matters into a much worse condition, than they can well be where no such relation exists. It is disorder in action. In consequence of which, nothing can safely come between a minister and his people in the discharge of those duties which are wholly the one's in relation to the other—nothing of such can operate without injury to their states of mind in regard to each other.

The entire parental in the temporal on the part of the people in relation to their minister seems even more necessary for their sound states of mind in regard to him than the entire parental is, on the part of parents, for their sound affectionate states towards their children ; and all because the connexion between minister and people is so purely

mental in denominations that maintain their own ordinances—so depends upon unity of sentiment—so hangs, also, for its health upon regard for him who is over them in the Lord, and is in consequence so dependent upon the discharge of their appropriate duties in relation to him; and which, as discharged, have a power in promoting and maturing regard or respect.

Where such a relation does exist, the rights, or duties, or functions cannot be taken from the people with impunity; for all the circumstances are such, that should they be deprived of any of their functions—as regards the parental in the temporal, they cannot feel well. They may not be able to see clearly the special right or function of which they are deprived; yet such a void in the rights or functions of that in the maintenance of which they are necessarily so much, will make them feel that there is such a want as comes from usurpation somewhere—*where* they may be unable clearly to understand, but that it is somewhere, the very part which they have in raising the maintenance, and which constitutes their relation will render them unable not to feel.

The burden of raising the maintenance *unrelieved or uncheered* by the discharge of the duties connected with its proper distribution—which specially to them would be quickening and invigorating—must tend to make them feel its weight, or must tend to make them infer that there is wrong somewhere; and is quite calcu-

lated to render them listless, or dissatisfied in regard to every measure and person.

To disconnect the burden of raising, to any extent, the maintenance from the quickening discharge of the duties belonging to its distribution is indeed pernicious, and could succeed in nothing upon earth which depends in any manner upon the voluntariness of man. It is much as disconnecting body and soul; for in other cases the vital impulses which spring from the discharge of such duties, may be seen as the spirit which relieves the burden of its weight, or makes it both light and pleasurable; and separate, in any case, these two, then the latter comes to be as a dead unbearable load. Let even parents be so situated in regard to their children—let them have, to any extent, the burden of providing a maintenance, yet, nothing to do with its proper distribution, then the spirit which so inspires would soon flag, and the arm which is so indefatigable would soon become weak. And so must it be in all possible cases. Nor can the church—where it ought least of all to be—form an exception. It may for a time be maintained, still, it is calculated to beget a much worse state of mind than what can well exist where there is no such burden, or where no such relation exists as springs from it.

At times the mental states proper to the parental, as regards the temporal, are seen seeking to develop themselves by an exercise even of those functions that are in part taken from the people. It is doubtless, from the

promptings of the parental spirit, that a congregation here and there—unable to give into the funds of their church half the amount of that which their minister gets in return—cannot well refrain from giving out of their own hands to their minister for his maintenance. This is a spirit which can be loved as having good in it—is what seems scarcely capable of existing but in such churches as maintain their own ordinances. While, however, what is so done by it must be deprecated as immoral—as calculated to give an evil impulse, and to pollute and destroy itself, still, its existence in a congregation would seem an essential element of sound vigour. It is right in itself, but very great evil may result from its mismanagement. It is doubtless capable of abuse, yet not therefore less the right in itself, nor the less indispensable as regards a congregation's vigorous and healthful moral or spiritual condition. And the whole, in whatever way we look, but induces the conviction that neither its vigorous existence nor its sound working—which powerfully contribute to each other—can well be maintained and promoted without a full and free possession of the entire parental, or the entire discharge, by the people, of its quickening functions.

Did there exist any formidable difficulty in sending the aid, which is given, direct to the congregation, little might be said about the matter; but in the whole there seems no more difficulty in so sending it, than in sending it direct to the wrong party or to the

minister. These different ways may, indeed, seem much as one, and so from one point of view they do appear; but they soon diverge from each other and tend to very different ends.

In the aid being sent to the congregation there would be a quickening and healthful recognition of the people's relation or rights as brethren, and that in regard to the entire church—there would also be a quickening and healthful recognition of the relation which subsists between them and their minister—they would be all in their minister's maintenance, and he would have no cause to recognise any in that maintenance but his own congregation. The people thus aided would rather be made feel—in a sensible and salutary manner as from their brethren—what they owed to their minister—*their duties would not be taken out of their hands, but their hands would be strengthened for the discharge of their duties*, between which, there is, verily, a very great difference. The aid thus final in regard to them, as from brethren to brethren, there would be a quickening process between givers and receivers, and the people or congregation *aided* would be entire in the parental, or in the healthful and invigorating discharge of appropriate duties as regards their minister. All this seems so much more calculated to be permanently beneficial than what the present system is, that we cannot but see in this *how* the simplest deviation from the right is fitted to weaken all schemes in their power for good, or tends to entail evil, instead of stirring and promoting great and lasting good.

The deviation, in the present case, is that by which the power of the action, or of Sustentation Funds or Supplements, is driven adrift from the proper minds on which it ought to operate—is what renders such funds incapable of working out a place for themselves in the general mind—of thus gaining for themselves a self-sustaining power, or anything like permanent efficiency. Such a desirable end cannot well be attained unless the method is right in which they are wrought. When the method is not right it must be calculated to make them felt as wrong whatever be their rightness in principle. And no method can be right which, in any way, does not recognise and honour real relations. As such operates it must be felt as wrong—must tend to make all connected with it felt as evil—must be fatal to permanent efficiency in all, and cannot be anything in itself but that action which is incipient confusion, or self-de feat

We know that many deem it altogether undesirable to give a weak congregation all power in the temporal, or that a minister should be dependent upon a weak congregation for his entire maintenance. Many seem to deem that, in such a case, he must be the victim of the weaknesses, the whims, or the caprices and passions of the people. In all self-sustaining congregations, however, ministers are so dependent upon their people in one way or other, and take them generally, there can well be nothing of a social character more sound, happy, and permanently effi-

cient in regard to minister and people. And in aided congregations, weaknesses, whims or caprices and passions may much more be dreaded when the aid, as given, rather overlooks their relation to the church as brethren, and deprives them of the purifying and invigorating discharge of appropriate duty in relation to their minister, than what they could be, if aid, as given, would rather tend to keep them more vitally exercised, or connected with the church—more as brethren in having brethren who sensibly cared for them, and whose respect must be maintained—if aid, as given, would preserve entire in them that spirit which is stirred and promoted by the full discharge of their proper functions as in relation to their minister. Aid, as meanwhile given, is calculated to make havoc among all that is so important. And it requires not to be demonstrated that to overlook relations, or to impropriate their duties is to unhinge the mind, is to beget discontent, or to create the soil which is pregnant with the noxious.

That the evils so complained of do, to a certain extent, exist in aided congregations cannot be questioned. As matters generally are in regard to such, one is unable not to feel that there is something which rankles, or which is very unsound about them; but then it may, indeed, be questioned whether the way in which they are aided (*entailing such a deprivation of their rights and duties as regards the temporal*) can repress such evils, or whether it is not their prolific, though hidden, cause.

It is true that, as Supplements have operated, some con-

gregations, by aid so given, have been forced up to the self-sustaining point, still the whole is not therefore good. We believe that this has frequently been impelled, more in order to get quit of an evil than induced by a sense of gratitude. It may well be asked, how it is that there are so many demittings of charges among the supplemented, or among congregations that are now aided. Many causes will doubtless be assigned as many evils always start where there is anything radically wrong, and which, while the real cause is, yet, seldom felt as the mighty evil. And so radically wrong is the system of sending the aid to the minister rather than to the real party—the congregation, that we feel disposed to be no way amazed at any inauspicious event which may result in congregations so aided.

5, The improper mental states apt to be stirred and matured in ministers.

We might look at the mental states which are apt to be engendered and matured in a minister in relation to his own people by not being, as a minister, wholly maintained by them, or by being—in the vitally stimulating matter of a maintenance—induced to look beyond them or made dependent upon others, and responsible to them both for himself and his people.

No one in contrasting a congregation that is all to a minister in the temporal with one that is so only in part, or whose minister depends, in part, upon others, can hesitate in concluding that both are not equally favourable to pure or

due states of mind—that the latter, as compared with the former, is naturally calculated so to operate as to be very detrimental to a minister's mental states in relation to his congregation. And, as no minister should have his mind thus put on the rack, or be led to run the risk of the mental states which such a system is naturally fitted to beget, so in this, as in all else, there is no need for the evil. The remedy is simple—let the right party and not the wrong be recognised or duly acknowledged. Important, however, as such a view is, we dwell not upon it, as our design is to look at other aspects of the subject.

A minister having his maintenance as a minister coming direct, in part, to him from a Board, or from his brethren in the ministry, must be subject to states of mind no-way favourable to his independence of character as a minister.

He is no way related, as a minister, to those from whom he receives the aid—his relation as a minister being to none but to the members of his own congregation ; and the absence of such a relation is altogether calculated to make the aid given felt as a charity, or to make it so affect the mind. Once so aided, he cannot well feel as on a par with those who give, or even as on a par in many cases with his brethren that are efficient in raising what is given. Such a result is as natural from such an action so out of its relation, as for darkness to cover the earth in the absence of the sun. His brethren, through-

out, may feel as free and as equal to him as to any other, still, the very consciousness of so receiving aid from those with whom he has no ministerial connexion, must itself gag him in relation to many an open question—his liberty, externally, may be as full as that of any other ; but the external, is much as nothing to the best minds, if all is not ease within.

It will not suffice to affirm that it is given to him as a minister, for this is rather the evil *itself* than a removal of it ; for he has no relation as a minister to those who give, and in the absence of such a relation the states of mind proper to it cannot well arise. The character of the whole action is more contrary to, than in harmony with such states ; and there is no remedy, but in giving the aid to the right rather than to the wrong party—to those to whom he is related as minister, and in so giving it, all would tend to right.

In such a case there would be a full and sound relation as brethren in vigorous exercise, which would make the whole more healthful both to congregation and to minister. Otherwise, the whole tendency is to suppress good states of mind, because though right in itself it is wrong in its way ; but made right in its way, then as it is right in itself, so it would be naturally fitted to stir sound and vigorous states of mind in all—in congregations towards their several ministers, and towards the church at large, and in ministers in regard to their several congregations, and in relation to all connected with the church.

As aid is meanwhile given, not only is there danger to the party receiving, but there is also danger in regard to those who are *employed* to give. It may be safely affirmed that all corporate action, with which theirs has any *homogeneity*, is calculated to make arrogant and tyrannical.

Such a statement cannot be applied to those who contribute of their means to, or who labour gratuitously to raise that which they are employed to apportion to others—In such cases their gratuitous labour, or what they have contributed to it of their own means makes it as their own; and the action of the heart in giving, is, much as if it was all their own which they gave.

While our statement cannot be so applied, it may, however, be safely applied to all who are officially employed in giving to others that which they have not so raised, nor to which they have in any way contributed of their own, or who are the paid agents of others for so giving. And, within such limits, the statement has its confirmation in whatever way we look, or to whatever class we turn. The whole would seem naturally fitted so to affect all thus employed as to render them arrogant and imperious. Hence *almoners*, *poor-law officials*, and the like, are characteristically overbearing and tyrannical. We find it so in whatever way we look. In a recent number of "The Friend of Israel" we noticed the following, "It is known to all acquainted in Jewry, that the Jews of all this land are almost entirely without employment, and are supported by the contributions of their brethren residing abroad." The contributions

so raised would seem to be placed under the control of such Rabbis as reside at Palestine, and hence it is added, "This eleemosynary fund being 'apportioned and ministered, or *withheld* entirely at the pleasure of the Rabbis, the poor *lay* Jews are altogether subjected to their control; and a more grinding oppression, I verily believe, does not exist in all the earth."

That corporate action of such a nature acts so upon those thus employed is not because they are worse than others, but is altogether by reason of its own peculiar character. In all such action there is no due relation on the part of those who give to those who receive, and this is what is calculated to disturb and injure the best of mankind: The giving is not, as with them, stirred by the condition of the receivers—the condition of the receivers has no appropriate mental state in the givers—in the givers there is a void as regards such, and the act not so moved is but calculated, upon the whole, to deaden all due mental states. To this other circumstances, such as the known dependence of the receiver, contribute. No one is more apt to become dead to the want or misery of others than one so employed to deal with it, or to become arrogant and imperious to those in any way so dependent upon him.

All such corporate action, in whatever sphere, would seem to have the tendency which we have specified. Nor can any excellence of a cause with which it may be connected, overcome or neutralise this tendency. That the

cause is good is what admonishes not to run the risk, or not to run thus into temptation. And it is this which seems incidental to those who stand as givers in connexion with our Sustentation Funds. And that they are men is what assures us of their liability to be so injuriously affected.

In the case of those so employed to give, there is the same want in regard to what they give, as above specified. This alone would tend to be perverse in regard to all else. But more—he, to whom they so give, is not their minister. He has no such spiritual relation to them, and consequently they have no co-ordinate relation to him in the temporal. And where there is such a want in regard to the relation according to which an action is performed, the moral power of that action, having nothing proper upon which to operate, must tend to run waste, or prove destructive rather than beneficial. This also, has, of itself, a natural tendency to infringe upon due states of mind—In so giving they must deal with him in his character as a minister—a character in which they have no mutual relation, and can have no mutual sympathies, and are consequently apt to have begotten in them a feeling which more regards him as their dependent. All this results quite naturally from the fact, that they deal with him as a minister while as such he has no relation to them.

The influence of action upon the mind is what no one can well master, and even the best of persons, in the cir-

cumstances specified, would have great difficulty in preventing such an evil result.

This feeling, in regard to him as their dependent, may not be all at once matured, but it is apt to be at once begotten, and though, as a mental state, it may be long in making even its possessor conscious of its existence; and still longer in becoming so matured as to be clearly seen by all others, yet, while unfelt by the possessor and unseen by those nearest, its sting may, nevertheless, be painfully felt by those that come in immediate or live contact with him as receivers.

The aid given is doubtless well meant, and cannot be otherwise, but as so given and as so received it is quite calculated to make the giver *arrogant*, and the receiver *servile* in regard to each other—all because there is nothing between them of that relation according to which the giving and the receiving proceed.

The aid given could as easily be sent to the right as to the wrong party, but, as meanwhile given, we would shrink from the mental consequences attendant both upon so giving and also upon so receiving; for in whatever way viewed—in relation to whatever party, the whole is seen as what “gendereth to bondage.” The giver, in such a case, is as much to be pitied as the receiver; for arrogance, as much as servility, empoverishes character, and proves destructive to all genuine happiness, social or personal.

The whole is from overlooking the relations of the people—the *relation* as brethren to the church; but chiefly,

from overlooking the *relation* which they have to their minister in the temporal, or from placing its duties upon those who have no such relation but are connected with him in some other way. And hence while these duties are inert for good in their own relation, they at the sametime but disturb the states proper or peculiar to other relations. Their power as regards their own relation is allowed to run waste; and that in such a way, as to become destructive to what is good or proper in other relations. This would seem the main cause of the late disorders in connexion with WESLEYANISM.

It is, indeed, grievous for Christian societies to be in such a distracted condition, still, with them, as with all others, evil from wrong cannot but spring. The late distractions, in connexion with Wesleyanism, have doubtless, been accounted for in different ways by different parties. Some trace their cause to the want of the lay element in their Ecclesiastical Courts; and also, to the want of a fixed pastorate. These may, doubtless, appear co-operating as palpable defects, still, there would seem a greater, and that is *the relation which the management of the temporal has in Wesleyanism*—a relation so false and of such a nature as to make it quite calculated to beget and mature all that has of late been developed.

The management of the temporal as wholly taken from the people, to whom it belongs, could not but produce

grievous results. The whole is very analogous to the children of a family taking the *income* and managing it in despite of the parents. The cases are not very different; for, the relations violated, are not unlike each other. And as in such a case, the due mental states in regard to parents would not only be destroyed, but also all due state of mind in regard to each other; so, ministers in thus acting cannot well have their minds duly maintained either in regard to the people, or in regard to each other. We can see nothing but disorder as capable of springing from such an arrangement.

The management of the temporal as wholly in the hands of ministers was quite calculated to make, those more especially engaged in the management of the temporalities, arrogant to their brethren as their dependents; and, while tyranny would be begotten on the one side, servility would as naturally be begotten on the other. And all, not because the men were worse than others, but because they were not better than men generally are, or had no relation to each other, in the character, according to which the one gave and the other received—the relation in which they so dealt, being what belongs to the people alone.

Should we analyse the whole of the late distractions in connexion with this body of Christians, their character will show the despotic conduct of those, who have chiefly to do with the management of the temporal,

as their original cause. And what have we in Wesleyanism as seen in this relation; but, on the one side, men—doubtless christian in other respects—acting disgracefully as cruel despots in regard to their brethren in the ministry; and on the other side, what numbers have we dependent upon them for their own maintenance, and that of their families; and who dare not *peep* nor *mutter*—that seem so fettered and paralysed as to be incapable of acting an independent part as ministers of the Gospel!

The whole, as thus seen, appears as a true growth from the relation in which the management of the temporal has been placed, or, is such a growth as would seem to indicate that its origin and maturity have come from what is so falsely organised.

So long as there were leading men whose feelings, habits, and ways of thinking had been formed by other systems, no such distractions, as have of late been developed, could so easily result; but so soon as the entire body became thoroughly leavened with this element of Wesleyanism, the result as speedily matured soon developed itself. The despotic on the one hand, and the servile on the other, would doubtless grow imperceptibly for a period. As the one, in such a system, could not well exist without tending to produce and augment the other, and as despotism on the one side would be fed, strengthened or emboldened by any amount of servility on the other, so it could not be long in becoming unbearable *to many* in its exactions or pretensions.

Wesleyanism in this view would truly appear as a seasonable warning to others, and what a great blessing that it has not been more extensively copied ! Had the same element been incorporated into the systems of other Christian denominations, and been working co-temporaneously with it in Wesleyanism, the same sad results might have been simultaneous or nearly so, which would have been truly blasting to all the interests of dissent. And that such a development has taken place when dissent has got such a new impulse, and is so vigorously on the increase, is what may make *it* felt, and cause it to act, much as a timeous revelation.

It may also be more so felt from the fact that anything analogous to what is in Wesleyanism—as we have viewed it—seems to have, under all circumstances, the same seminal properties ; for, wherever the management of the temporalities is to any extent thrown into the hands of ministers, the tendency may be felt and seen to be to the same evil results. And, however much we may speak of other arrangements as calculated to check such results, yet, for anything we know, these very arrangements may facilitate and enhance them, or may be much as the barrier that for the time best stems the flood, but which is no sooner made slightly yield, than it is *itself* most overthrown in ruin, by what, as now a torrent, bears destruction to all in its wide, devastating course. Our only security is in recognising and honouring all the relations of others, or in giving the amplest freedom and greatest encouragement to all

as regards the discharge of those functions which belong to their relation.

It is, indeed, very desirable that ministers of the gospel be relieved, as much as possible, from any special connexion with the management of all that is pecuniary or secular. It does not belong to them. That mismanagement so results when it is in their hands, arises altogether from the fact, that the states of mind proper for it, are not possessed by them, or, that the mental states peculiar to their own relation are not for it. Hence, as managed by them, not only is there a want of the mental states proper for it, but *it*, as quite out of its place, also disturbs seriously those mental states peculiar to their own relation or position as ministers.

The whole management of the pecuniary or secular belongs as thoroughly to the people as the co-ordinate in the spiritual belongs to the minister ; and true order and vigour can in no way arise but from their discharge of all its functions, while nothing but disorder and weakness can well result, or be desired to result, from ministers having any special connexion with its management.

The only part at all consistent with the duties of a minister, is to shew the people the relation in which they stand, and to urge them to the full and faithful discharge of all its functions ; but confusion must inevitably result from his assuming that relation which so thoroughly and

exclusively belongs to the people, or, from attempting in any respect to discharge its functions.

In all cases there is nothing that so effectually makes people hostile to, or sinks them in dormancy respecting even the best measures, as not to recognise their proper place, or, to allow their functions to be assumed by another party : for there is in *wrong* that which moves hostility or sinks in apathy even though what is wrong may not be seen, as there is in *right* what conciliates and stirs energy, even though it may not be clearly seen to be right—these thus move the heart however much hid from sight. And the best way to make the hostile friendly, the apathetic interested and active, and all vigorous and efficient, is to give all their own proper place and functions, or to leave, as in this case, the management of the temporalities of the church in their hands whose right it is ; and who, as engaged in, and thus alive to their duties, would have the best position and the best mental states for their efficient discharge.

This would be the way of order and progress, and the most effectual for blotting out the unseemly in ministers having so much to do and say in regard to the temporal—which is *unseemly* because quite out of its relation. It is thoroughly discordant with a minister's proper duties—is what must tend to weaken for their due performance, and must also tend to impair their efficiency as discharged.

While what is wrong in principle can never in any way be right, yet what is right in principle may be so set in a

wrong way as to make *it* more appear as the wrong. A wrong way for what is right, may make it result in great disaster ; and must, at least, retard its progress and impair its strength in doing good. A right way, for what is right in principle, is what must give it the greatest power and growing might for the achievement of great, extensive, and lasting good.

The assuming of the duties of those in one relation by those in another is an extensive and oppressive evil. On all sides its pernicious results may be seen abounding. To this may be traced almost all misrule, whether ecclesiastical or political. Its beginning is generally very harmless like ; and hence, is either altogether unheeded, or approvingly sanctioned ; but it has only to exist for a short time in order to make its oppressive and imperious character felt. From this have grown most of those grievances, which, ever now and again, distract both Church and State. This is clearly that bane in Romanism which now so enslaves the souls of millions ; and it is, as clearly, the crushing and degrading evil of all despotism.

And what is it for a nation to recover its liberty, but to uncoil this—what but for each to have his rights restored which others had assumed ! It is for each to have that liberty which is his divine right—the liberty of discharging his own duties in relation to God, and his own duties in relation to society as a citizen, as a neighbour, as a brother, as a child, or as a parent. It is

only as we have this that we are free—as we have not this we are yet in bonds—others still assume rights which are ours, which cannot benefit them, and which as so held tend to enfeeble and prostrate us.

Liberty may be viewed as consisting in such a respectful recognition of our different social relations as protects our possession of the rights which so arise, and gives thorough freedom for the discharge of appropriate or consequent duties. Without such there can be no liberty: and each but sinks and enslaves himself, and injures others as he disregards his own relations—as he surrenders his rights to another, or seeks not to discharge his appropriate duties. And no people can be styled a free people, to the extent, that their relations to church or state or to each other are ignored; and that by others assuming their rights, or discharging for them those duties which none can discharge for others, without damaging himself and tending to degrade them.

PART II.

To seek our needs met by others while we could meet our own, or irrespective of the rights and needs of others, is against the Divine method, is what throws all into disorder, and is attended, personally, with great moral degradation.

THE kind of action or course of life divinely allotted man, is not that of mere impulse or gratification, as in the case of other creatures upon earth—mere impulse, which leads and maintains them in their several ways, is what blinds man to his, or drives him from it. The course of life or action divinely assigned man, is that of righteousness and mercy; for these he has got the light of intelligence, so that, as thus seen and admired, they might guide him in all, or that his entire states of mind and motions of body might be formed, directed and altogether suasively governed by them.

It would even appear to have been for these, that man has been endowed with the power of speech, so that thereby they might be declared, joyed in, and advanced by him. And without man's need to speak of righteousness and mercy, even from the cradle to the grave, his want of that about which to speak would soon supersede the use of speech, or destroy it as a power.

The way of righteousness and mercy, as that which is divinely allotted to man, is the way of life for which he was made—is God's own high eternal way, and which was *not made for man but man for it*.

This way as that of absolute good, as that for which man was made and as that in which all his bliss lies, is that blessed way to which the cross would graciously restore him, as having fallen from it. And all else in religion, as for fallen man, is rather the positive—what has been made for man and not man for it. The divine and gracious object of the whole, is, in order that thereby man may be restored or redeemed to all for which he was called into being, or for which he was formed and quickened by the most High. Such is the character not merely of the Sabbath and its enlightening, refreshing and strengthening ordinances ; but this is also the divinely blessed and gracious character even of the cross of our Lord and Saviour, or of the great atonement which has been offered for sin. All these, as well as all connected with them, *were made for man* ; and were made for him in order to restore him to *that* for which he was made.

In all views that we can thus take of the way for which man was made, it is seen as that which is of unparalleled importance to him. The whole ground of divine pardon, which has been established, as well as all the aids and comforts which have been so richly provided, are all made for man in order to open anew his way to him, and to enable

and divinely persuade him to return to the great object of his existence ; and these are but gracious in relation to man, as they are fitted to enable him by divine strength, and to induce him by divine comfort, to return to that way of righteousness and mercy which is everlasting, or which is eternally the same. This is that, and that alone, in which lies all for man that is ennobling, that is blessed, or that has true and enduring excellence. And hence, all the light, and aids, and comforts of religion must be vain ; unless, that thereby men have this way opened up to view, be induced to follow it, and be strengthened and established in it.

All religion which has not this as its great and gracious end must be degrading superstition. And should we not aim at this great end, or thus seek *first the kingdom of God and his righteousness* by that which is the true religion, we but make what is true false unto ourselves.

No religiousness, or strictness in the mere ritual of our most holy faith can serve any good purpose. or make our righteousness *exceed* the *righteousness* of the Scribes and Pharisees ; unless, we are thereby seeking to be instructed, established, and strengthened in the way of God, or in that of righteousness and mercy. All that belongs to our most holy faith has this as its one great end. This is that great and gracious end of all religion which the Scribes and Pharisees rather abandoned than sought ; and, in consequence of which, they had nothing of benefit from all that was done—

it was thus that their religion became their woe rather than their blessing. And it is only, as by the faith of the gospel, we sincerely seek this great and blessed end, that we can know anything of the greatness of our guilt and the thoroughness of our depravity—that we can be duly stirred to seek pardon and renovation, or that *we can walk in the light as God is in the light, and that the blood of Christ Jesus his Son cleanseth us from all sin*, or that we can, in any sense, *be reconciled to God and have his Spirit*.

While, however, righteousness and mercy are so set, in every possible way before man, as the all-important; and while, in no sense, can we live according to the latter, unless we live according to the former—as there can be no mercy without righteousness, and as righteousness must be the basis of all mercy; yet, it is needless to demonstrate from Scripture, that as the latter is truly inspired in us by the former, so it is in consequence set in view, as that without which we can have nothing of the righteousness of God; also, as that which, if followed or possessed by us, is the only positive and assuring evidence that we are in the way of God. And, it is as needless to demonstrate *that meeting need* is what chiefly belongs to mercy—to that which is so vital, so enriching, and so demonstrative a department of true godliness. That it so belongs to it as to be that without which mercy could not be known; and also as that which testifies whether or not we are influenced and guided by mercy, or have it as a live and ruling ele-

ment ; and are thus alive in the righteous ways of the Lord, or in the way which is everlasting.

To give to others no more than what, in righteousness or strict justice, we are constrained to give, is rather that which, in many instances, shows how dead we are to all true righteousness ; and, as that which may comport with the greatest sordidness, is that by which the most covetous may frequently deceive themselves as being righteous ; while it but deadens in them the spirit of all that is divinely and savingly righteous. Righteousness that knows nothing of mercy has no life within us, but is “ of the letter” *which killeth* ; whereas, mercy is from righteousness being alive within us, and is its vigour and bloom, or is “ of the Spirit” of the righteousness of God ; and is that which giveth life.

To meet need is not what can, in any sense, exceed righteousness ; but is rather what gives its spirit free course, —is what advances us in it, or is what augments its power or quickens its spirit within us.

While every deed, which is done for the purpose of meeting known or real need, confirms in us all that is truly righteous ; it is also that which, as the true, has the most healthful and blessed influence upon all else, and tends to render all external being auspicious in relation to us. It would indeed be worth while to consider whether any has ever been less rich, or less happy from having so acted—“ Godliness is profitable unto all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come.”

As regards this great and demonstrative department of true godliness, general experience sets the liberal to the poor, and the liberal in maintaining the truth, in view, as but the more abounding the more they abound unto others; and, that in such an aspect, as to make their liberality appear more as the *cause* of their prosperity than their *prosperity* as the cause of their liberality—thus “there is that scattereth and yet increaseth”—thus “the liberal soul shall be made fat,” and even in this view it is seen that “It is more blessed to give than to receive.”

Had we more of this vital godliness all hearts and hands would be more cheered and strengthened; and nature itself, as affected by this new life and joyous energy, would feel, acknowledge, and rejoice in its blessed and potent sway. It is but action of this character which imparts thorough health and lasting vigour to every interest. And it is only as all connected with man partakes of the spirit of this that it can have genuine power for good, or can possess the element of permanent efficiency. It is only as this grows and abounds among men, by the progress of the truth as it is in Jesus, that all within the range of human power shall come under a better law—shall become more fertile with blessing, or shall get a mightier impulse for universal good, and “then shall the earth yield her increase, and God, even our own God, shall bless us.”

To meet needs implies that there are needs to be met. And, while we are in this world, we shall not be independ-

ent of others, nor will others be independent of us. And very great is the blessing which is involved in this. But, for this divinely gracious order, there could well be nothing of that brotherhood or friendship which gives warmth and heart to life—which infuses soul into soul, and which enables us to have somewhere on earth which we can call our home.

In order, however, to render this our blessing we must act duly in relation to it, or seek to have its benign spirit within us—we must follow it, in *seeking to meet need*, and not merely *seek that our own needs be met*, which is what tends to disturb and to destroy all good, and is that which is pregnant with every evil.

As the spirit of *seeking to meet need* possesses and guides us, so the power given us will be found abundantly adequate to the needs that exist; and a pleasure will be called into being which otherwise could have no existence. And as God in mercy provides for the right and not for the wrong, so, in proportion as the spirit of seeking to meet merely our own needs possesses and guides us, the power given us will be found growingly inadequate to the growing greatness and number of needs; and nothing but weakness and want can well result. It is so, to a very great extent, with each; and so is it, in full, with the world. In proportion as seeking to meet the needs of others is the general way of man, and in proportion as it brings all of the world under its power, so, want and misery disappear, and abundance and happiness augment; but, as seeking to

meet merely our own needs is the general course, and in proportion as this brings the world under its power, so, blessing departs from among men, the good is over-borne by the evil, and want and misery cover the earth.

The one way is the thorough inversion of the other—The one tends to universal good, and the other tends to universal evil. All, as it partakes of the one, is full of good; and all, as it partakes of the other, is full of evil. The one is as thoroughly a universal good as truth is; and the other as thoroughly a universal evil as error is. And as truth produces universal confidence, gives genuine vigour to all, and opens up the world to the beautiful, cheering, and quickening progress of all that is blessed; and as error produces confusion, imparts weakness to all, and can be attended with nothing but saddening retrogression; so truly, as each seeks to meet the needs of others, health is infused into all, need itself diminishes, and the power to meet it grows; while, as each seeks to meet but his own needs, so need itself grows, and the power to meet it diminishes—all become more and more in need, and none can well help another or have his own need met. In the way of the former, order, plenty, and bliss spring up and abound; whereas, in the way of the latter, disorder, want, and misery are the the sad creatures that can alone get birth—which but grow, in appalling form and crushing magnitude, as they feed upon and consume all that belongs to the former.—The latter is the thorough inversion of the former, as all sin is the inversion of righteousness;

and hence, while "the Lord preserveth the strangers," and "relieveth the fatherless and widow," yet "the way of the wicked he turneth upside down." We now hasten, however, to look more immediately at our subject.

SECTION I.

To seek our needs met by others while we could meet our own, or irrespective of the rights and needs of others, is against the Divine Method or arrangements in regard to man.

The above is inclusive of all that is oppressive or hurtful to others—and depraving to ourselves in being wrong to others. It is inclusive of all slothfulness, of all injustice, and of all oppression; for all these impel in a course of action or life which injures others, and hence degrades us; for none can, in any manner, knowingly harm others without rendering his own soul more dead to, and impercipient of the right. The course of life so impelled is that also which God condemns, or which he hates as followed by man. It is not, however, our purpose to treat each of these specifically. Such would be felt rather as a digression from the matter on hand, still, it is requisite that we look shortly at them in order to see clearly the kind of action, or, the way of living to which the one as thoroughly as the other belongs—which is that of prey, and that of disorder, in which aspects we shall now look at it.

I.—It is the way of prey.

It is not so much what man seeks, as the manner or way in which he *does not* seek it, which turns all that into prey which he pursues, or which he possesses. And it is because all slothfulness, and all injustice, and all oppression belong not to the *kind* of action which should characterise man as a rational being ; but more to that which characterises the irrational tribes, that as man lives according to these, so his way is that of prey. The way gives character to all done in it, or to all got by it ; and hence as these are chargeable against man, so all that he seeks and possesses is but prey. Man as he so lives pursues a course much worse than that of other creatures ; for their way is one of prey mainly in regard to different species, but man's is such in regard to his own.

Slothfulness, or reliance upon others for having our needs met, rather than exert our own powers either to meet our own needs, or to help the weak, is but looking to others in the way of prey. It may not be attended with the violence of the lion, still, it may as truly turn all into prey as does the way of the sluggard ; and can well have no sensations or impulses superior to those which belong to appetite, or to the mere animal, or to the cravings of nature.

Injustice, on the other hand, may be specifically different from slothfulness, or from the way of the sluggard, yet, generically it is not less that which deals with all as prey.

It may be more in accordance with what is specifically true of the serpent, still, it is not less that which seeks its own needs met irrespective of the rights and needs of others, or in despite of all the claims of righteousness and mercy.

And *oppression*, while not necessarily the same in character as either that of the sluggard, or that of the serpent, is yet what belongs as thoroughly or generically to the way of prey. It is what more accords, specifically, with that which characterises the lion or the tiger, whose craving is all from impulse, which bears down irrespective of all right or need as regards others; and with which might is right.

In all such ways of living as have no regard, or not supreme regard, to righteousness and mercy, all the several specific characteristics of the lower animals must be, less or more, shared in by man. And though less in what characterises one, yet that will be because he is more in what belongs to some other. It is only as he lives in his own way, that a thoroughly distinct and nobler course raises him above all on earth; and shows that the pure human, is what partakes of the high excellence and enduring dignity of the divine.

That all other ways than that of righteousness and mercy are those of prey, when followed by man, is what Scripture clearly declares.

Our Lord said, in answer to what was related to him of

Herod, "*Go tell that fox,*" which is doubtless a correct indication of the methods Herod adopted, or of the character of his plans to accomplish his purposes. In harmony with this all *injustice*, fraud and oppression are set in view as making prey of all ; and those who follow them, as the swallows of the poor, or as the ravenous devourers of the poor, of the helpless, of the weak, of the needy. "Hear this, O ye that swallow up the needy, even to make the poor of the people to fail, saying, when will the new moon be gone, that we may sell corn ? and the Sabbath that we may set forth wheat, making the ephah small and the shekel great, and falsifying the balances by deceit." "Her princes in the midst thereof are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood, and to destroy souls to get dishonest gain." "Every man is brutish in his knowledge." "The pastors are become brutish."

Thus "the ephah small and the shekel great," and oppression "to get dishonest gain." All deceptive and oppressive means whereby the simple, the weak, and the helpless or friendless poor, were defrauded ; and that, whether by merchant or ruler, constituted their *swallowing up of the poor*, and made them *like wolves ravening the prey*. And all was *brutish in knowledge*, and also in *professions*, however sacred, in consequence of the end to which these were turned—in consequence of being rendered subservient but to the securing of the things of this world, or to what was merely for carnal gratification.

While all is thus characterised as the ravenous, or the

brutish with man by reason of the means he employed and the end he had in view; so, in harmony with this, *war* (in which man is incomparably more brutish to his fellow men, than any other creature on earth can well be to those of its own species—in which man is as brutish to those of his own species as the most ferocious of any other tribe is to those of species not its own) is thus indicated “behold the noise of the bruit is come”—and what could be more designative, or expressive of its hideous, unutterable atrocities!

How truly do all these, at which we have shortly glanced, turn every thing into prey which man seeks or possesses!

It is not what is sought and possessed, but it is the character of the way by which we *seek* and *possess* that gives to everything such a characteristic. Nothing can have this characteristic, in man's case, where his seeking and attaining are directed, and ruled by a supreme regard to the principles which ought to distinguish him. But man's want of all regard to such principles is his acting, or living according to that manner, or in that way which turns all into prey which he pursues, or which he can possess, and how truly does it so!

The difference between man and other tribes in regard to this, is, that, while man ought to have supreme regard to the way, or to the principles according to which he *gets* anything, other creatures are incapable of having regard to anything but the mere *getting*—with them the mere *getting*

is all ; while with men, the *way* of getting is what is vastly more important than all else.

Other creatures may have their specific ways of pursuing and seizing their prey, still these are natural, and require no attention. With them the one generic purpose is the *getting*. All is for this—to *get* is all, and once got *all* is attained. With man, however, there is a generic, or mighty difference. With him the way of getting is the chief—that of righteousness and mercy. The way with man, is the supreme, and is what determines the character of all. It is that without which nothing can be good to him as man, or as a rational being. The way is vastly more important to him as a rational creature than the mere getting can be in any other respect ; for unless man be maintained as a rational creature, he cannot well have any well-being even *as* a creature.

As such is the difference between man and the other tribes on earth, so, unless righteousness and mercy, direct and sway man in regard to all that he either seeks or possesses—unless nothing is got or held, but all spurned which would infringe upon, or violate these ; then, there can be nothing but the one generic object of irrational being—all must be the *mere* getting. He may, indeed, be conscious of something like other motives—there may be the desire to get *rightly* if possible, still, righteousness and mercy not supreme, or thrown aside, is what discovers that *the mere getting* is the supreme ; and to get *rightly*, is doubtless, that it may be *safely* held when got—if it can

be safely held, then it matters not how got, whether rightly or not.

As in all such cases, the one generic object of the irrational tribes—mere getting, is man's one, or supreme object, so this must give all that he seeks, or possesses its characteristic. This is what makes all prey which men can seek, or which can be possessed by him.

There may appear much, connected with men, which is incapable of being so characterised—such as his power, his wealth, or his honour, his great acquisitions and attainments. There is also much, however, about some of the lower tribes to distinguish them greatly from others. And as man is endowed with higher and distinct powers, and capable, in a sense, of following all their several ways as they seem to suit his purpose, or as he judges them adapted to secure for himself what is their one generic object—mere *getting*, so he cannot but rise above all others, both in his plans of pursuing his objects, and also in the objects sought and attained. Still, as it is not what is attained, but the way of attaining which distinguishes, so nothing of rank, of wealth, of power, nor of learning and ability, nor of celebrity and highest honours can show that man is following any other way than that of prey, unless, righteousness and mercy be held as the richest, and have supreme sway; for it is not what he has, but it is the direction given to it which constitutes the characteristic.

This way of prey is comprehensive of all ways in man's case, that are not entirely regulated by righteousness and mercy. It is that in which all live and act, who live and act not in God's way in relation to all. In some cases the degeneracy may be less than in others, still *degrees* do not change the *kind* to which they belong; nor are all irrational creatures equally ravenous.

It matters not whether our way be that of the less or more rapacious, it must be *that of prey* if not God's high and blessed way. Nor does it matter, what differences characterise our methods of following it—whether it be in mendicancy, or in robbery; in the shop, or in the market; at the desk, or in the pulpit. Nothing of these can make any change, if righteousness and mercy are not the supreme objects which we follow as intelligent and rational creatures; and which as supreme, attract and impel us in regard to all. If not so attracted and impelled, then our way can be no other than that of prey—our knowledge is brutish, we are carnal, nothing sways us as *that* of heaven and eternity. The end we propose or follow is one, generically, with that of the irrational; and all that we have is made subservient to this. And whatever we so follow, or possess, has its character from the way in which we live. Hence however great, honourable or illustrious it may appear, still, there is nothing in all that we so follow, or in all that we so possess, which, rises in spirit above the old or first sin, *that which is good for food and pleasant unto the eyes*.

II.—This way is that of all *disorder*.

“THAT the way of man is not in himself” as the several ways of other creatures are in them, is manifest from all views we can take of man in connexion with other creatures. With other creatures, mere impulse or gratification directs unerringly, or their nature is their law. And had man been as entire in himself in relation to his “way,” the excellence and eternal glory of righteousness and mercy, as intelligently beheld, would have been his supreme attractions, or unerring guides both in regard to satisfaction and delight. That it is not so with man—that impulse and gratification, all drive him on in every course that leads from these, shows how truly man is depraved—*how* as having his way thus broken down, “it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps.”

We might dwell upon the fact, that it is in consequence of this, that while other creatures, when most left to themselves, grow best up in their own respective or specific ways; yet man, when so left to himself, grows most up in ways the most inhuman, or, degrading to all that is *the* man; but we rather hasten to make the whole bear upon our subject.

No creature on earth could well live out of its own allotted course, or leave its own way of living for that of some other, without entailing upon itself disaster and ruin; and

causing disorder also to all others with which it might come in contact. Each, as living in its own way, is that in motion or action which is the greatest security, health, and pleasure to itself; and the best order and comfort to all others.

The way of each creature is not, only, that which is best for its own real satisfaction or kind of life; but also, its living in its own allotted way, may be viewed as what contributes to what is best upon the whole for all others. Were any of the irrational tribes to become so disordered in their natural impulses as to be made uncertain of their own respective ways, or to be driven thereby into the several specific ways of others; then, all would be dissatisfaction to themselves and confusion to others. The good contributed to others, by living in their own, would rather become an evil by their living in that of others. The encroachment upon what did not peculiarly belong to them, would be privation to others; and, even an abundance to them, in ways not their own, would yield them nothing but greatness of discontent, disease, or, would result in nothing but final extirpation—would destroy them rather than be of benefit to them. No creature of the lower tribes could well live, to any great extent, out of its own specific course without entailing disorder or immediate ruin upon itself.

Man also has a way which is *his*, and which, as *his*, is that which is best for himself; and his living in it is, also, what truly contributes most to the good of all others.

Man's way—that of righteousness and mercy, is infinitely more distinct from the specific ways of all other creatures than any *one* of theirs can be from *those* of all the rest. All theirs have a generic sameness, whatever be their specific differences, but man's is generically distinct from all that so belongs to them. It was in relation to his own way, or to that of righteousness and mercy, which is the high way of God, that he was pronounced *good*. Hence as *good* in relation to this, he cannot be good for any other as living therein; nor, can he have good in any other. As man is in any other way, all must be felt *as* not made for him, or as rather set against him. In all other ways nature and providence must be out of harmony with him, and he must be out of harmony with all being.

In no sense can man, more than any other creature, abandon the course divinely assigned him, for that of any other, without destroying *that* in himself in regard to which he was pronounced *good*, or without incurring detriment to himself; and also, stirring disorder to, or entailing disaster upon others. As the course of action, or way of living which has been divinely allotted man, is greater than that of all others—bears, also, upon all other creatures more than all theirs, put together, can bear upon man, or upon each other, so man's abandonment of his own exalted way for the grovelling ways of others, is degradation and misery to himself; and is what chiefly disorders all creation, or begets and augments calamity to all with which he comes in contact.

It is man as out of his way which is what blights all nature. And in what respect is he more conspicuously seen as thoroughly out of his own way, than in *seeking his his own needs met by others while he could meet his own, or irrespective of the rights and needs of others!* In what respect does he more entail numberless pains and agonies upon himself, stir and perpetuate social disorder and disaster among mankind, and inflict, mercilessly, many and crushing cruelties upon all other creatures! Truly, it is man thus not in his own way, but in that of others, which is what subjects creation to vanity, and is what makes *the whole creation groan and travail in pain together.*

Not only is the whole *vain* to man and *vain* to all others, as that by which any good can result, either to himself or to any other creature upon earth; but it is also *that* by which all is driven out of order—by which all becomes burdened with such toils and pains, with such distresses and woes, as otherwise could have no existence. Is there an evil on earth which may not be seen springing in some respect from this as its root! From this, which is the thorough wrong nothing but evil can come, as from the thorough right nothing but good can come. Can a calamity disturb a family and blight domestic strength and comfort, or can social misrule prevail—can national disorder or distress of nations exist, or can anarchy, or war desolate, without all springing from *one or more*, in some way or other, *seeking their needs met by others*, rather than duly seeking to meet their own, or from endeavouring in some way to

get their needs met, irrespective of the rights and needs of others!

But for the monster evils that arise from this cause we could know very little of evil. What results from any other cause can scarcely be called an evil, and while it may be borne with dignity, satisfaction, and advantage, would at the sametime be much less, had we nothing of the countless and crushing calamities which get birth and maturity and propagative power from our not living in our own divinely allotted way. And looking at the disorder, the want, the distress; and also at the agony which man, as in every way but his own, stirs both to his fellow-men and also to all other creatures, as well as to himself, the whole shows us that man, out of his own divinely appointed way, can manage himself in no other. As man is in any other he can do nothing that is beneficial, in any respect, or to any being; but all so done is vain in regard to good. But, while all so done is powerless for good, it is so in being powerful for evil. It is that disorder in action which is ruinous to himself—which is degrading to all that is human—which is distracting to every possible interest; and baneful in its tendency to every living being.

We have here an open field for bringing, conspicuously and extensively, into view the real character of all that annoys and disturbs, whether as in church or in state; and which can have no such tendency apart from being organised, in some such way as to regard the interests of one

class irrespective of the rights and needs of all other classes. But not to enlarge upon what is so extensive, we may state merely in passing, that all despotism, anarchy, and the like have their root and spirit in what is so productive of evil.

Despotism is from one or more consulting but their own temporal interests at the expense of the rights and needs of all others, and is that—whether of one or of many—which cannot be maintained but as righteousness and mercy are silenced or expelled.

Despotism on the throne and weakness among the people spring from the same cause. The weakness of a people is as there are few among them but who would, in all circumstances, seek their own needs met irrespective of the rights and needs of others—who are swayed more by *meat* and *drink* than by *righteousness* and *peace*. The weakness of a nation is as there is no regard to each other's rights, or as each would govern another to serve his own purposes. Man's weakness is when might is regarded as right; and his strength arises and grows as right guides and sways all might. As a nation weakens itself through disregard for each other's rights and needs, or by each seeking to govern another but for his own ends, so, a way is laid open for the despot's triumphal march, or for the strong and most unscrupulous to advance to power by taking hold of all their rights, and wielding for himself an oppressive sway over all. While despotism is thus the index of a nation's moral weakness, it, at the sametime, cannot maintain itself with-

out perpetuating and augmenting that which has rendered it possible.

As despotism has thus its origin and strength in the disregard which a people have in relation to the rights and needs of each other, so, as those increase in a nation, who have a commanding regard to the rights of others—as those multiply who are ruled by righteousness and mercy, so despotism becomes impossible. As a few of such are spread over a nation, so mere might, arrogance, or unscrupulousness is terror-struck, made cowardly, and sunk in weakness. He who in other circumstances, would climb by mere might to the highest heights, becomes powerless and prostrated, and impotent through contempt, under the might of right—*his way is turned upside down*. Thus, that which renders a despot's power unbearable, is that which gives self-rule both to persons, and also to nations.

It is as the former of the above states of a nation exists, and is armed with power that “judgment is turned away backward, and justice standeth afar off; for truth is fallen in the street and equity cannot enter.” When to speak of righteousness and mercy, is what makes one a rebel—thus “truth faileth, and he that departeth from evil maketh himself a prey.” How very frequently has it been so! And what, still, is more the rebellious—in some of our Continental nations—than to appeal to right, or to speak of righteousness and mercy!

This which, to a less or greater degree, is the spirit of

all despotism or tyrannies, is also, throughout, the spirit of all that is framed to meet mere class interests. It will be upon the demolition of all that is so hostile, in its very nature to righteousness and mercy, or upon the *triumphant success* of the latter way of living, that "the kingdoms of this world will become the kingdoms of our Lord and his Christ"—*that his kingdom will break in pieces all other kingdoms*. All that is now not this, whether of persons or of kingdoms must be *overturned, overturned, overturned*, till it becomes this, ere, order can be permanent and peace glorious.

It is the Gospel's power to promote order and peace, not only in the hearts of men, but also, through the hearts of men, over the world, which shows how truly, in its whole character, it is "on earth peace, good-will toward men."

In harmony with this, the object of the church on earth is that righteousness and peace, or righteousness and mercy may have a place here below. And nothing can more demonstrate that we are not of the church, than our not living in God's way but in the way of the world. It is the way of the world, not merely because the men of the world so generally live in it, but also because it is that of all other creatures in the world—is carnal—not that which can in any sense be viewed as good for man, but that which in all senses, as followed by him, disturbs all on earth, degrades his own character, and crowds his lot with misery.

The great object of the church on earth is to reclaim

man to that way which is his. Hence the *perfection of her beauty* is as she shines in the divine light of righteousness and mercy. As these grow within her and are spread by her over the earth, so the beauty of the Lord is upon her, and she becomes the glory of all the earth. This glory is not in any material wealth or strength, but is as she abounds in righteousness and mercy, and as she renders unrighteousness and oppression, as ashamed, to hide their face.

Such glory is that true glory which gives health, excellence, bliss and stability to all that is rational, and the foundations of the *rational* world are made firm, or are removed, or, true rational life but rises and falls in the world, as the church grows and declines in righteousness and mercy; and, apart from such, she can have no beauty, nor fruit, nor strength as the Church of God.

As that which is called the Church, leagues itself with the unjust and oppressive, its glory evanishes—the characteristic of the church is destroyed, and the Divine wrath is incurred—“He looked for judgment, but behold oppression; for righteousness, but behold a cry” therefore he says, “I will lay it waste, it shall not be pruned nor digged; but there shall come up briers and thorns: I will also command the clouds that they rain no rain upon it”—It is only as the church shines in the divine beauty of righteousness and mercy, that she can be a blessing upon earth—not this, then she hath no mission upon earth, and must, in consequence, become but a *burden* and an *enslaver* upon earth; and, that according to her material strength.

There is nothing can exist, and not follow its own end, without doing great injury. It must be specially so with the church, as her mission is of such unparalleled importance; and how thoroughly is it so!—How, as what is called the church, abandons righteousness and mercy as more to her than all on earth, does she become instrumental in making them despised; and, in spreading unrighteousness, oppression, and degradation!

The church hath no end to seek in this world—no purpose to serve upon earth—no mission among men, but that which is from her Lord. Her mission is to make known the glory of her Lord, or to proclaim his character, or to show forth his righteousness and mercy. The church hath no purpose to serve here, but as the bulwark of righteousness and mercy—Her work is to abound in these; and her glory is as she abounds in these, and induces all to return thus unto the Lord. And, as the church gives up this divine mission, so righteousness and mercy cannot well have an asylum upon earth—cannot well reign among men; but must be most wounded and weakened where their power should be supreme, and their rest glorious.

SECTION II.

To seek our needs met by others, while we could meet our own, is what is attended, personally, with great moral degradation.

In this department of our subject we shall confine ourselves to remarks respecting *seeking our needs met by*

others while we could meet our own. We shall do so, not because it is comprehensive of all that may be characterised as the way of prey ; but because it is that which so moulds us as to make us easily driven on in all that belongs to it—which so forms or fills us with such tendencies as leave little probability that, under any circumstances, any other way will ever be sought by us.

It is a course of life which is apt to be attended with the most fatal results, or which is apt to issue in a state of deepest depravity. It habituates the mere animal to predominance ; and hence, continuously, so embases and deteriorates as to undermine and lay waste, more and more, all that is peculiarly the man. Evil becomes so interwoven by habit that all of soul and body but tend to evil—"Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard his spots ! then may ye do good that are accustomed to do evil." Thus, habit is declared to be the great confirmer in evil, as it is also the greater confirmer in good. The great moral detriment in such cases, is, that we are thus sunk most thoroughly into their sad condition "who call evil good, and good evil."

It may well be said, that, few in doing evil, do it for its own sake, or because it is evil. But this does not exculpate any. This is rather that which tends to ruin the person and which fills the world with disaster.

To do evil for the sake of evil is what rarely occurs. Had we no ill, but what is done because ill, the world would have little of which to complain. The most of the

evil which takes place is done for the sake of some proposed good ; and, in thousands of cases, the evil done is as not seen—the mind is wholly fixed upon the proposed good, or it has got the habit of estimating all that as good which best secures its object or serves its purpose. In the way of proposing good to oneself, the most atrocious deeds are frequently perpetrated—deeds which would be revolting, and even impossible to the doer, did they stand alone, or were they not connected with some fancied good. The fancied good is what, meanwhile, hides their enormity, or gives them an aspect not their own.

Should we select the worst possible character, it would, doubtless, at once appear that, in the vast bulk of his crimes, there was no present design of evil for the sake of evil—that the whole was more from habit, or from states of mind and body which had acquired the ascendancy over him. It would rather appear that he had become habituated to certain vicious ways, not because vicious, but because they served to secure what he deemed good, or what would gratify cravings which had got the mastery, and which to satisfy was *his* good. The greatness of the moral damage consists in the fact that evil is enjoyed as good.

Almost all that is done by one, whether good or evil, may be traced to habits acquired by his manner of living. It is *by reason of use, we have our senses exercised to discern both good and evil*. It is by use also, we lose all sense of the intrinsic good and choose intrinsic evil as our good.

Once habits are formed, by living perversely for a time, we become the victims of every impulse; and all in order to satisfy, by any method, the cravings which have been nursed and matured. We are instigated not by any love of evil as evil; but because we have become habituated to live by evil as good. In general we feel towards it as good, and are, also, unable to restrain our hand *even* from *known* evil if only, thereby, we can secure what we have been *accustomed* to enjoy as good.

As under the moulding influence of habit, we are doubtless now being made or confirmed in *what* we shall for ever be; and in regard to how evil thus takes hold of us there is very much in what Plato affirms:—

“Κακος μὲν γὰρ ἐκῶν οὐδεὶς, δια δὲ πονηραν ἔξιν τινα του σωματος και απαιδευτον τροφήν ὁ κακος γιγνεται κακος.”

The power of action is what fashions and determines us; and that according to its own character. There can be no continuous course of any kind of action without so incorporating itself in us as to render its spirit the spirit that impels and sways us. Nor can its spirit so become as ours without still more moulding and determining our entire frame in accordance with itself.

It is specially so with what is evil. The good, to be maintained and embodied, requires a constant conflict, but the evil is more the natural and easily attains a confirmed ascendancy over us. And it is the *habit that seeking our needs met by others while we could meet our own*, begets and

so easily matures which is what makes it specially degrading. It, with ease soon depraves the whole man, or soon turns the entire force of mind and body into a propenseness towards others. This propenseness is, as that may be got which will meet present need, or be of any present temporal advantage.

We know nothing that so accords with and promotes the depraved habit so engendered as that which is affirmed of "respect of persons." "To have respect of persons is not good; for, for a piece of bread that man will transgress"—will violate all faith—will abandon and betray all persons and interests; and that for the slightest possible temporal advantage, or most trifling momentary gratification—"for a piece of bread." And such is very identically the depraved habit or vicious turn which is easily begotten and matured by *seeking our needs met by others while we could meet our own*. The latter is very identically the former, because it is not only that to which the former tends, but is also its worst condition.

"Respect of persons" is moved, and moves, by accidents that belong in no sense to character as good or bad—such as the features, condition or circumstances of persons. To all such accidental qualities its faith is pledged, and not to principles or persons. Its one object is what gratifies, in some form, the senses; and hence, it mainly developes itself according to what will be of temporal advantage, or of greatest present gratification.—But for so developing itself,

it would be little known in the world; nor could it be so depraving. It is, doubtless, this form of it—to which it naturally tends and which is its worst state—that is characterised as so degrading. And, as it is in this that its ground of procedure, and mental states, are identically those of *seeking to have our needs met by others while we could meet our own*, so what is predicated of the former is fully predicable of the latter. Also what we feel respecting the one is very much what we feel respecting the other.

In regard to him that has “respect of persons” we, at once feel, that all hope in the way of good is gone; that whatever he may otherwise be, yet, in regard to conduct his soul is not governed by principle—not in live contact with what is really excellent, but is under the dominion of sense or passion—that what should stir admiration, or sympathy is apt to beget the very opposite—that no emotion is right, but that all states of mind, or springs of action are perverse whether in regard to principles or persons.

What we so feel in relation to those who have “respect of persons,” is what we at once, feel in regard to one, who *seeks his needs met by others while he could meet his own*. In regard to such, our feelings compel us to infer, that his whole mental condition is out of order, that all his springs of action are vicious—that his loves and his hatreds, his admirations and indignations, and the like, are all irregular and conflicting in their character; and having no princi-

ple, are all immoral in their sway. The respect or affection for persons, which such a one may have, comes and goes according as—from their circumstances, or caprices—they are likely to be serviceable in meeting his present temporal wants, or in yielding what may meanwhile gratify.

“Respect of persons” bows with supreme reverence to all of station, wealth or power. Let those so prompted have access to any that may possess the accidental qualities which are so admired, then, as their chances are for temporal advantage, they will yield all for favour—will traduce and betray all, if only thereby a fleeting moment’s consideration can be purchased. It is thus seen *how truly* the sycophant and the traitor are one. And, verily, wherever sycophancy dwells there treachery also has its abode. The one cannot live out of the soul in which the other resides. The traitor is all but necessarily a sycophant; and the sycophant is altogether necessarily a traitor.

As seeking our needs met by others while we could meet our own, belongs to the matured condition of “respect of persons,” so it is that which as fully tends to make temporal advantage present need, or what may meanwhile gratify the supreme; and by which as supreme, we treat both principles and persons. And as this becomes the strong confirmed habit of the soul, and the prone tendency of the body, so we come to act both consciously and unconsciously in regard to all with an all-ruling consideration respecting present satisfaction. All our faith becomes

pledged to such objects as will meanwhile most gratify. This must develope itself in vice, either of a more subtle or gross character, according to special mental idiosyncrasies, or education, or circumstances. And it is in *this* that it is *personally* so morally degrading. *This* is its inherent or necessary disregard of *all principles*, and its *treachery* to all persons.

The faith *pledged* is neither to principles nor to persons ; but all faith and power of soul, and habit of mind and body hang but on objects that may yield the slightest temporal advantage, or supply present carnal gratification. Hence, in consistency with itself, it comes and goes and moves hither and thither, in regard to principles and persons, with these, and that as a straw on the billow, or as a feather in the wind ; for it acknowledges no impulse but what comes from that which may gratify.

Righteousness and mercy are eternally the same or *one* in themselves. Hence their way is unchangeable. But those who so live in *seeking their needs* met by *others while they could not meet their own*, have no way but that which is ever shifting. Change is its law as regards themselves, and also as regards all principles and persons. What they now admire or dislike is of the moment and is constantly changing—their own tastes may suddenly change—new chances “for a piece of bread,” or for the slightest possible gratification may speedily spring up in some other ; and none of these can affect them without moving a change.

Take the whole range of their views, objects, and corresponding impulses; and principles and persons are, at once, seen as their *tools*—are of no estimate but as thereby their ends may be achieved; and are changed, exchanged, and changed again — as a tradesman his implements —if only what may now gratify can be got by one more than by another; and that at whatever cost, in the violation of principle, or in treachery to persons.

We may well feel assured, that whenever there is one who would traduce those that have befriended him, and would sacrifice their interests in order to chime in with us, that he is such as can have no respect for persons, that his faith is pledged to neither principles nor persons, that his whole power drives him away from regarding us, that what we have, or what he may get by us sways him; and that, on the slightest change in his own impulses, or in us, or in another, he shall turn away from us, will break all faith with us, betray us in all, will become our worst foe; and that in proportion as he has been befriended, or as his needs have been met. That on which all his faith and all his power of soul, or habit of mind and body rests, is of the most shifting character. It is what obliterates all sense of right as in the soul, makes all regardless, in relation to principles however sacred; and renders all treacherous to persons, however honourable. It is that which turns all feelings and impulses as into those of the grovelling reptile—with which we may as well enter upon terms of faith.

The above would seem to supply a reason for the alleged general want of faith in servants. This averment is chiefly made in regard to male servants in the higher circles; and there is with them not a little naturally calculated to stir and promote such a want.

The great disparity between them and their employers has, upon the whole, a disadvantageous moral bearing. There is, in consequence of this disparity, a more general want of interest in them, on the part of their employers. Their work is all, and they themselves are much as of a different species. In sympathy and sentiment the human is as denied them; and the general effect is to render as selfish as what the treatment itself is. Much of a similar character, and which is calculated to have the same result, might be stated.

There is, along with the above, not the ready access to employers which servants in lower circles have. This, in many instances, may but be the want of a presence which makes a more aggrieving distance felt, still in general it has its drawbacks. There is not the same impulse or spirit for uniformity of deportment, which is very hurtful. And when they have access to the presence or ears of their employers, the temptation to secure their smiles is strong; and that at whatever expense. This, to any extent, tends to perfect in artifice. It is the same force or action upon the soul which is in "respect of persons"—is "respect of persons" in the nature of the action, and destroys all respect for persons; and also all regard in relation to means as

theirs. The whole is exercise, not in respect of authority and in care of substance; but in that deceit which is disregard to others in action; and which hastens recklessness in relation to all with which they are interested—recklessness so far as it serves not them, or so far as it is but for another. Anything of this cannot be begun without injury to themselves. To carry on this for any length of time must inflict grievous moral damage upon themselves for life.

The caprices of masters have, doubtless, very much to do in such a sad result; for where principle is not the rule, on the one side, all principle on the other, is much as a faculty without its object—has nothing to stir it but everything to discourage and deaden it. Where no principle sways, servants are naturally driven to such expedients or shifts as are also without principle—as have no end but that of possibly pleasing.

It is manifestly from the same cause that servants are also to be found in whose hands you may intrust your all. Having resisted all temptation to act against principle, the resistance has confirmed them in principle. No action for principle is stronger than that which is against temptation; and hence nothing can well more embody it, or confirm it in us. This is what is truly calculated to render faithful as regards both the persons and fortunes of others. The want of artifice may once and again be attended with failure; yet, ere long, fidelity makes itself felt; and once so made known, then all is confidence, honour, and reward for life.

As no habit can well be more debasing, or more sink one into a helpless and hopeless condition than that which we have had under consideration, so, we may now look at a few of the many conditions or circumstances which tend to beget and mature it.

I.—Dependence upon others while we could meet our own needs, but are unwilling to do so, is morally degrading.

"If any would not work, neither should he eat."—Thess. iii. 10.

If unable to meet our own needs and the kind help of another be extended to us, then, in proportion as the help given is unostentatious, or felt to be purely from sympathy in regard to us, and in proportion as our need is real or urgent, so the agreeable mental state of gratitude is naturally stirred. This, like all right states of mind, has a cheering and an invigorating influence in the way of good. As without gratitude no great good can well be effected, so—in order to clear our way—we may look at the conditions which seem essential both to giver, and also to receiver, ere it can well exist.

1st, *The condition essential to the giver ere gratitude can well be stirred in the receiver.*

Gratitude is not gratification or mere gladness that re-

gards but the gift. We do not feel gratitude to a stream which has quenched our thirst, because we know that it had no special regard to us or our need. This is the defect in public charities—they are as streams to which each one feels he has as much right as another. And however much any one may partake he can have no gratitude, or feeling that there was any special regard to him or his need. True, we are not to *let our left hand know what our right hand doeth*. And unless we respect and obey this, our giving must want the spirit which gives it moral power, still this regards mere ostentatious display.

What is so enjoined regards that ostentatious display which shows, that in giving, we have no regard to another's need ; but that our special outlook is for praise to ourselves. It is our own need, in such a case, that we seek met—our own glorification is what moves us, and not the distress of another. Where this is felt, or where there is any ostentatious display on the part of the giver, the gift is felt according to its character, and naturally, stirs hatred or disrespect on the part of the receivers towards the giver. This is the natural result however valuable his gifts. The spirit, which prompted or made them gifts, is felt. Their value is not meant to serve the receivers but to purchase honour to the giver. It is false dealing—the mercantile under show of the charitable, and the false in what is so important cannot affect well—may move contempt, but is unable to stir gratitude.

In relation to gratitude, it would seem essential that the

receiver know the giver, as gratitude arises from a state of mind which goes beyond the gift to the kind giver. It springs from the feeling that another has so far *put his soul in our soul's stead*—that as he would not like to be in our situation, so neither does he like to see us in it. Hence, the vigour of gratitude must very mainly depend upon the knowledge of its object—cannot well be stirred without the knowledge of its object—which object is not the gift but the giver; and must, at the sametime, much depend upon seeing or feeling in him *one* who so far *loves us as he loves himself*.

Nothing which so owes its all to such a spirit—which is so stimulated and directed by the spirit of right—nothing which is so filled with the spirit of good can well itself be powerless for good. All of such a character is but to be felt in order to move our minds and put them into a right condition, if our need be real, or if that be true in us which has stirred it. Its effect in us must be, at least, a grateful sense in relation to our benefactor. This, as moral in its influence, must cheer and invigorate—must move in its own way, or stir anew the power which we may still have, in order to get ourselves into those circumstances in which our benefactor would like to see us. As he would give, so we, in thankfulness, would spare his giving—would show our sense of his goodness, or that his kindness has not been powerless.

2d, The condition essential to the receiver ere there can be gratitude to the giver.

While there would seem certain conditions essential to the giver ere gratitude can well arise in the receiver, there are also certain conditions essential to the receiver ere the kindest and richest gifts can move anything like grateful emotions.

It would seem necessary, on the part of the receiver, that his professed need be not only real, but also that there be a consciousness of inability to meet it. If no gratitude be stirred, by kindness in relation to professed need, we may safely infer, that, either the need is not real, or that there is not a consciousness of inability to meet it—that there is more a want of will than ability. And, on a mind so disordered, gifts must but increase the disorder, or can have nothing but an immoral tendency.

The consciousness of inability to meet our need would seem essential to the very consciousness of our need as real. Nor can grateful emotions be stirred by that *done to us* which could easily have been *done by us*. It is only in proportion to urgency and difficulty in doing, that aid, as given, kindly affects the heart.

Unless, in the case of professed need, there be a *consciousness* of inability to meet that need, all is false. In such a case the mind itself is active in the false, or under its deteriorating action ; and no such work can go on unconsciously to us, or be other than weakening to all sense

of right. It must be very demoralizing in all its power upon the soul. In all such cases, gifts, in proportion to their greatness, must beget ingratitude—cannot stir anything so morally beneficial as gratitude. The whole tendency must be to debase and render more dependent, as the action upon the mind is that of voluntary dependence. Hence, the whole is opposed to, or destructive of all impulse in regard to self-maintenance; and cannot stir so as to be less dependent; but must rather intensify the cry “Give, give.”

As the results of such an influence on the part of the receiver must tend to tire the hand that gives, so, as soon as giving ceases, it will become manifest that benevolence has nursed virulence rather than gratitude. The virulence will be in proportion to the greatness of the bounties formerly conferred—the greatest gift having moved it most, and sunk in oblivion all recollection of the rest. In relation to all such, as truly living in the way of prey—the mere *get* being all with them, we feel thus admonished—“Neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet, and turn again and rend you.”

Consciousness of inability to meet our need, and gratitude for having it met are seen essentially connected in what pertains to Saving Grace.

What we have had under consideration is somewhat analogous to our condition in relation to God as we live in impenitence. It is analogous, because the same mental states are at work; for, though higher in relation to God, yet that is more a difference in degree than in kind.

As sinners, we are unable to meet what we need ; but, unless conscious of our need, and also of our thorough inability to meet that need, it cannot be met, as it is God who meets it. Nor can there be gratitude to the Most High for what he has done to meet it, or for the great gift of his well beloved Son.

We must be conscious of our need, and also of our thorough inability to meet that need ere it can be met, or ere we can do anything but despise the Saviour. It is as we become conscious of our lost state, and of our thoroughly depraved condition that God meets our need ; and that we are enabled to bless him for his great love in our Lord and Saviour. Hence in this, clearly, a *consciousness* of our *inability* to meet our need is *essential* to all *gratitude* to God for what he hath done to meet it, or ere there can be that gratitude which is a powerful element in our moral change, or in our spiritual renovation ; and, as clearly, no one could be *reckoned in need* had he *power to meet that need*. From which we may well infer that *a consciousness of inability to meet our need is essential to all gratitude to him that meets it*. And that, unless there be *inability of which to be conscious, no one can be reckoned as in real need*.

But more in regard to our condition in relation to God while we live in impenitence. As in every case in which there is indifference respecting the greatest gift of a kind benefactor—the gift which cost the giver most, and which

is of most value to the receiver—that benefactor must feel as insulted; and can neither acknowledge any expressed gratitude for other gifts, nor believe that gratitude can exist. So, in regard to God, (who is kind and gracious to us in all, but who has richly exceeded all in the great gift of his only begotten Son,) should his great love to us in the Saviour not be that which most stirs our praise, then we can have no thanks or praise to him for aught.

This is that gift which is of greatest estimate in the eyes of God and is that of greatest possible value to us. It is that gift of love by which God has truly magnified man—done more for us, thereby, than he hath done for angels—is that gift without which no other gift would have had any value to us, as lost and depraved creatures—is that, which as full of the richest gifts of pardon, and also of all that is for regeneration, is what truly sanctifies and turns all else into blessings. Hence, unless our “rejoicing in God through our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ by whom we have received the atonement,” be above all our rejoicing, then, nothing can have moral power, nor will we be disposed to thank God for anything. In this the moral tendencies of the heart are true to what is declared. “He that honoureth not the Son, honoureth not the Father.” And it is truly but when inspired with the great love of God to us as displayed in the Saviour, that the true spirit of gratitude is begotten in the soul of a sinner. It is the Cross’s power to bring a sinner’s soul under the influence of gratitude and love to God, which is its power under God, in destroying

the enmity of the heart. But for the gratitude which it so stirs and the love which it promotes, there could not well be power to save the sinner from the dominion of sin. This is that power which, under God, is seen as essential in changing the heart, or in making man alive unto God.

It is only when a sinner is brought under the power of divine love as manifested on the cross, that the divine can savingly affect him. And it is as he is enabled to exclaim with holy and highest gratitude, "thanks be unto God for his unspeakable gift," that he can bless God for any of all his great gifts—that he can understand his own relation and thus feel their worth—that he is made feel how truly he *is not worthy of the least of all His mercies and truth*. Without the gratitude which is so stirred we can have no idea either of saving change in man, or of power swaying such a spirit as is adapted to and essential in a change so great and purely moral. It is only, as we come under its heart-moving influences, that true thankfulness unto God can in any way stir us, or that true life can be begun and advanced—that true life in relation to God and hence to all, which is *living not unto ourselves but unto Him who loved us and gave himself for us*.

Thus, in what is divine, gratitude is essential to all true moral change, and a consciousness of inability to meet our needs is essential ere there can be gratitude for having our needs met; and we can have no gratitude for needs met, unless conscious that we could not ourselves have met them. Since so in what is divine we must infer that it is univer-

sally so with man as a moral creature. The divine shows what obtains universally with man. And from all views it must be inferred that where there is not inability, of which to be conscious, but want of will to meet one's own needs, there can be no gratitude stirred by aught given—all done to meet his needs must promote the false action of his mind, or must be positively immoral in its tendency. Nor is this the only want, or deteriorating influence.

3d, One who has ability to meet his own needs, but is unwilling and depends upon others deprives himself of the beneficial influence which labour has upon all in regard to others.

The power possessed, in such a case, is as much a blessing—if not more—as what can be got by its exercise. It is that by which we may help others, as well as meet our own needs, and thus secure great benefit. Hence, its whole moral purpose, or force, is reversed if we exercise it neither for others nor *even* for ourselves. And truly, in the case of man, the ability or power which is so possessed cannot well be vigorously and healthfully employed for himself, unless as all but exclusively employed in aiding others. There is thus a quickening moral power in being so exercised. And let us glance at how ALL LABOUR TENDS TO MAKE US LOOK FROM SELF TO ANOTHER'S NEEDS.

All the several occupations in which we can be engaged have a tendency, as from our nature, to make us look from self to others. All connected with our sphere so turns itself in man's hands, or tends so to move man as to show, that

each best aids himself in seeking but to aid others. Even in this, it is seen that "none of us liveth to himself." To live to one's self envenoms and corrodes life, or makes it a burden and crowds it with the insatiable. All that is for us would seem naturally fitted to lure us away from so living. Hence there is not an occupation or profession in which we can engage but has, or acquires such a stimulus as tends to make us look from self to the needs of others. In what on earth can any be well engaged, when that in which he engages is but for himself!

No one can well be a physician merely for himself. Were it so there would soon be no physician. As no one can well be a physician but for himself, so no one can well be a mechanic, a farmer, or a merchant but for himself. Were it so, we would soon have none of these, and soon there would be neither an abundance nor proficiency in aught which regards man. All such, as well as all else in which man can be engaged, look from us to others. We are healthfully and vigorously employed as under their true impulse, or as thereby we are active in regard to the weal or needs of others, and they succeed in our hands, as by them we look from self to others. Were it otherwise, millions would be unable to live, and few indeed could live well.

What one does in his own vocation is greatly for others; and, as he is engaged for others, so others are engaged for him. The law of all such is, as we meet the needs of others so others meet our needs. Money got for our labour has no possible value, beyond being a convenient medium,

whereby others may meet our needs; and that as we have met the needs of others. Every possible occupation shows that "with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again;" and may well be legibly inscribed—**AS YOU MEET THE NEEDS OF OTHERS, SO OTHERS WILL MEET YOURS.**

The character of every occupation or vocation in which any man can be thoroughly and well engaged, is that it is for others. Without this all such occupations or vocations would become spiritless—would flag and all but perish. We may engage in them with different motives, still their impulse is towards this; and our pleasure and success in them vastly depend upon this. And in the whole, it really is as we seek to meet the needs of others, that others are constrained to meet our needs. It is not in carelessly and sluggishly doing our work, as if we regarded nothing but our own ease or needs; but it is in diligently doing our work—in quality so as to please, and in quantity so as to satisfy others.

The true spirit of all occupations or vocations, is, the want of others, or what may meet their need and be for their weal. This is the true and ennobling spirit of all labour. As we are inspired with this spirit, so our labour ennoble us; and we have that which is best for stirring strength and pleasure, for promoting activity and proficiency, and for securing countenance and success, or for making others meet with spirit all our needs. It is also as so employed that we can have the circumstances and the peace of conscience, or that rich quiet which comes from right, by which

we are enabled to "take no thought for the morrow." Our Lord's admonitions point to the good which flows from the right; and are therefore altogether impracticable, only, as we are in the wrong.

The whole work is that of God. It arises from all that he hath made us, and established in regard to us. And he who does not employ himself in this work of God when he could—who willingly abandons it and depends upon others, acts a part which could not be followed by others without entailing universal disorder and want. Nor can any such part be acted without being attended with universal moral damage to the actor.

4th, The unfavourable moral position of one who willingly abandons labour, or who depends upon others while he could meet his own needs.

"He that is unjust in the least is unjust also in much," "If therefore ye have not been faithful in the unrighteous mammon, who will commit to your trust the true riches." In all that is moral, want in the less is what proves total want in regard to the greater. And one who lives as above specified, can have no possible credit in regard to any good; for all experience teaches and forces the conclusion, that he is under the dominion of all that is sordid and sensual. As he is void of all moral power in regard to the less, so verily, he cannot be expected to have moral power for the greater; and that no more than the arm which is

unable to move *one* hundred-weight, can be expected to lift *ten* hundred-weight.

As one is usefully employed, his labour is a check upon, and a measure to his desires; and has, besides, a purifying and healthful influence in turning all—even of appetite into moral powers for great good. It also connects us, as we have seen, in a right and vital manner with others, or with each other's needs, interests, or comforts. There can be nothing of all such connected with idleness—*idleness is itself a FEN for the growth of all that is noxious.*

When one who could be useful surrenders himself to idleness, he abandons the good, and throws himself under the power of evil. Whatever be his needs, no gratitude can spring from having them met, as he cannot have the consciousness of inability. His mind is of itself, or of his will, under the power of a false or depraving action. Nor can he possibly have any of the influences or moral impulses which the spirit of labour helps to stir and mature.

Idleness is void of all such, acts reversely in regard to all such, is truly a *fen* for the growth of the noxious; and when one, who could be useful, abandons himself to it, the very strength which he possesses, but stimulates the ranker and grosser produce. As he has strength so he is driven by the force of insatiable desires and appetencies to seek, as his supreme good, what will gratify, or to seek not HOW but WHERE his wants will be met; and we know the downward career—the yawning of destruction which each, so driven, becomes to himself.

Looking at the whole in all its mighty moral bearings, we cannot but feel that there is a graciously saving purpose in the Apostle's admonition—"If any would not work neither should he eat." We cannot but infer that it would have been mercy to thousands, had the Apostle been obeyed rather than blind fondness. Many thousands of young that have been destroyed for life, by indulgence in indolence, would have thus been saved from ruin. Not induced to work by a sense of duty, nor by a sense of shame, they would likely have been brought to themselves, like the prodigal son, by a sense of hunger; and might, in many cases, have been led into a course of well-doing, which would have saved from the vicious, and established them in the useful and honourable. That is verily the abuse of mercy, or great incipient cruelty, which meets his needs who has power to met his own, but will not. It is encouraging the most baneful powers to gain the mastery over him—it is aiding one in that course which is hurtful to all, and which has nothing but ruin for him.

In all cases, needs met by others, when the person could meet his own, but tend to pauperise the whole man. One so reared is soon habituated to look but to others for what he needs, and is soon despoiled of all those salutary mental states which belong to independence. Honest industry nurses all such states—such mental states are in no way so healthfully and vigorously maintained and promoted as in seeking to meet the needs of others; but they are all polluted, weakened, and prostrated in looking to others merely for our own needs.

As idleness is itself that which most increases needs, so those thus sunk are driven both by the power of habit, and also by the stress of numerous, great, and *never to be satisfied* wants, to think of *nothing* but of what will gratify—have little impulse but from appetency. This, as the master impulse, goads them to violate all faith, and to trample all interests and principles under foot as, thereby, the slightest gratification may be got. Giving, in all such cases, rather makes more ravenous, and as no gratitude can be stirred, so there is no regard or affection to restrain their arms from deeds of violence. Hence spoil and plunder must be growingly their desire, and would doubtless be their greatest delight.

It is from this class that many of those come who seem sunk hopelessly in the lowest abysses of degradation and crime; and, doubtless, thousands would never have been so sunk had the Apostle's admonition—"If any would not work, neither should he eat"—been respected. It is that which accords with divine righteousness, and is, consequently, that which is richest mercy; nor can it be disobeyed without entailing evils which all should seek to avert. Clemency which disregards righteousness, or one's right state is greatest cruelty.

In all cases it is perilous, and, in the most of cases, it is deeply demoralizing to meet one's needs as well when he does wrong as when he does right. The right is that from which nothing but good can issue, while, the wrong is that

which can produce nothing but evil; and there can be no greater work of mercy than to subordinate all, so as to make the soul feel the distinction which subsists between these. This important distinction, however, is but obliterated when all is the same to us whether we act according to the one or according to the other. And, in the case of all, it is truly a pity—a mournful delinquency when the greatest possible difference is, in mercy, not made to be felt by all that is due to the one, and by all that is due to the other. Whatever good may be effected by giving to those who are unable to meet their own needs, no good can possibly be effected by giving to those who could meet their own but are unwilling. Yea, in such a case, all good is as thrown into the ocean, and all evil is invoked, fed, and matured.

5th, The evil of indiscriminate giving, or of countenance to Vagrants.

Indiscriminate giving, or giving to all who may profess to be in need, or that wander from house to house, or from town to town, must be attended with great moral injury. Many motives or reasons actuate those who give indiscriminately to all, but two prevailing ones are—*giving to keep alive one's own sensibilities*, and *giving lest the professed need be real*.

Such grounds of giving are not quite sound, and though the latter is better than the former, so far as regards the giver, still, both have an evil effect upon the receivers. The

pernicious results also upon our pauper population must greatly outweigh any chance good that may, otherwise, be effected.

Giving in order to keep alive one's own sensibilities must defeat its own object. The object is our own want, not another's. It is that selfishness in action upon our own souls which, in designing no good to others but all to ourselves, deteriorates our moral condition. It is self so acting in regard to self as to weaken all due emotions in relation to others. Action of such a character must render us more indifferent about the needs of others—must deaden rather than quicken our sensibilities. It is self sporting as with another's needs, or self is *all* in a case—that of need—in which another should be all; and, possibly, no action could be stronger in rendering more selfish. As such is the nature of the action, so it cannot but yield accordingly. It must quicken in regard to self, and deaden in relation to the needs of others. The result on self must be contrary to that designed, because self is all in that where it ought least of all to be. And we doubt not but those who so give could discover that it has thus operated.

Those who give *lest the professed need be real*, may not be so classified among the selfish, still there is with them an amount of inconsideration which is beneficial neither to others nor to themselves. The part which they act is apt to be too wide of its object to be beneficial to them, or

other than hurtful to others. They, upon the whole, are not unlike those who purchase whatever seems a bargain, lest by chance it may at some time be required; and who, in consequence, have seldom what they really require. Those who so give are, in consequence, not so apt to have either the disposition or the means when the proper objects of sympathy come in their way; and are not of those who act an efficient part in regard to need, or who are able to act efficiently in any emergency. It seems necessary that we know, in all cases, something of the object towards which we act ere we can act well for others or for ourselves, or ere our act can be well directed towards others, and our own soul so in contact with the object as to be thereby duly affected. And any course of action which tends to damage others must have in it some want or some property to render it no way beneficial to us. And we cannot but infer that such is the character of indiscriminate giving. Those who so give seem calculated to do much more evil than good. They are the victims upon whom the impostor lives; and, upon the whole, they tend very much to induce and to increase those shoals of vagrants that turn every way from honest and honourable labour—all because something may thus be got.

All such indiscriminate giving (which is without all knowledge of those who receive and of that for which they receive, and which gives to one as readily as to another) is what gives hope to all. It makes each feel, also, as if he

had a right to get. Others have got who had no better claim, and therefore he ought to get; and thus both the number, and also the boldness of vagrants are increased—a bounty is as held out to idleness and to vagrancy, and shame is removed from both. Multitudes are thus induced to abandon all healthful and ennobling industry, and to carry idleness and immorality, with all their degrading concomitants, over our country; and that most into those families—to the hearths and homes of those who most befriend them; but whose befriending rather helps to confirm them in evil, and to encourage others to the same sad demoralizing life.

There must, indeed be, at times and in special instances, much to excite our sympathy in regard to many that so wander from house to house, and from town to town. Yet, upon the whole, enlightened sympathy will shrink from increasing an evil which is so great, and one which is so pregnant with evils, not only for the present, but also for future generations.

It may be difficult to furnish a rule that would so guide us in giving, as not to be subject to many exceptions. Still it seems clear, that much discrimination ought to be exercised so that no encouragement but all possible discouragement be given to vagrancy. It is altogether incompatible with paupers trying in some honest way to help themselves. It so breaks off from all means by which the poor may better their own condition, as it demands all their

time, and requires no ordinary strength of body and ingenuity of mind ; which certainly could be better employed. It tends to become as a profession which requires all strength and skill for itself. Also the families of vagrants, as reared up in vagrancy, have to be educated in all the vices, which seem necessary, as arts, ere they can maintain themselves. And these are, in consequence, ever swelling the grievances and burdens of crime, as tributary streamlets their river. What could be more among the class of great evils! And the whole may, to a very great extent, be viewed as upheld and promoted by indiscriminate giving.

In this, as in all else, we see how that what is not under the sway of principle—though of kindly feeling, or of what is frequently characterised as warm-heartedness, has in one way or another all the evil results of mere passion. To act upon mere feeling is the action, not of principle but of passion—is what, in man's case, must upon the whole, do vastly more mischief than good. And the best way to purify and strengthen all sympathy, and to render it efficient for good, is to bring it under the sway of principle, or in true and vital contact with its own proper object.

This would be done were we more generally giving to persons or families that we knew to be in destitute circumstances from infirmity, sickness, or some cause over which they had no control. Our giving in such cases would naturally be more blessed to us, and also to those that now and again received from us. We would, naturally, get a

growing interest in, and affection for those to whom we so gave. This would be pleasure to us, or rather in us, and this is that which indiscriminate giving dissipates rather than produces.

As our sympathies would thus naturally be more with those in known need so they would be less with those—would recoil from those—who, were they rightly exercising the power and skill which they waste, or pervert in wandering and in mendicancy, would be in no need. Were we acting, in this important matter, more in regard to the known than in regard to the unknown, need would be better met, and fewer would be induced to waste strength and mind which might be usefully employed. Man can scarcely afford to act in regard to the unknown—his so acting, is all but invariably attended with damage to others and harm to himself; and in this case, there would be little ground and less inclination for it, if he would but turn attention to what can be known.

Were we more giving to those of our own locality or acquaintanceship whom we knew to be in want, need would be more effectually met—our own souls would be more vitally and healthfully in contact with it as an object; and we would, doubtless, rather recoil from giving to those who dissipated their strength, and consumed their time in making mendicancy their trade. In such a case vagrancy would not be so nourished—would be incapable of increasing; but would naturally wither under discountenance, and thus gradually diminish.

Giving in such a way, as has been specified, would not lessen our giving ; but would be more calculated to help those who cannot help themselves. It might, also, enable some here and there to become useful members of society. How much genuine good has been done in this way ! And in fact none can well aim rightly at doing good without effecting some good. Many have thus been snatched from sinking into degradation and misery. Having had a helping hand kindly and timeously extended to them, they have thereby been enabled to become established in ways beneficial both to themselves and others. Still the many who have been so aided are few, compared with the thousands that might have been, had giving been less aimless—had there been more of that given for this, which has been indiscriminately squandered to the unknown ; and which can neither design nor effect anything beneficial.

In giving as so specified, those receiving would have more stirred in them the emotions of gratitude which are morally healthful in their influence ; and our own sensibilities, as more in contact with their object, would be vitally stirred and more pleasurable in their character. In all views there would be some ground for doing good and for getting good—to bless with our deeds and to be blessed in our deeds ; whereas, in that of indiscriminate giving, all would seem the encouraging of evil ; and we are weakened thereby, for doing good when, or where good might be done. In our acting, as specified, we would more truly receive good from designing good and from doing it, and would be more

vitality affected by its spirit in seeing it working. We would thus be much better capacitated to act the part of the good Samaritan whenever, as in his case, real need came in our way. Our seeking the right way to do good would, here as in all else, be powerfully calculated to stem evil in achieving good.

In this, as in all on earth, man must seek the right way ere good can be effected by that which is right in itself. Better let right alone than not seek its own way, or handle it indifferently or carelessly as if it had no way. Our seeking the right way in this, as in all else, would be our consideration of the real object, which could scarcely be even glanced at without giving us as much to do as could well be managed. Our so acting would not be opening the flood gates of evil, but would be powerfully calculated to stem evil in doing good. In doing what is right in itself, we maltreat it unless we seek its own way, and our part as wrong results in evil. The right way is the index of our regard for the right, and unless sought by us, we must be altogether in the wrong and doing evil rather than good. We are in the right, but as we seek the way of right, and in this is all our power for good. In all cases the right, as thus sought, has much more power to destroy the evil which comes from wrong, than the wrong has to destroy the good which comes from right. The right can, and shall thoroughly destroy the wrong. The wrong has no such power over the right—all because the right is of God, while the wrong is of weak man, or of the depraved creature.

II.—Dependence upon others for our needs when,—*age, maturity, or strength* considered,—we should be meeting our own, but are, from a mismanaged education or some such cause, unable to do so, is morally dangerous.

There are many who would be industrious and honest if they could, but their powers have been so misapplied, or they have been so habituated to do nothing for themselves, that they cannot turn the faculties or powers which they do possess to any useful employment or beneficial account. Hence, do what they can, they are scarcely able, or are quite unable to meet even their barest wants—Such when thrown upon their own resources, or when left to push for themselves, are very apt to be driven, by the stress of their needs, into the same self-degrading course, which those follow who are able, but are unwilling, to meet their own needs.

The difference between those that could meet their own needs, but are unwilling, and those that should be meeting their own needs, and would gladly do so, but are unable, is in much analogous to that between a person who, resolved upon self-destruction, throws himself into the river, and the person who, having accidentally fallen into the river, cannot, with all his struggles, save himself. The one must perish unless dragged out and forcibly dealt with; and the other must perish also unless kindly aided. Neither can be saved unless dealt with according to his case; and this wanting—different as are the

persons—the waters will ere long as completely overpower the one as the other, and leave no difference in the ultimate result; and so in the case on hand.

Those that could meet their own needs, but will not, and those that would gladly meet their own needs, but are unable, are both in much the same current—have much the same forces acting upon them in the way of need, which neither can well resist. And though very different in themselves, and requiring different treatment, still, if left as they are, the forces which so act upon both must, ere long, prostrate the one as entirely as the other. The current has power to master the one as thoroughly as the other—to bear down both with equal ease; and the result in the one case is generally as disastrous as in the other.

We all know that anything like a true picture of the general consequences of a misapplied education—of an education which has been wholly turned aside from fitting one to meet his own needs in the best practicable manner, and that as soon as practicable, would be revolting to all due feeling. It would be but a sad catalogue of self-ruining courses, in which our lowest hovels, our prisons, and criminal lists would have no small share.

Our emotions in relation to such consequences are generally more correct than even our sentiments.

It is, doubtless, by reason of the well-known sad tendencies and results of such inability to meet one's own needs, that there is a kind of dread uncertainty in regard

to all who are not quite in the way of doing for themselves. It is also from the same cause that, so soon as one has his mind engaged in some useful study, or his hands employed in some useful occupation, a weight rises as from off our hearts—dread gives way in regard to him by sanguine hope springing up. And, truly, as soon as one is brought the length of doing for himself, and doing so in any measure as he ought; we bid adieu to all fear, and confidence and respect take its place.

All this results from feeling that now there is the best rational ground to believe that he is in the fair way of being a useful member of society; and it is only as he is on this way that his character is rightly formed, and attains a stability on which we can calculate. But, otherwise, all is doubt. Even in relation to those thrown out of useful employment, we dread the consequences because we at once realise the influences which are at work; and all this is, and must be much more the case as regards those who have reached maturity, and are yet unable to meet their own barest wants. As idleness has nothing good in itself, but is rather that which matures the worst mental states, so, should such be left destitute, few could pledge themselves, in the slightest, respecting their ultimate well-doing.

Our emotional states, in such a case, are true natural results from what so frequently takes place. The disastrous consequences abound in whatever way we turn. And there can be but few who know not of some left in such a condi-

tion—almost as unable to provide for themselves as to live in want, and who have become debased as under the pressure of continuous want. Having been so acted upon for a time and thus formed, or thus driven beyond the shame of having their needs made known to all, or having them met by any, they have thus become moral wrecks. And how very frequently do such become the victims of all that debases now, and that ruins for ever ! It is the frequency of such distressing results, and our knowledge of the influences which are in operation that make our hopes and fears in relation to all so connected, as natural, as what are our anticipations of light as the sun rises, and of darkness as he sets. But we shall illustrate this part of our subject by what may be the still more familiar.

Children that are soon able to do well for themselves are generally the most *industrious* throughout life, and the most *affectionate* and *honourable*. These three grow very much together. Early industry, whether in education or labour, has a healthful effect upon the other two ; and is in turn so stimulated by them that, together, they become as the triple might of each other. That early industry so operates is what any one may well understand, by a consideration of what has been his own states of consciousness ; as well as, by a consideration of the known influence of such, in restraining from evil and confirming in good.

Each one can well recollect for himself the new kind of delight he experienced when by success either in study or

labour he first contributed to the hope of his parents or to his own maintenance. It may indeed have been small in itself, and have become forgotten as a toy of childhood. Still, though small in itself it could be mighty in influence upon a tender mind. Such sensations again and again repeated, and the mind constantly at work under their influence—and these frequently the most powerful and seldom very weak. Looking at this, the whole mind would seem to burst into view, and open *wide* our entire being, so as to show how it is all shaped and quickened by this work. The mightiest that have ever lived, would seem as but the full growth of what was thus begun.

We are very apt to imagine that such small beginnings, were more as ripples on the stream that affect not its current. And, though to maturer years, they would have been so, still, as we recollect the sway they had over us, we are more constrained to acknowledge that they were the mighty forces, which as at the spring determined for ever the course. Who can calculate what such did in determining his entire condition, and in making him all that he can *well* ever be! These, though small in the view of riper years, have yet been the mighty and ennobling influences which have formed thousands for eminence. And each as he recollects their power, when as yet he was but being formed, may well feel that he *now* is what these have made him—that to them, under God, he owes all that he now is as useful and happy in life.

That such joyful sensations should be encouraged in youth,

when in truth they can—that parents should nurse them, and give them all possible vigour and true life, when in truth they are at all able to do so, is but their barest duty, and is what must, in some way or other, yield them a blessed reward. Such sensations are the stirrings or motions of a new kind of life. In them there are mighty moral influences on which hang the most blessed consequences.

And as that which stirs such is the conscious certainty of parental approbation, so should this be withheld, then they must be destitute of the object which moves and maintains, and can no more exist with vigour and efficiency, than the eyes can see without light, or the ears hear without sound, or the bud shed its blossoms, emit its fragrance, and yield its rich fruit without the sun. The power or the object which stirs such important sensations being wanting, they cannot well exist, and sad and blasting is the blank which is so created.

To this want may well be traced many distressing failures in the families of those, who though stern in principle would yet be more the good, and have in life the spirit of all true principle, were they somewhat less austere, and able so to smile on the good as not to maintain the same rigid expression alike for good and ill, or for right and wrong.

In connexion with the sensations above specified, there are many influences ever at work to determine children against evil and to advance and confirm them in the things

that are *true* and *honest*, in the things that are just and pure, that are *lovely* and of *good report*.

They are not by any means so exposed to vice. Their lively energies, which must ever be in motion, are directed from what would ever now and again be their fear and and their shame, till fear and shame as moral powers, became immoral in their sway. Their energies are rather exercised in what not only restrains from such, but which is also of a character, that must ever now and again yield a healthful satisfaction,—in that which cannot yield shame but must be frequently yielding true pleasure; and such satisfaction and pleasure as purify and invigorate all that is moral. The whole, as thus viewed, has a power to give what is *good* in itself a permanent place in the mind, or to strengthen and confirm the mind itself in all that is excellent.

There is nothing that more embodies the filial in children and makes obedience and honour to parents both their easy and delightful task. And, verily, parents look in vain for good from their children, either for this world or the next, unless obeyed and honoured by them. This is essential in all root of excellence, is what cannot co-exist with idleness, is what industry tends to nourish, and is what best fits children for this world, while it is that without which they cannot enter heaven—"Honour thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee."

This commandment, as the first with promise, may be

viewed as having its promise bound up in all that is our nature, and in all that is providence in relation to us. Nothing more nurses the bones in strength when young, keeps the heart sound, the spirit buoyant, the mind pure, and the whole frame free from fatal humours. Nothing more makes a child amiable, active, and true for life; and there is consequently nothing that more assures the world respecting one, and opens its heart and arms to embrace and so confide in one, as to raise him to its places of trust and honour. It is truly that which gives beauty to every form, grace to all accomplishments, and is what adorns and gives true power to all acquisition.

All this, however, and much more, must be lost, should the powers of children be allowed to run waste through idleness—should their energies become but vicious propensities, or should they, in having all their needs met, be kept still, entirely, dependent upon others when they should be usefully employed and rather the helpers of others. In such a case a very main end of parental affection is grievously neglected and evil must result.

All that we can know of the *parental* throughout *nature* shows that the *directing* of power to what is *useful* in the way of self-maintenance is a very main end of it. A very main end of it with man unquestionably is, that thereby the powers of children may be well directed to, and exercised in all that is beneficial and excellent.

The object of parental affection with man cannot be in

order to induce parents to make idols of their children, or to rear them up in indolence and in incapacity to provide either for themselves or for others. It would, in such a case, be short of that which has been appointed for all other creatures. The object of parental affection cannot be to waste power and ruin those who enjoy it, but its great object must be, to arm parents with all the untiring might and strength which can be maintained in regard to what gives great and increasing pleasure; and that, in order so to sustain the liveliest, best directed, and most indefatigable energy and care in training up their children, or so to direct all the power which they have as to render it a blessing to themselves and beneficial to others. And, in man's case, it cannot well be the former unless in being the latter. Should, however, any neglect in parents, or even any perversity in children defeat so important an object, then, in either case, the divine design is inverted, and there cannot be a blessing, but rather a curse must rest on all.

In children not being so trained, all in them becomes more and more *sacrificed* to immorality. And let us glance at the sad sacrifice. Their powers not well employed are yet employed; but it is in what degrades instead of being in that which elevates. Powers not well employed, or not usefully engaged, can be at work in nothing but what must tend to carnalize the whole man; and the entire action upon the mind must be hostile to all affection, and demoralizing on soul, mind, and body.

As children so reared grow, their needs must grow with them, and such needs as those of idleness must become more and more exorbitant. At times, the very exorbitancy or grossness of their desires may shame themselves; still as idle, having nothing to engage their minds, their needs have all their consideration, are their only master powers, have the full sway of their entire soul; and if not met, they but tend to exasperate and to drive to dishonourable shifts for gratification. The whole action is morally destructive, and in no way could victims be more truly laid on the *altar of demons* to have all good sacrificed to all evil.

Under this process all their powers are weakened for good and strengthened for evil—their needs, as fed, grow and but determine and impel in the way of evil. In such a state of matters, receiving destroys still more their powers as rational, augments yet more their needs, consumes all true affection, destroys all power for good, and makes them more as the ravenous in the way of prey. All that can be given to maintain them, while tending to such a course, is what augments or intensifies their disregard of all, either of heaven or of earth, but as it may gratify or meet their needs, like the ox that grazes in the field, or “like the lion that is greedy of his prey.”

Such is the sad sacrifice which those make of their children who train up their families in indolence and irreligion; for training in indolence must issue in irreligion. And though all so trained may not become so utterly lost, yet parents who neglect what is so mainly the object of

parental affection expose their children to all the forces that are calculated so to prostrate and demoralize.

It is doubtless from differences in such training that the greatest changes take place in the *position* of families, or that families reared amid comparative affluence so frequently sink into want, into the lowest habits, and into the greatest moral degradation. And it is from children having been trained to useful occupations, and brought as soon as possible under the invigorating and self-directing sensations of well-doing, that families reared amid comparative want, or even *severe penury* have yet risen to have a place and a name amid the respectable, the honourable, and the illustrious.

The greatest changes in the social and religious condition of families may be seen as very much the results of how they are educated. And if parents wish their own affection kept alive, their children to be loving and honourable, to grow in character, to be truly religious—ornaments in society, and pillars in the house of God, they cannot be too careful, in so turning the education of their children as to fit them as soon as possible for being useful in life. We may, indeed, be industrious and honest, and yet not religious, but we cannot be religious, and yet not be industrious and honest. How frequently is failure in industry and honesty seen as what blights all hope in regard to all that is true in religion!

Not to have a good way of *providing things honest in the*

sight of all men must be one of the greatest impediments on earth in regard to religion, and to have a good way of *providing things honest in the sight of all men* is what, at once, gives a position and a sphere in which all religion may prosper, or is what, under God, may itself prove a handmaid to pure and undefiled religion.

Much might be advanced in regard to the very great importance of all that about which we have ventured the above remarks, but we rather turn to look—in the light of this particular—at a subject which is of growing importance as connected with the church, and which from its great and growing importance, is now invoking the church's consideration.

The subject, to which we refer, regards such means of maintenance for students, studying for the gospel-ministry, as may best accord with, and advance their *intellectual* and *moral* improvement, or, what are known as SCHOLARSHIPS or BURSARIES. It is more their bearing upon moral, than upon intellectual improvement that falls within our province.

The connexion of Scholarships with this department of our subject belongs mainly to what has been remarked respecting those mental states which are attendant upon self-maintenance. These mental states being of very great importance as regards moral independence of cha-

racter, cannot be rudely treated, or *even* neglected without tending to debase morally, and to weaken as well as pervert intellectually. In one view Scholarships appear suspicious as calculated to impinge seriously upon what is of such worth as regards the entire man. Still every one thing must be looked at in the light of other things ; and, in so looking, Scholarships seem to assume an aspect which shows that their existence is somewhat essential—that, without them there would be a serious void, or which shews that they are calculated to do very great good, if only kept by right management, from doing immense injury.

It may at the outset, be affirmed as obviously a great defect in relation to the efficiency of the gospel-ministry, that students cannot so live, in any way, by that which they pursue as to be enabled from the first, to give all their time, energy, and study to what is to be their profession for life ; and thus have their acquisitions, and their habits of thought, of feeling, and of study, all such as may fit them to act efficiently in their own department.

Few evils attract attention ere they attain a grievous magnitude, and it is the increased and still growing greatness of this grievance which is now justly inducing the attention and interest of the church. This growing magnitude of the grievance is manifestly from the fact, that other professions and occupations are rightly coming to demand increasingly for themselves that exclusive devotement of

time, energy, and study, which is so essential to proficiency in any one profession; which the Gospel-ministry would require more than any other, but which as matters are, it gets less than almost any other; and all from the fact, that students for the ministry are forced to give, their time and strength of body and mind, to other professions in order to get a maintenance. This could be beneficial at no period, but now it is much worse, and if allowed to grow must be attended with great injury.

Even, in the case of those whose parents may be able to maintain them, during the whole period of their academical and theological course, it is yet far from being desirable that young persons at their age should, to any extent, be so long without any of those morally stimulating and invigorating impulses, or sensations which arise from self-maintenance. Such is undesirable in any case—character so formed must be grievously defective in true energy. To have their character so formed, who have in prospect the arduous labours of the Gospel-ministry, would be to unfit, rather than fit them for life—is what could not prevail, to any great extent, without begetting a certain imbecility both of mind and body as the general characteristic of the Christian ministry.

The mental states attendant upon being engaged in some legitimate way for one's own maintenance are self-regulating and confirming in their influence—are powerful in stimulating and in maintaining energy, and in establish-

ing in that independence of character which is dependence upon one's own powers, and there is no genuine moral advancement till this be reached. On the one side of this—so to speak—all is doubt, and after a time, all is growing weakness; but this attained, all is hope, and this goal must be reached ere there can either be the disposition or the power to be really useful.

Character, formed without the live operation of the mental states attendant upon being engaged in some way for one's own maintenance, or without having them incorporated into it, would seem as that which must be lame or impotent for good. In such a case, dependence upon others, must rather be the incorporated. And hence a want of energy, whether as regards vigorous interest in the well-being of others, or as regards independence and vigour in thought or study. This is doubtless the cause of much sickness of body and spirit.—the cause of much of that want of self-reliance both in thought and action, which is a lamentable defect in professed leaders. It is, doubtless, also the cause of much of that mawkishness of sentiment which so vitiates public taste, which carries no compensating good in it, and which cannot be too soon, nor too mercilessly driven from our pulpits.

It must, however, be admitted that where there is a strong disposition to study there cannot be the same danger; for industry, and vigour, and success in study will, to an extent, supply the place of the impulses of which we speak. While this, however, would not be impaired but rather im-

proved, if even a partial maintenance could thereby be secured; it must, on the other hand, be admitted that such circumstances in regard to the many would rather make them pithless for life.

It need scarcely be said, that there is no great danger of students suffering generally from such a cause, as the great majority have to engage, less or more, in some employment in order to ease the burden of their education, or to meet the entire expense of their own maintenance and education. But this, though desirable in one way, is like all else, not desirable in every way; and is, as meanwhile existing, what operates inauspiciously in regard to the ministry. It is more that which—as compared with how it is in other professions or occupations—appears as an insult to its importance.

In the most of cases, the employments in which students so engage require all their time, vigour and thought; and are also, not unfrequently, quite alien to the great object which they have in prospect. Would any other profession admit of this to the same extent! Could any other profession prosper with this to such an extent! It is such as might suffice in relation to what is to be a pastime, is what could scarcely do even for an amateur in any other department; and is, certainly, what looks like a mockery in regard to whatever has any importance in itself, or what has to be a serious profession for life; and for which attainments even in the best of cases, must ever be inadequate rather than excessive.

No Profession has, more than the ministry, in connexion with it, all that is most important and noblest for man. No profession has more of what may be styled the inexhaustible and available, nor does any more open a field of labours for which art and strength are really the necessary. And, must it not come to pass from this kind of *shattered attention* which is left so much but to it, that few can well have the true art and strength for its arduous labours—that its great treasures must but tantalize many during life, or that very few can well, in any sense, be ever at home amid its rich, extensive and varied stores.

But the sad effect which such has upon *independence of moral character*, is what seems much more the really disastrous than what regards the intellectual—and there can be nothing but evil to all if the moral be in any way injured.

In ministers of the Gospel sound christian principle, is doubtless that which must best sanctify the whole domain of character and acquisition ; and, is that without which, all must in the highest sense be really inefficient, or to a great degree destructive. Still, to be respectable and efficient in the church, in relation to the present condition of the world, it is indispensable that ministers have great moral independence of character conjoined with the most appropriate and thorough acquisition.

Both of these belong almost equally to education ; and in neither can they be deficient, without great damage re-

sulting to the Christian cause. As the latter is necessary to enable a minister to bring forth things both old and new, and to defend the faith of the Gospel against the aspersions of its enemies. So, the former is necessary, to fit him for acting an honourable part in all the relations of life ; and, above all, necessary as fitting him to bear with the weak—and also to sympathise with the distressed and with the afflicted. For, where moral independence is wanting, there must be that low state of moral feeling which induces such self-seeking, or such supreme engrossment about one's own, as disqualifies “ To weep with those that weep, and to rejoice with those that do rejoice.”

It may be said that sound Christian principle includes all that is truly moral, and doubtless it does—all must be without the true spirit of right which is not inspired by it. Still, there may be moral defects or weaknesses where there is great piety, and which frequently spring from a vitious education.

Moral independence of character seems to depend almost as much upon education as any intellectual acquisition. There are many as truly Christian as others, who could not for a moment be compared with them as regards independence of moral character. This moral excellence takes its bearing very much according to education ; and is that which is of very vital importance as regards Christian ministers. It is needless to prove that to the extent ministers are without this, to that extent they must be too habituated to

have their thoughts and feelings centre on self; and be, in a manner, thus incapacitated for acting a truly dignified or honourable part—for having true heart and spirit in the cheering and strengthening of the weak, the sick, the dying and the bereaved, for which moral independence of character is of great importance, indeed, all but indispensable.

It is the great bearing which Scholarships appear fitted to have upon this department of character, or upon the moral tone of the minds of students, which makes them of far greater importance in this relation than in their relation to what is more the intellectual. And as they seem but susceptible of good in either the one or in the other when given—as with those in other Professions—as one acquits himself, or for merit alone and not as gratuities or as charities, so we shall now glance shortly, (1) at the evil which must result from the want of Scholarships, (2) at the evil which would naturally result from giving them as gratuities or charities, and lastly at the good which seems naturally fitted to arise from them as given for merit, or as students acquit themselves; or as it is, analogously, in almost all other professions or vocations.

1st, The evil which must naturally result from the want of SCHOLARSHIPS.

Though the period of study for the ministry is not longer than the great importance of the work contemplated demands, yet, as a period full of vigour and of strong action in the formation of character, it is too long to be under the

influence of the struggles and shifts which are incidental to unsettled and precarious ways of living. That ways of living are unsettled and precarious is not necessarily what render them immoral in their tendencies. It is when they are no way connected with an ulterior object, and are yet followed as means to the attainment of such an ulterior object, that they are apt to bear upon us, or to work so in upon us as to undermine our moral power. To be so situated, is calculated to make us feel as in the morally paralyzing predicament of endeavouring to serve two masters, which can never be done without weakening or vitiating all that we are as moral beings. Such is very apt to be the trying position of students, and to be so under trial, for any length of time, would require more than ordinary strength of mind and of principle to withstand such inroads as must be sadly deteriorating.

In many instances, if time is to be got for studies, it is such as must be snatched at the expense of other duties, which cannot be done, even once, without tending to undermine all sense of duty. This, continued in any one way, but leads to it in another, and on till it invades all of character, encompasses all of life—till not one duty is felt according to its own importance, but merely as it may serve some selfish purpose. How has many a character been ruined in this manner! And nothing of this can take place without tending very much to make self-gratification more our object than what is right, or to yield to mere impulse

from desire, that mastery over the emotions of conscience, which at once gives them a fatal uncertainty as regards us, and which, at the sametime, despoils them of their authority or power.

In not a few instances, continuous employment cannot well be got, because students are unable to give their whole time from year to year. In consequence of this they are, at times, driven to distracting, dispiriting, and weakening shifts in order to eke out a livelihood, or meet the expenses of both maintenance and education. That debt is now and again contracted in such circumstances, is more than merely supposable. And this, specially in the case of students—with such a protracted course of preparatory study, is indeed such a root of bitterness as is calculated to trouble and defile—is what first fetters and then tends to degrade.

While so embarrassed there cannot but be such mental distraction as exhausts the mind and unfits it for vigorous study. Nor can there well be any of those placid or passive conditions of mind which are frequently attended with greatest progress in study—when a subject which has got hold of the mind works of itself—strikes its roots deep, or dawns in such refreshing and captivating light upon the mind as to impart new strength and stir indefatigable application. Anxiety—of the character specified—about ways and means, engrosses all such, and tends to render progress all but impossible.

It is, however, attended with what is more serious. Should debt be an element in what embarrasses, the conse-

quences are apt to be very damaging. It cannot, generally, be reimbursed by persons in such circumstances for a length of time. And all well know, that however sensitive the mind may be under it for a certain period, still it must flag in this, or it must become increasingly passive or indifferent respecting it. All mental science shows that such is a most natural result. And in all this there is a baneful process in regard to that sense, which, when in health, gives one no rest while anything is due to another.

The sense of which we speak can no more be kept in health, without the prompt and regular discharge of its high functions, than any other faculty either of mind or body. Nor can it cease to stimulate regarding what is more remote without having suffered impairment, or without becoming less vital in regard to what is more recent—for the one is as much due, or as thoroughly its object as the other. It is not time, but *right* which is its object, and, deadened in relation to this in regard to any one, it is deadened in regard to it in relation to all. All that so infects or diseases what is so important as regards character, must tend to be fatal, in all respects, to that pure, noble, and proper condition, to which the Apostle points when he says, "Owe no man anything, but to love one another."

It may be said that what we specify are not peculiar to any one profession, but are less or more common to all positions in life. This must be admitted, still in few positions

are they so protracted, cumulative, and also antagonistic as in that of a theological student.

The Medical and Legal Professions may be compared, in this respect, with that of the Gospel ministry, and in many aspects the struggles and shifts attendant upon their respective preparatory courses, may appear to be as severe and trying, as those attendant upon that of a theological student. It is, however, well known that the course of preparatory study for them is not necessarily so protracted. Nor are the struggles of students, in such cases, kept generally so apart, or so in a direction that has nothing of the professional. But there is another element which is of vastly greater importance than any of these, and that is the pre-eminently moral character of the position or object of all who devote themselves to the Gospel-ministry. We may look briefly at each of these.

It would, we apprehend, be felt as quite incongruous for either medical or law students to be generally so extensively engaged, as theological students are, in occupations which have little or nothing in common with their respective pursuits. In no case can such exist without tending to impair, generally, the moral strength of those so adrift from the objects of their lives. Nor can it be favourable as regards proficiency.

Anything of evil so entailed must be more serious according to the length of time it has to be borne. As long borne, so it must take a faster hold, attain a more thorough

ascendancy, or become an incurable and fatal moral disorder. And it is needless to say that the extended period of a theological student's preparatory course—stretching as it does over that period during which man's character gets almost all its impulses, or begins to assume its settled form—is quite fitted to give an ascendancy and permanency to any evil incidental to the course. There is, however, another aspect of their position which is calculated to intensify any such evil, and that is the moral.

The moral is not less important to others as individuals than it is to them, still it is not so pre-eminently connected with their several professions—it is not so much that which is the pre-eminent character of that to which they have devoted themselves. In such a case, anything hostile to their professed character, and to the character of the Gospel ministry, must be peculiarly hurtful. The very fact that it is done in the way of seeking such an object must make it banefully blighting in its influence. What is in itself equal to them with others, must in its results be much more baneful to them—it is so antagonistic to what they profess—so opposed to that which they seek by it—so condemned by everything connected with the one object to which they have willingly surrendered their lives, that its morally shattering and ruining effect upon them must be great beyond comparison with what it can well be upon others. What may not taint others, as being no way connected with such forces, may inflict serious and irreparable injury upon them. Then the effect which it has in regard to the Gospel-mini-

stry, and the great moral interests of the world. In this view, should the moral be impaired, all must be useless, no light of intellect can well be other than as an *ignis fatuus*; nor can the man well move in his profession without positively damaging the world's greatest interests.

The distracting and dispiriting expedients and shifts—to which students have at times to resort—continued during a course of years, cannot but have, in general, a mighty influence in indelibly stamping their character. Such, also, must always stamp their own image, or rather produce according to their kind, as like produces like. The impulses so long at work must influence and form according to their own spirit. Hence, one very natural result will be, to habituate those long so subjected to think and plan but for themselves. This habit is truly that which vitiates the mind. It is that which makes havoc among all our nobler feelings or impulses. It at once destroys all that is generous; and it thoroughly disqualifies to care for, or sympathise with others in a true, hearty, vigorous, and efficient manner.

The mind so habituated to think and plan but for self becomes too prone to such a way to be easily moved, or so turned as to think or feel with due vigour respecting others. And while such is really hurtful to all—blighting to the character of all, in whatever position or profession—it is yet, specially hurtful when it affects a minister of the Gospel. The moral disease in such a case is painful

even to think of. Nothing could well more unfit one for the duties of a Gospel-minister. Anything of this must be in positive antagonism to the great end of ministerial labour.

In other positions, few could well escape what is so conflicting and blasting without detriment. And that many get habits, or deteriorating influences, fixed permanently in their minds, is what cannot be questioned. Nor is it that which can be our *marvel*. Very many of the distressing failures in character, which now and again take place, may be seen as the growth of seed sown, or of habits begun, while subject to what we have specified.

Nothing in the present state of society, seems more adapted to remove this grievance than some such means as that proposed by Scholarships—such means as would comport with what is general in other vocations, or such as would enable students to live, to an extent, by that which they are pursuing. Thus their duties would be one, both as regarded maintenance, and progress in regard to the great object of their lives. The stimulants regarding the one would promote the purposes of the other. Anxieties, exertions, and success in relation to the one would be healthful powers for success—direct success in regard to the other. To provide for this seems almost as much the duty of the church, as it is for parents so to provide for the healthful training of their children. Something whereby to effect this seems urged by the consideration of every spiritual and moral interest.

It is not, however, to maintain students equally, whether as students, they do well or ill. All of such a character is retrogressive in its influences and could be no other than hurtful to the interests of any family, society, or profession. It is to supply in regard to the ministry, that which is so generally connected with other vocations, and which is seen as so favourable to proficiency. It is to connect their labours more with the ministry—to open a way of well-doing to them as students—to encourage them as they are students. No other condition would be safe. We shall now shortly consider.

2d, The evil of giving Scholarships as gratuities or as Charities.

From all views which can well be taken in relation to persons who have reached the average age of students, it would be unspeakably better to have no Bursaries than to give them as gratuities or charities. To make anything, such as greater poverty, the condition of their distribution would not enrich but impoverish.

The period of life attained is what should possess the spirit which seeks to help rather than to be helped, and which recoils from touching that to which a superior and undeniable claim has not been lodged by merit or by labour. It is also that period which—irrespective of position or occupation—should be usefully engaged, and not encouraged in any sense to depend upon others, or to possess that to which there is not a most honourable and just

claim. And as greater poverty in one than in another can be the only condition of distribution—if that of superior merit be removed, so we shall glance at its spirit or power.

Such a condition as that of poverty, is not only delicate, but it is also beset with innumerable difficulties. We all but feel assured that those who would be most ready to receive Scholarships upon this condition, are most the very persons from whom, in mercy, they should be withheld.

Granting that the poverty of some could be clearly attested as greater than that of others, still all so receiving could not, in ordinary circumstances, be positively more in need than all who did not receive. And, in this view, they must, in the vital action of that by which they live, have that operating upon their minds and forming their characters, which is questionable—to which some, by its own condition, have as good a claim as they, or even a better. The tendency of this, in such circumstances, could not, by any means, quicken their sense of right; but would rather deaden it in regard to others—would be calculated to render the mere *get* superior with them to any claim of right, or of greater need as in the case of others. A very little action of this description soon moulds the mind according to its own character, and thus inflicts irreparable damage.

It may happen, however, that their greater poverty is so obvious as to leave no doubt in regard to their superior claim. Still would not many others be as poor, had they not

a spirit above being reckoned poor, or did they not exert themselves, and apply industriously their strength or skill!—of which, as possessed, all should be ashamed to say that they are poor. In such a case, the greater poverty of the one is but his greater culpability, and the aid given must be felt, and viewed more as a brand both of his poverty and also of his inefficiency.

It is, in all such cases, so felt that no youth of spirit proper to his age, can well bear it. And if borne long, its power is such as to beget, ere long, the very mental states which it is understood to betoken—all sense of the honourable is destroyed, and there is not only an end to all spirit in Scholarship, but also a moral depravity in looking to others for aid is generated and matured. It would be so in connexion with all else. This results from a law of our nature, which operates in its own way, whatever be our object.

In some instances there seems a braving of the felt stigma; but bravings, in such a case, are immoral, and the result is a loss of all sense of propriety, a lifelessness in study, and audacity and recklessness in conduct. In all views, the action of mind generally so stirred is baneful to all excellence in any relation, and is what seems thoroughly destructive of moral independence.

But, even admitting that all the above objections could be obviated, there is still a very formidable objection to all aid given by a church as a church, to students, upon con-

dition of mere poverty. All who are so aided must, on moral grounds, feel that their freedom, to have any other views than those of the church, is purchased.

The stage of life is such as would enable them to meet their own wants, and as aid given has obviously the one object of keeping them from other occupations, in order that they may be fitted for the church—as in this they are the more willing party, so in such a willing surrender of themselves, their liberty is morally curtailed or their freedom is sold. Could the aid given be afterwards returned, there would still be a legitimate way of escape; but this is somewhat impossible, as it tends to make them all that they can ever be. Apart, however, from such a view—which seems too manifest to be enlarged upon—the natural tendency of all such giving is seen as no way favourable to after deportment, or to mental vigour and moral independence.

It is even calculated to stir change where, otherwise, change might have been progression, and not mere mutability. Having been fed, nurtured, and educated merely by getting rather than by acquiring, so there is the natural tendency to be moved hither and thither by the probabilities of mere *getting*. This is of its fruit—from its producing according to its kind, or from its begetting and maturing a proneness to veer about, not according to principle, but according to what appears as more desirable, or of greater temporal advantage.

Everything has the spirit of its kind, and, as acting upon

us, works its own spirit into us. Hence, the whole—as having nothing of special right, as void of anything like merit—has no power or spirit in itself to stir the spirit of these within us. It cannot quicken the sense of right—must rather tend to deaden it; and must rather have power to destroy in minds, still being formed, all that spirit which rejoices in merit and which impels in progress.

The natural tendency is to lower the tone and weaken the power of the entire mind—is to deteriorate the intellectual and the moral. The one tendency is to produce a vitious proneness to be ever on the outlook for the *get*, or for aids—*inclining the heart unto covetousness*. And, in proportion as there is any such bend given the mind, all power, to act a prompt and honourable part in any emergency, is lost or reversed—all power for having genuine sympathy for others is perverted. One so affected is manifestly dispossessed of the spirit, which should specially fill and stimulate him, who is to be a teacher of the ignorant, a warner of the ungodly, an encourager of the good, a strengthener of the weak, and a comforter of the mourner.

Though much evil must result from the *want* of Scholarships—though, upon the whole, it is pernicious for students to have their struggles for maintenance so dissociated from the object of their lives, still all is not hopeless. The evils attendant upon such may be conquered, and now and again eminence springs up from amid such struggles, when well borne. This shows what might be expected were their

labours more connected with the object they have in view, or made more conducive to professional attainments, But there seems no hope connected with aid given upon condition of poverty—to receive it is that itself which seems to conquer or give the whole mind a mould according to its own character.

It would indeed be worth while to ascertain whether many ever rose to eminence, or acted a noble, disinterested part for the good of others, who were so educated. We rather believe, that the most of those so educated, must feel too great a drag during life to be able to rise with any natural ease—must, in many instances, be unnerved as regards principle, or in possession of those mental states which quite incapacitate for acting an independent and philanthropic part, and without such there can be no genuine eminence.

Well would it have been for the intellectual vigour of many ; and above all, for their moral purity and strength of soul, had they—on the first offer of all such aid—gratefully yet unflinchingly declined it. Better far to have indignantly spurned it than, for a moment, to have stood even with moistened eyes, or fallen mien, yet with outstretched hand clutching it as a boon ; for, as regards results, it is indeed of those tender mercies which are cruel.

Did the young know the damp which extends to the fire of their spirit, or the servile form which their very bones assume, as such aid is touched, they would shrink from

thus beginning that *cringing* through life, which develops itself in such varied shapes—not only in what, to the eye, is the more menial or abject ; but as well, in such discourse as panders to prejudice, as intensifies even the depraved, or which humours or tickles the popular ear—which in whatever way developed, exhibits one who mainly degrades himself—who renders not life his blessing, but himself a slave in life. Did the young know their youth, their plasticity under the power which action has, and that confidence in strength to baffle such power is most that weakness which renders them its victims, they would maintain, at all hazards, that true might, which consists in the hand unpolluted by such aids, and in the firm recoil of soul which gives that spirit and bearing which become their years.

Such a part acted could scarcely fail in opening up such ways as would soon raise above the need of aids, and would, ultimately, be attended with success and honour. But in the touch of such aids, there is nothing so much, as that power which sinks for ever under their need, or that venom which paralyzes and prostrates, and from which all, who *would live*, cannot too much shrink in dread.

While, however, it would be unspeakably better to have no Scholarships than to have them so awarded, still, between aiding in the wrong way and aiding in the right, there is all the difference which subsists between wrong and right. Very frequently what is best in itself, is worst in its results in consequence of not being done in its own way.

Right is as changed thus into wrong, or a great good becomes a degrading evil as done in a wrong manner. The most grievous of our evils are from the way in which things are done.

3d, The good naturally calculated to arise from Scholarships as awarded to merit.

It would be needless to enter upon any argument in regard to the influence which circumstances have in the formation of character. It would be as grievous a mistake, for all practicable purposes, to affirm that circumstances have no such influence as to affirm that we are nothing but what circumstances have made us.

The influence of circumstances is not so much that which comes upon us through necessity, or what we cannot resist, as what gets into us through our more passive states, and which, thus, not less moulds us—What gets so into us, is frequently that which gives a certain character to, or may even impart a determining power to our more active states.

None are quite free from passive mental states, and many have seldom any other. Hence many are, doubtless, altogether what circumstances have made them; and those over whom circumstances have had the least control, are the persons most likely to be alive to the real influence which circumstances have had in determining their character.

In all positions such circumstances as are calculated to stir right mental states must be best for all; while those

which tend to distract and lower the mind in any of its states, must be hurtful to the many, and hence, pernicious upon the whole. And it is to improve the circumstances of students in regard to their position as students—to bring them under more healthful influences—influences which may so stimulate as to have a beneficial result both intellectually and morally, that Scholarships awarded according to merit seem—as matters now stand—not only expedient, but even necessary.

It is upon the condition of merit that Scholarships seem best adapted to occupy the place of that which is in almost all other Professions, whereby, those who follow them, are to an extent, able to live by them—are under no necessity of having their minds distracted, and their time consumed by what is foreign to their pursuits, or are enabled from the first to give their time, their vigour and their thought all to their professions. This is what the Gospel-ministry would require, as much as any other profession or vocation, if not more. And this is what must be secured in some way, or progression in all else, must be concomitant with and, in part, cause of retrogression in it. An evil so great cannot, surely, be permitted by the church without some effort to reverse it. And in her circumstances, no means seem more legitimate for securing progress in the Gospel-ministry—while progress is going on in all around—than such Scholarships as shall stimulate and enable students to devote their time and vigour to their studies.

The condition of merit upon which to award Scholarships, is, that which most assimilates them to what is in connexion with other professions or vocations ; and is also that which accords with the better impulses of the mind. The condition of merit is not, by any means, calculated to deaden the good ; but is rather that which is adapted to quicken the mind—to move and form it by what is most honourable, or to work the *good* into character as its permanent and moving element.

As awarded to *merit*, deteriorating influences would seem removed. The object, in such a case, is not persons, than which nothing can be more doubtful, and upon the whole, in such a matter, more hurtful. But the object is *merit*, than which nothing can well be more made out, and be more ennobling in its influences upon the mind. The ennobling power of merit is what all vitally feel who succeed and, in any way, so live. It is that which they feel as inspiring them according to its kind, or infusing its own spirit more into them.

Whatever objections any may have about the propriety of receiving anything as maintenance, from any special portion of the Christian Church—as being what must bereave him of his full moral freedom, or as what must be an impediment in the way, should his mind undergo a change in views—this condition of merit is the only one which can well weaken such objections ; and is what would seem to reduce them to the character of such objections as may be conjured up against what is best on earth. For the main-

tenance is not special to any, but *merit* is its special object. It is not *as* belonging to any portion of the church, but it is *as* meriting, which lodges in all so got, that special claim which enables one to call it his, and *his*, in a sense the most honourable in itself, and hence most healthful upon the mind.

It is, doubtless equally true, that did he not belong to the special portion of the church which so awards Scholarships, he could get no such claim lodged. Still, it is also true that the church, in having merit as the condition, cannot well have regard to the pledging of special persons. It seeks the greater proficiency of all—proficiency in regard to the whole is its one and only object; and therefore, in no sense can it seek to clog any, or render rather inefficient than efficient. The very condition which it institutes shows that it recoils from all such.

All that the Church regards is, that meanwhile, the student design for its ministry. And having greater proficiency in regard to the whole as its main or one object, is, what raises it above all purpose in regard to the binding or clogging of any. The spirit of the one object cannot subsist with that of the other. The condition may, doubtless, act rather severely in relation to some, still it is the only condition by which Scholarships can soundly operate. Any other would result in unspeakable evil. And the good, which Scholarships seem adapted to accomplish upon such a ground, is what appears to lay a duty upon the church which cannot be too zealously discharged.

Were Scholarships amply provided by the church, students would be enabled to yield their whole time to studies, which demand this, ere there can be what may be called proficiency. As awarded to merit, they are admirably calculated to stir and feed vigour, to mature true power, and to establish those habits of study which all the circumstances and interests of the church render more and more imperative. Scholarships as provided and as so awarded, would supply to all the means whereby those impulses or sensations would be stirred and wrought into character which belong peculiarly to efforts for self-maintenance—which become no weak element in all true energy, or in all such industry, management, and providence as are inseparable from a well-ordered life.

These impulses or sensations are what none—specially during the vitally important period of the average age of students—can with advantage want. Many would seem to fail from having been too long in experiencing such, or from not having had their characters any way formed by the refreshing and invigorating impulses which spring from that exercise of power which frees from being a burden to others—which capacitates one to feel that he can move on of himself, or which enables one to meet his own needs. Not to dwell on such, let us rather glance a little at the general bearings of Scholarships as awarded to merit.

As everything stirs according to its character, or moves according to its own spirit, so Scholarships, as awarded to

merit, cannot be calculated to deaden the sense of right. They are rather adapted to quicken such a sense, as merit is their spirit, and not persons, or one's pecuniary condition.

As none, whatever be his position or relationship, can succeed unless he excel, so all who excel have nothing from such partial grounds as position or relationship—these are thrown aside as unworthy of consideration; and nothing could so healthfully make it felt how unworthy they are, as regards real character. All that they get comes to them upon the impartial or righteous ground of merit—merit is what stands out as the worthiest, as what alone can be felt—is what rises supremely above anything like the mere *get*, and is what truly elevates the mind above what is so of the irrational. The whole spirit of Scholarships so got is quickening in regard to right—it makes all regard the rights of others as much as their own. And weakness can but seize the whole, as the slightest impression seizes any, that right in regard to merit has not been done—that persons, and not greater excellence or progress have led to their apportionment.

Nor can there, possibly, be any brand of poverty or inefficiency in what is so got. All is thoroughly the opposite. The whole is as a badge of honour, which the best may well prize. Nothing of the whole can be the shame, but all must be the honour, even of the highest; there can be nothing to avert or sink the eye, or in any way bemean the form of the receiver in the presence of the giver. The whole is merit; and is such as may make the giver rather

admire the receiver ; and, while filling the receiver with gratitude, it is yet of such a high character as to make him feel on a level with the giver.

Then, in the case of many, Scholarships so honourably got would keep from condescending to those distracting and humiliating shifts which so tend to undermine all intellectual and moral power. Means so got have a felt value, and are most apt to be carefully applied but to their own object, so that it may be well secured. The very spirit of means so got tends to this, as it inspires a regard to what is honourable, and fixes an invincible disdain in the soul in regard to all that is unworthy. Like all that is sought and obtained in a right way, they have a self-regulating power as regards their own ends, and animate, still more, with their own ennobling spirit.

While the whole, as thus acquired, is to the enriching of the intellect, yet the whole, as thus possessed and enjoyed, is what most contributes to the elevating of character. All the states which we have brought into view are powerfully moral in their bearing. And it is the vital power for moral good, which Scholarships seem calculated to possess, which makes them appear to be of great importance—tending richly to repay the church, in proportion as amply provided by the church.

Students so provided for, and under such influences, would be under impulses somewhat essential to their period of life ; and such as would naturally promote intel-

lectual and moral vigour. Such training would naturally so raise in feeling, as to make them spurn seeking any such Office, as that of the Gospel-ministry for "filthy lucre," or "for a piece of bread." It would naturally establish that moral independence which would ever attend and prompt them to act in all departments of life, not from mere squeamish etiquette, but with that vigour and honour which their position demands, and which would show moral dignity as native to them. And what more serviceable as capacitating to throw themselves with heart and energy into all that is truly philanthropic.

The want of such moral independence leads to be so engaged about self, as to unfit for entering with spirit into the griefs and joys of others. It can only be where such independence is, that any can so command and dispose of himself as to become all for others—that he can yield his soul to compassion—that he can, with true heart, pity and instruct the ignorant, commiserate and warn the ungodly, bear with and help the weak, sympathise with and comfort the afflicted, console and uphold the distressed and bereft. All that is calculated to capacitate for what is so important, cannot be too ardently promoted, and anything tending to impair for this must be deprecated.

In assigning such influences to what is so incidental to the preparatory course of students, it may appear to some, like assigning to the straw on the billow the force which is in the billow itself, or to shadows all the power of sub-

stances. Still, let us think for a moment what would be in other professions, had those that followed them such a preparatory course. Would it not so operate as to make improficiency and want of character soon seriously affect every temporal interest?

It may, indeed, be affirmed that those in other professions have to live to an extent by them from the first, because, without the devotement of their entire time and vigour, those professions in which they engage, could not be carried on. But, that the Gospel Ministry may, in some sort, be carried on without such, is not what renders the evil less—is not what renders the entire devotion of time and vigour to its studies from the first, that which is less necessary for proficiency in it. To be otherwise followed is rather that, which is apt to stamp great improficiency as good proficiency, and to perpetuate and promote that in regard to it, which would be weakening and frustrative in regard to all other professions. And we see no great prospect of the Ministry of the church maintaining a leading position, amid progress in all that is around, without more care being exercised in relation to students—an important element in which would be, to have adequate *Scholarships, placed on such a basis, as to be within the reach of all who may attain a certain fixed standard of excellence, and to admit of less or more to be given to others as they rose above such a standard.*

To bring the church to such would require no ordinary struggle, but once brought to it, and rejoicing in its happy results, we believe that the results would have power in them-

selves, to uphold and advance the church, in all the elements of true health, in regard to the ministry. This does not, by any means, appear of less importance than the supplementing of inadequate stipends, and would be one of the most effectual ways to supersede, ere long, the need of such supplementing. We cannot look at it without feeling that strength, progress, and success belong to it.

It may still be urged that sound Christian principle should *of itself* accomplish much of that which we have been advocating. Doubtless all will be useless where there is no such principle. Still, unguided principle will not accomplish all; and it is more for where there is to be principle, and for bringing under its thorough sway, that we have to provide, than for where there is to be no principle.

Nothing, could more be fatalism put into ruinous practice than for the church, in such a matter, to rest at ease by delegating all to undirected principle. Could such succeed in any case? Could parents so neglect to provide the proper means for the education of their children with impunity? In so acting, however much their children might afterwards be under the government of principle, still there would be a lack, a stiffness, and an uncertainty; and all from such a fatal neglect—also to such a neglect would all want of principle be rightly ascribed. It is to neglects of such a character we may trace much of that inefficiency during life, which is so baneful to the social and religious interests of many in all the departments of society.

Should the church act so in leaving all to principle, or in providing nothing for bringing more under the power of principle; the results in regard to her ministry must, as matters are, be somewhat analogous. Her ministers, however much men of principle, will have less power even as regards it, and the whole will become more a sphere for the success of quackery than for that dominancy of principle whose *being* becomes seen as its sway is all of ease. Her ministry, not formed for efficiency at the appropriate period, will not be able to act that part in relation to her and to the world, which her own vital interests, and the cause of human progress, demand at her hands.

Much might be advanced in regard to what is so intimately connected with the great interests of the church; but we must hasten, ere we close, to glance at another department of our subject. We cannot leave this, however, without expressing a hope that the Church's response to the appeals now made for Scholarships, will not, in substance, be that of the oppressor—"Go, therefore, now and work, for there shall be no straw given you, yet shall ye deliver the tale of bricks."

III.—There is moral danger in meeting his needs who could meet his own, and would willingly and gladly meet both his own, and also those of others; but who can do neither, by reason of the want of employment, or of appropriate labour.

Those who have both the power and the will to meet their own needs, but are in destitution, through want of

employment, can, in many cases, be no more blamed for that destitution, than one in darkness can be blamed for not seeing because he has his sense of sight. And though such have an unquestionable right to our sympathy and aid, yet experience demonstrates that their needs cannot be met without danger. And all we know of mental action warns us of the care which ought to be exercised, lest—in meeting such needs—those vital emotions and energies, on which character so depends, be injured and for ever weakened.

In all circumstances, the object which is *really needed* should be ascertained. In the case of not seeing, from want of light—not from anything wrong with the eye—the desideratum is light. And as it would do irreparable damage to begin and doctor the eye, so in the case on hand, the real object or desideratum is employment, and the real cure is to supply such employment. When they are treated in the same way as those who want the power to meet their own needs, the result may be, and very commonly is, irreparable injury for life.

In regard to all such persons the real want is that of occupation, or such labour as to enable them honestly to meet their own needs; and all aid is dangerous, unless given for some work so performed as to make them feel that they have a greater claim to what is, thereby, got than all others—that it is theirs by greater right than it is that of even those who give. This is what meets the real want,

or is what supplies the needed object; and is what tends to maintain the moral integrity of the whole man, or that spirit of independence which, otherwise, would be very liable to great injury. And the whole is what seems to account for much that is, ever now and again, taking place.

We see, on the one hand, those who are enabled to bear on unaided through adversity and want, generally made nobler and more vigorous by the conflict—gathering new energy, as well as enhanced experience for greater success in what may await. While, on the other hand, those who have their needs once made public, and thus met, are generally for ever sunk in spirit, and destroyed in all energy, and seldom afterwards do much either for themselves or for others. And doubtless the opposite results are to be traced to the influences, respectively, to which we have been adverting.

We know that those who have been enabled to bear through a period of trial and want, without having been publicly aided, feel as if they had escaped an overwhelming calamity, in having their hands still unstained by the gifts of public charity; and that the spirit of independence thus still entire—as well as the emotions and habits of thought, and tone of acting which struggles, well and honestly maintained, stirred and confirmed—but fitted them the more for advancing in triumph amid the more prosperous. There has been many a noble conquest in this way, whose glory is too pure to be so much that of time as that of eter-

nity—before it the rude and dazzling glory of time shall wane, and disperse from view with time itself.

But, in the case of those once publicly aided, a blight would seem to take hold of their entire character at the touch of such aid. The very fact of being but once so aided would seem to pierce, as with a poisoned arrow, all power of independence, if not all sense of right. The event may be temporary, yet the results are generally very fatal. It becomes as a fact in their history which they cannot well blot out, or as a weight of disgrace in their lives which they cannot well throw off; and the issue is as if they argued—*having been once so aided, as well now be ever so aided, having, at all events, the disgrace to bear.*

It is owing to this that Depressions or Stagnations in trade are so demoralizing.

While the hardships incident to stagnations press upon a community, many that hitherto *provided for their own and for those of their household*, are reduced to the heart-depressing necessity of looking in all ways for aid, and what astonishing changes to the worse seem to seize many as constrained so to look! How frequently does the aid which they may get but wound, and weaken, and prostrate the man! change the rational as into the mere animal! Hence during such trying periods numbers are invariably so sunk, or so despoiled of all character—so robbed of all spirit of independence and deadened in all sense of right as to incline ever afterwards to look but to others for aid; and

become the victims of all the vices of idleness and rapacity.

It is true that when depressions are succeeded by a lengthened period of an abundance of provision and labour, the numbers so sunk diminish. This, however, is not so much from their being again established in industry as from not being meanwhile augmented ; and also from death making great ravages among such, and thus wearing them rapidly away.

Many of the greatest evils are seen rising up from all connected with circumstances of such a character. Ireland has thus had the strength of its arm, and its moral power weakened and destroyed. It has been too much aided as a pauper rather than having been supplied with means, whereby to meet its own needs ; or rather than having been taught to live by the exercise of its own power, and its own ample resources. Hence, all aid so given has but begotten and matured ingratitude, and established " Give, give," as the unappeasable cry.

It is also on this account that many of our purely manufacturing districts tend to become so low in all moral feeling—as stagnations bear more heavily upon them than upon those which depend more upon commerce. And the whole contemplated in whatever view we may, but impresses us the more with the great importance of the matter on hand—but impresses with the danger of giving to those that are *able* and *willing* to meet their own needs had they the means or opportunity of doing so. The pro-

per way to aid such, is in supplying such means or occupation, as may enable them to meet their own wants in an honest and honourable manner.

Aid otherwise given is not supplying the proper object, is like much else, good meant, but done in a wrong way. The real need is not met; and much might be advanced as demonstrative of its tendency to do evil—of its tendency to impoverish in character, and thus, permanently, pauperise—to make those so aided look, ever afterwards, but to others instead of seeking to maintain themselves, or to depend upon their own industry. Soon as there is such a result there is nothing but one downward course—no check can be given to demoralization.

That aid so given has such an impoverishing tendency all must know who have anything to do with the administration of the Poor Laws. Turning up the “Extracts from the information received by His Majesty’s Commissioners as to the administration and operation of the Poor Laws,” 1833, we quote as follows:—

“Those whose minds have been moulded by the operation of the Poor-laws appear not to feel the slightest scruple in asking to be paid for the performance of those domestic duties, which the most brutal savages are in general willing to render gratuitously to their own kindred.” This is corroborated by a list of the names of persons who applied to be paid for attending their own parents, or other near relatives, during illnesses. And all who have any

part to act in regard to the Poor-laws, know that such is no uncommon circumstance. We add another extract.

“There were two labourers who were reported to me as extremely industrious men, maintaining large families. Neither of them had ever applied for parish relief. I thought it advisable that they should receive some mark of public approbation, and we gave them one shilling a piece from the parish. Very shortly after they both became applicants for relief and have continued so ever since.” And the reporter adds, “he was not aware that any other cause existed for this change in the conduct of these two men, than the above mentioned gratuity.”

Many facts analogous to the above, and illustrative of the very great demoralizing influence of the Poor-laws might be furnished. Such, however, would require a more thorough entering into the character of these laws—as framed without a due consideration of man’s general character—than would comport with our present purpose.

Other evils may appear to create a necessity for some measure like the Poor-laws. Still, we cannot but believe, that their own existence has, most of all, created their necessity. They have, doubtless, been the stirring cause of much more want and misery than they can ever meet or ameliorate. The needs which they have been instrumental in stirring, and which they are unable to meet, are, doubtless, much greater than would ever have been, granting that they had never existed.

Their existence empoverishes the general character of the community, in deadening public sympathy; and the effect upon the objects contemplated cannot be, but what it is—"destructive of veracity, industry, frugality," domestic virtue, and hence of all morality.

The evil which is in the very existence of these laws—not to speak of their mal-administration—is too gigantic to be presently encountered. Hence we meanwhile defer drawing our principle through this subject, as well as through many others—such as Public Charities, Government Education, and the like,—in all of which there seems a want of many conditions which are essential in regard to what is most important in relation to man. That in which they appear defective must, to an extent, either make them rather augment the evil which they are meant to diminish; or cause them to do more moral damage in one way, than they can do good in any other. Not, meanwhile, dwelling longer upon these, we hasten to another subject, which has an intimate connection with the whole, as well as with all morality—the subject of LABOUR.

Throughout the whole of this Section we cannot but have seen the vital connexion which LABOUR has with morality—that immorality, or all the worst vices of depravity must abound and augment, in proportion as those dependent upon LABOUR, are cut off from obtaining it; and that from whatever cause. Very manifestly if men cannot get—at all *times* and in all *places*—that by which they may earn

an honest livelihood, then it matters little what our charities are—they must but promote moral degradation. Nor, in such a case, can it matter much what our Churches are, or what are our Missions and Benevolent Schemes or Christian undertakings, vice can have no effectual check—in defiance of all, irreligion and immorality must abound and increase; and all because that is removed which God hath graciously appointed, in this world of sin, as a check to vice, or wickedness, and as a guide in the way of righteousness—this wanting, all man's efforts must prove abortive.

LABOUR has, of late, been more abundant to the multitudes that depend upon it, and the social and moral blessings which have resulted may well gladden every generous heart. This—a leading cause, under God, of such great blessings—may in part be traced to the discoveries of gold which have induced emigration to an unwonted extent, but must be chiefly attributed to late Legislative measures—such as the repeal of the corn-laws, and greater encouragement to agricultural improvements—which more regard the good of the entire community than the mere interests of privileged classes. Still, however salutary such measures have been, we cannot regard them as final, or in any other light than as the mere beginnings of good. And as labour is, yet, far from having the relation to vast multitudes which its importance demands, and which the Most High seems to have appointed, so we shall now look a little at it according to such, or at:—

The relation which LABOUR has hitherto had to large sections of our population. The relation, also, which the Most High seems to have given it to all.

The relation which labour still has to multitudes, or to us as a nation, is not what can admit the surrender of dread respecting a return, now and again, of old evils. It is rather such as may make us feel that the vital interest of thousands, and the most solid interests of our nation, must be more and more seriously affected, unless, some such radical change take place in regard to Labour, as shall make it more harmonize with the best interests of man, or make it serve the end of its Divine Mission. But returning to our subject as specified, let us bring into view,

1st, The relation which LABOUR has hitherto had to large sections of our population.

Which relation has been more that of a *prize for having done well*. Matters have hitherto so been with us, or with the vast multitudes that have nothing to depend upon but labour, that unless one had a good character there was no labour for him; and also in the case of many, however good in character, once out of employment, very great difficulty existed in again getting it. The evils which have, in consequence, been entailed are great both in number and also in magnitude; nor can we infer that there is no remedy for such, or that all the causes—or even the great cause, have been removed.

(1.) The relation which labour has hitherto had to great sections of our population—as more that of a prize for having done well—has shut out from well-doing all that have had the misfortune to do ill ; and that though but once.

It is well-known—even as matters still are—that many of our criminal classes would be glad to get back into Society through the honourable and only legitimate means of honest industry ; but then as they have lost all character, so there is no labour for them. Labour has been, and still to an extent is, so much of the nature of a *prize* for having done well—consequently such a privilege even to the best—that there is none in any way for those stained with guilt, and who would gladly wash away, by honest toil, their hated stigma of crime. In consequence of this we may almost as reasonably expect the hunger-driven tiger to abandon its ferocity, as expect those to become reformed by that which goads them, in pressing need, to seize what is not their own ; or which removes from them all earthly means of living honestly, and so regaining their character.

Thus, labour as a prize for having done well—more than an open way of inducing all to do well—rather tends to sink still more those who are once sunk. Hence those once injured in character are, as at once, for ever deprived of it, and incapacitated for ever becoming useful and respectable in society. Any such relation of labour to those who depend upon it, is what leaves no hope to the criminal but in the way of living by his crime. And truly, all may well feel, that but for such a state of matters, many who are

dragged along as the most miserable wretches, and that can have nothing but a felon's sad doom, might have been useful, respectable, and honourable members of society. They are, as often, the ruined victims of a public wrong as, inherently, more vicious than others; and how different it might have been with them, had their circumstances, at one period, been but slightly better !

That such a state of matters has existed, or still, to any extent, does exist, or may yet return to what it has been, is certainly what forms an urgent motive for parents to train up their children in early, in vigorous, and in cheerful well-doing—for, if soon not so established, society becomes as shut against them. The whole is also a subject to which the serious attention of Christians cannot be too much directed, in order to ascertain whether it could be corrected, —whether there is not some fundamental error which must be removed ere things can be put right ; as on what is fundamentally wrong even good itself becomes an evil.

(2.) The relation of labour as a prize, for having done well, makes it difficult to be got when once lost; and this has driven many thousands to crime.

Not only has it been difficult for the criminal to get back to society through honest industry; but it has also been difficult in many instances for the industrious, or the honest and *even* respectable to get anything like sure and constant employment. Hence many, against whom nothing could

be charged, have, from difficulty in getting again employed when once out of employment, been made paupers, or induced to try those methods of living, which are so allied to all that is base and criminal; and have thus become moral wrecks, not only in themselves, but also in their children, and in their children's children.

Those out of employment and unable to get again employed may resort at first to such methods of living, from a hard necessity, with a perfectly honest purpose. Yet, as their haunts, as their familiars, and as the very atmosphere which they breathe become increasingly the degrading and criminal, so generally, they and their families are not long in being fatally infected. It is by reason of this that those driven, through want of labour to methods of living, of a questionable and disrespectful character, are rightly dreaded as on the high way to crime.

It is in such ways of living that they, and more especially, their children, and their children's children get so generally all those feelings, tastes, voracious habits, and *even* cast of countenance which would seem to consummate depravity—which would seem to render all that is extreme in degradation and vice, as of their natural impulse, or *even* as indelibly fixed in their peculiar physical form. The numbers so sunk, and that race after race become more degenerated, may well make us feel that there is something, fundamentally, wrong in the relation which labour has had; and which it still, to an extent has to vast multitudes; since, in any such relation, it so inadequately meets what seems its great design.

This depraved class has so augmented, and has become so peculiar in habit and feature, or in all that is of character—and that by its peculiar pursuits or methods of living—as to be more like a distinct nation in our midst. It is, at the sametime, of such a polluted and hostile character as to contaminate and waste all that is pure and healthful. It, meanwhile, preys as upon the very vitals of society, and is doubtless, dangerous as regards the future—the slightest weakness on the nation's part, or greater strength given to it, is calculated to make the whole burst forth in ruin to all that we are as a people. Such a class may well be, meanwhile, felt as a smouldering volcano in our midst, which, unless some effectual change come, no weight of armies, nor power of prisons and chains shall keep from, ultimately, bursting forth with wide and overwhelming disaster.

This is not necessarily the result of a large population; but seems to arise mainly, if not exclusively, from the relation which labour has to large sections of our population.

It is well known that it is not in America as with us,—that the reverse has taken place there of what has happened here. The generation which would likely have been here sunk in crime, is there established in the habits of industry and honesty. There, though parents are profligate, yet the children have ready access to labour, and all the means of rising to respectability are within their reach; but here, if the parents be profligate there is no work for

the children, and hence nothing for them but the ways of crime. In consequence of this, the class which so tends to augment here, tends to vanish there; and all by reason of the abundance of labour and the amplitude of its rewards.

So long as labour has such a relation to the vast multitudes of our nation that depend upon it, as rather to shut out from well-doing than invite to it, as to make labour rather what must be courted than what courts, as to make it rather a great privilege to get labour than a privilege to get the labourer—So long as labour has even a tendency to such a relation, the class which has so augmented with us must still exist, and ever now and again augment yet more; and nothing of Church or State will be competent to stem the deepening and widening current of irreligion, immorality and crime.

(3.) Though certain causes have co-operated, of late, to modify the relation of labour of which we complain, still, the main cause appears to us as yet all but untouched. The fundamental error, or main cause which gives labour such a relation, would seem to be the way in which the land or soil is cultivated; and in the effect which this has upon all other occupations or professions.

The culture of the soil, as the first, is doubtless the fundamental occupation of man. No other occupation or profession could subsist without it. In following other occupations throughout all their labyrinths, we are brought

back to the labours of the field, as forming that primary occupation to which all others seem but secondary or auxiliary. All other occupations are seen as helping and encouraging it, or as so depending upon it that its health is their health, and its decline, their decline.

As the culture of the earth is so fundamental, any want of soundness in regard to it must be disorder and weakness to all others; and while such remains unchanged, no more can permanent vigour be imparted to other vocations, than a ship can be saved by repairing the rigging while the evil—a leak at bottom—is unheeded. No change in regard to the great evil, all must be but such changes in the evil as may retard or hasten its final disaster, but not remove it.

The evils which must, necessarily, result from want of due regard to the cultivation of the soil, are evils that grievously affect every department of labour.

In all cases where the soil is kept from being as highly and as widely cultivated as it could, all other occupations must languish. For, in proportion as it is so, there must be less demand for all other occupations, and there must be a too great proportion of the population driven to them for a livelihood. Hence, two evils at once arise—a less demand for auxiliary occupations, and also an overcrowding of them with hands—less labour by that which increases the number of labourers.

As the above must tend to lessen the rewards or value of labour, so another evil springs up.—Each is, in consequence,

constrained to perform an undue amount of work, ere he can earn a livelihood. This tends still to render labour scarce for others ; and, consequently, still lessens its own value, and again increases the amount which must be executed, ere a maintenance can be got. From all this results the incongruous condition of both *labour* and also the *want* of labour being great or degrading evils.

The incessant drudgery of which many are the victims cannot but be baneful in its influence. We are unable to understand how more than eight hours, daily, of labour, less than eight hours for recreation and improvement, or less than eight for sleep, can be other than physically and morally hurtful. Such a division of time would certainly comport with all needs and comforts, and would make labour itself an invigorator and an improver ; but, as matters are, with how many thousands is the one routine nothing but that of labouring, eating, and sleeping ! And, while, the amount of labour, in the case of some, incapacitates them for having a due thought either in regard to time or eternity, this creates, on the other hand, that want of labour which drives others to all excesses in wickedness and crime. This state of things may, meanwhile, be ameliorated by emigration and other causes, still these are not fundamental, and cannot well be more than very partial and temporary in their influence.

It is well known, *even in regard to land under culture,*

that there is a vast amount of it impoverished towards the end of every nineteen years, and that there is no inconsiderable portion of it kept from yielding half of what it could, lest the enriching of it should lead to the demand of an exorbitant rent, or to an ejection to make way for a higher bidder. Is not all this very similar, to what it would be in the case of the merchant, if he could not stock his warehouse, for the extending of his business, without incurring the danger of having a rent demanded in proportion to the value of his stock, or of having his stock and warehouse handed over to some other ! No business could prosper under such circumstances—there would be encouragement neither for capital nor enterprise. Nor can there be anything like due encouragement to capital and enterprise as regards agriculture, till the farmer can hold his land by a condition, somewhat, analogous to that by which the merchant holds his warehouse.

In addition to the above there are also thousands of acres lying waste which would readily yield to the hand of industry, and richly repay enterprise and skill.

With a soil that could yield such scope for labour—that could withdraw such numbers from other occupations, and increase demand for every other kind of labour, is it not *mockery* to speak of an overgrown population ! The population may have outgrown our laws, or the interests of a privileged few, but obviously it has not overgrown the soil, nor means which if employed would still be for the growth and good of our country.

In such circumstances, to speak of emigration as a public blessing, is more that rhetoric which magnifies a possible good as if the greatest. Those who emigrate may not be quite lost to our country, still, were our own resources opened up to capital and enterprise; and their labour made bear directly upon the industry of the nation, it might be as well for them, and it would certainly be much better for us. As matters are, we may rather look at emigration, as what indicates that there is a great fundamental error somewhere, and that it is rather what keeps down our strength as a country, or is draining our nation of its vigour.

All that is needed, is to open up for the general good, what the Most High hath given for the interests of all, and not merely, for the luxuries of a few—is to open up the soil to the unrestricted and vigorous enterprise of all. This would doubtless give scope, labour and ample reward for a much greater population than Britain is like to have for years. Some such change must be effected, unless we are to assume the weakness of decay instead of retaining the vigour of growth. As this, however, leads to a subject which would require a distinct and lengthened treatise for itself, so we shall not enter upon it, but rather now turn to look at what seems the divine purpose and relation of labour.

2d, The relation of labour as divinely appointed.

“In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground.”—Genesis iii. 19.

The relation which labour has to all as divinely appoint-

ed, would seem to be that of a *Represser* of sin, and an Encourager in the way of well-doing.

Should we view the divine sentence—"In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground"—as denoting that labour is purely a punishment of sin; or should we understand *labour*, as while so far inflicted by reason of sin, yet, as being that Dispensation which under divine grace, is meant—in a sinful world—to repress sin, and to help to induce in the ways of righteousness, then we would readily infer, that there would be—at all times and in all places—an abundance of labour for all. Whichever of the above views we take, it shuts us up to such a conclusion.

Should we view the sentence as denoting, that Labour is purely a punishment of sin, we would at once, readily, conclude that, on no account, would there be a crushing burden of *labour* for those who live orderly—who have done well, or who live in the way of well-doing; while, those who have done ill, or who are the more especial victims of it—as a punishment—are not unfrequently driven from all labour. We could not well conclude that, to any extent, each in proportion as he did well would the more come under the curse; while, each in proportion as he did ill would be deprived of labour, or delivered from the curse. Our conclusion would be the same should we look at Labour, though inflicted by reason of sin, yet as that, under divine grace, which is a dispensation or gracious means to *repress* sin and *save* from it.

To repress sin and save from it, may be viewed, as the benignant character which all assumes, under divine grace, that was inflicted by reason of sin. This is now the character *even* of Death, and there is no more need to prove, why the people of God are not saved from death in this world, than to prove why they are not saved from labour. Under divine grace both death and labour become blessings, as dispensations, in a world in which those who are to be saved, must be saved from the power or dominion of sin.

Death has been met or fully satisfied as regards the Law. Hence, the Law has no more claims in regard to death, or no more death to inflict. The Saviour, in giving the Law all the death it required, purchased death—made death his property—his captive, and, as now his captive, is in his hand the servant of grace, or is made subservient to the ends of his gracious Government. It was thus that the Saviour “tasted death for every man”—thus he destroyed him that had the power of death, and thus in dying he conquered death.

Death is now the Saviour's captive or his purchased property; and, as administered, is not administered by the Law but by Him who declares of Himself “I am he that liveth, and was dead, and behold, I am alive for evermore, *Amen, and have the keys of hell and of death.*” Death, as sent to believers, is a messenger of peace from the Saviour calling them home; and to unbelievers, is a messenger of wrath. Hence the force of the warning “Kiss the Son,

lest he be angry and ye perish from the way when his wrath is kindled but a little." And, how truly "Blessed are all they that put their trust in him!"

Death, as now set before all, is that which is designed to alarm respecting sin—to repress sin—to stir to abandon it—to help, as all other means, to save from it. And truly, but for death having such a place in this sinful world, sin would soon overwhelm the world.

Labour has a somewhat similar position, as a dispensation, to that of death. Its gracious object is to *repress* sin and save from it; and, what a world of guilt and crime would we have, had sin no such check!—Neither death nor labour, as seen in this gracious aspect, can be viewed as of the law. We are not under the law but under grace. All which is thus inflicted in consequence of sin, changes, under grace, into blessings or means for the repression of sin and for saving from it. And all is thus seen, in regard to the sinner, as of grace. And, also, as necessary to repress what is evil and induce to all that is holy, just, and good.

Hence *labour*, as of grace, is not held out as a punishment but is urged as an indispensable religious duty—"Be kindly affectioned one to another with brotherly love, in honour preferring one another, not slothful in business: fervent in spirit, serving the Lord." Which as here connected with our highest duties to one another, and our most sacred duties to the Lord, is what cannot be dispensed with and these, at the sametime, discharged; but is

rather than which, if not attended to, shows how thoroughly we are neglecting all duties.

Labour, instead of detracting from our time in serving God, is that in which we are to serve Him, and is that without which we cannot well, at any time, have spirit for serving the Lord. As we are without it, so true religion becomes impracticable; but as diligently engaged therein we are in the most favourable condition for serving the Most High, and hence, living rightly in regard to all else.

As well engaged in labour, we are most favourably circumstanced for having the evil weakened and the good promoted within us. We are most favourably situated for having all inordinate states of mind and body under command and mortified, for being kept from the greatest temptations, for being under due restraint, and for having sin repressed and deadened within us. We are, also, most auspiciously situated for having—as by the vital power, action, or direction of labour itself—something of those pure and blessed conditions of mind and body stirred and promoted, which, but for sin, would have been entire and supreme within us; but which idleness renders impossible, and for which the restraints and impulses of labour are essential. Labour, as of divine grace, is a very main part of all sound religion or true Godliness—has, in all ways, a very powerful influence upon all that can be characterized as the moral.

Man, in his sinful state, could not for his *well-being*

enjoy the *immunity* from labour which *even* many of the lower animals enjoy. No other being on earth has its *well-being* made so dependent upon exertions for the *maintenance* of its *very existence*. And this, in itself, seems full of instruction.

That no other creature upon earth has its well-being so dependent upon exertions for the maintenance of its very existence, is what—in man's case as a fallen creature—is a gracious dispensation. This is what regards his dignity and happiness as a rational being. Labour is rendered essential to his very *existence* as a creature, because it is indispensable for his *good* as a creature.

Labour, in the case of man, is not to be viewed as *indispensable to his being*, and, therefore, rendered *conducive to his well-being*; but rather, it is to be viewed as *indispensable to his well-being*, and, therefore, graciously rendered *essential to his very being*.

Without the healthful influences of labour, the human race would soon, by the greatness and turpitude of sin, destroy itself.

That our existence, as made so dependent upon labour, is of those gracious arrangements which show how “It is of the Lord's mercies that we are not consumed.” Hence over the world, as persons are well employed, the moral attains strength; and, in no case, is all good so perverted, or all that is human so lowered and debased, as when men are not usefully engaged. In all such cases depravity augments and spreads with an overwhelming power. Nor can it by any means be checked, so long as what God hath

graciously appointed is removed, or so long as men have not that by which they may be enabled to live honestly—a want so great makes all else weak and abortive.

As labour has such a Divine Mission—has such mighty and vital interests pending upon it, so we cannot believe that either as a punishment of sin, or as a means to repress sin and save from it, there can be that, under God, which naturally renders it short as a penal infliction, or makes it adverse to its own gracious designs, as a merciful dispensation. And all that tends to render labour inadequate as regards its divine mission, or that deprives men to any great extent of it, cannot be viewed as of the arrangements of God,—must be held as of the perversions of man, and will, invariably, be discovered to result, in some way, from such self-seeking as turns that to the special interests of a few which the Most High hath given for the interests of all. This is what is calculated to throw all of heaven and earth into confusion, and to make that not very beneficial to any which would be more their good in being the blessing of all. We shall, however, dwell a little longer upon what seems involved in the fact *that our existence is made so dependent upon labour in order to secure our well-being.*

Though there is, presently, such a connexion between our existence and labour, yet we cannot infer that had there been no sin there would have been no labour. But we may rather infer, that *as labour* is essential to all well-

being, and as it is of the nature of sin, in this world, to dispense with what belongs so to all well-being, therefore it has been made essential to our existence, in order to engage us, as *by necessity*, in it.

And it is this necessity which we understand by "*The sweat of thy face.*" The expression, "Sweat of thy face," does not necessarily denote that without sin there would have been nothing to engage man's energies. It is rather thus seen to import that, in order to engage man's energies in such a way as to keep sin from having destructive power over him, his existence is made dependent upon his own exertions for its maintenance.

Though, in the absence of sin, there would not have been a necessity for such exertions in regard to existence, yet man, in a right state, would have had an abundance on hand to exercise his every power, and would have been unable not to work.

His work would not have been that of necessity for his own maintenance, or in "*the sweat of his face,*" in order to meet his own needs. But it would have been that of good-will—that of love for others—more that of Angels who cease not day nor night—not for himself, but in love for others, which would have given the true indefatigable—great labour would not have been weight, but rather great matter of satisfaction, joy, and delight.

This itself—not to speak of the other powers which would have been enjoyed—would have raised the existence of

each above immediate dependence upon his own exertions for maintenance. This, even as matters are, is what powerfully tends to efface the curse—"In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread"—or to dissolve the connexion subsisting between existence and labour. For it is as we are engaged for one another in love, that each is raised above the necessity of relying but upon his own exertions for his maintenance; and yet not the less, but rather the more indefatigable in labour. And such a state prevailing, and dominant, would be the world regenerated, and the curse all but obliterated.

Nor do we despair in regard to the ultimate prevalence of such a blessed condition, or that there shall yet dawn upon our world a period similar, in much, to what would have been had sin never entered it.—When the connexion between existence and one's own exertions for its maintenance will be dissolved by the moral power of the truth. When man's labour will not be so much for himself as in love for others—for their present and eternal weal. When the moral cause of the curse, or of the connexion of man's existence with labour for its maintenance will be greatly removed, and labour *itself* destroyed to a proportionate extent.

There is in the Gospel all that is divinely competent to achieve what is so great; and we are induced to believe, that as it prevails and brings the world under its benign power, *such* changes shall be effected, in our whole social

and political condition, as will tend to put the means of living honestly and honourably within the reach of all.

And, also, that such powers or agencies will, at the same time, come to hand as will lessen labour in regard to production and yet increase production; and be the means of enabling and inducing man, more extensively, to seek higher and more ennobling objects, and pursuits of greater moral influence, or more elevating in their character, because more blessed in their purpose and results. Along with these, we are constrained to believe, there will also spring up such influences as are calculated to increase the average length of human life. All these seem so essentially of the truth—are so in it, that its progress and their developement would seem inseparable. We may glance at each as specified.

(1.) The social and political condition of a people must always change with their moral character—as the latter changes so must the former, and that as necessarily as water seeks its own level. Hence, the former is always very much in accordance with the latter.

It matters very little how enlightened a nation may be estimated, the social and political take character from the moral. Where the people are immoral—where “None calleth for justice nor any pleadeth for truth,” or where they have no regard for each other’s rights—where all seek in their own way, or according to their strength, to be tyrants, *there*, a highway is opened to the usurper. And despo-

tism, as an effect of moral incapacity on the part of the people, is what cannot be maintained but by perpetuating, or still more deepening the people's moral degradation.

But as the people of a nation improve morally, or come to a sense of what is due to each other, so their rights are regained—are, in a sense, no sooner seen than they are in firm possession; and despotism crowned with shame, sinks in helpless weakness. As with individuals so is it with a nation. It is only as we respect the rights of others that we can exercise and enjoy our own. And, as a nation, to any appreciable extent, respects each other's rights, so all, of necessity, come to possess and enjoy their rights—true freedom is the necessary result. But without this all must be either despotism or anarchy.

As people improve morally so must their social and political condition change or improve. And how much has ours changed or improved by the effect which the Gospel has had upon the character of the nation—upon our views and impressions regarding what is right:—What freedom is now enjoyed compared with what has been! Hence, to affirm that radical changes will yet be effected, as the Gospel extends its sway and intensifies its influence, is what experience so warrants as to seem like affirming that it will be light when the sun shines. As some of our customs and laws are still more those of a semi-barbarous age, while others of them have no regard to what is of God, so none of these—however much, meanwhile, venerated, or

admired, or permanent like in character—will be able to withstand the Christian or moral power of nations as the Gospel prevails. These are destined to be overturned. In regard to these, as in regard to all that affects man, “Every plant which my heavenly Father hath not planted, shall be rooted up.”

What kind of changes will be effected, or what will be their extent, it may, meanwhile, baffle human sagacity to predict. As nations, however, will be at peace with each other ; and hence, each at peace with itself, so the weapons of mutual destruction will be changed into the elements of peaceful industry. And, as we look at the place which industry must have, ere what is so blessed can exist, we can well be at no loss to infer that the changes which will effect it, shall so open up all resources of legitimate labour to man, as to enable him, in all departments, to earn with ease an honest and an abundant maintenance.

Nor does there seem reason to doubt, that the progress necessary to this, shall sweep away—as unjust and oppressive—all that, meanwhile, keeps the earth from being *like a Garden which the Lord hath blessed*. As the expenses of war shall be abolished, as there will be little expense either for crime or for Government, so, doubtless, the culture of the earth will come to be acknowledged as that which gives the best right, or the chief claim for possession. This will ease and stimulate labour in every other department ; and thus “They shall sit every man under his vine and under his fig-tree, and none shall make them afraid.”

As what is thus predicted would be impossible, at any time, with our present social and political condition, so the former seems to indicate an entire revolution in the latter. In our present moral state such a revolution would possibly be attended with much greater evil than good—nor could it well be a blessing, unless, coming by the power of moral change in character. The liberty which becomes manhood, which it must enjoy or be so shackled as to be debased, would yet be pernicious to childhood or youth; and so is it with nations. But much as manhood assumes or secures the rights which comport with itself, so, as the Gospel fits us, in character, for what is predicted *that* fitness will *itself* be power to assume or secure it—as the one grows so it will stir or produce the other.

As our minds are much moulded, and our views as much formed by things as they meanwhile exist, so we are prone to deem that what exists is in itself somewhat essential—cannot well be removed, and, if change is needed, all the change required is not removal, but some improvement. So, at first, was it with Luther in regard to the Papacy—it was so with him, because he was as men generally are; and by this, as much as by aught else, his sincerity is set in light. Still as with the Papacy, so with much that belongs to our social and political condition, attempts to improve, but induce the conviction that there ought to be a removal, or but hasten on to destruction; and this, doubtless, is the pending fate of much that is now sought to be improved.

It would seem to be from this tendency to believe, that what now is must always be essential to order, that anything, even of Scripture, which would seem to interfere with the present frame-work of society, is so generally held, as what cannot be correctly understood. Hence, also, there is an almost universal tendency to be satisfied with the impression that such passages as—"They shall sit every man under his vine and under his fig-tree, and none shall make them afraid," denote nothing more than a spiritual condition. Such a rendering, however, is not what magnifies the spiritual, but is rather that which treats it as powerless in regard to this world.

We may already have the spiritual in the great blessings which the Gospel has achieved—in a spiritual sense we can now *sit under our own vine and under our own fig-tree, and there is none to make us afraid*. And the power which hath accomplished this manifests itself as still conquering and as destined to achieve much more. What the Gospel has already accomplished, may well be viewed as that which exceeds the Belief of the Past—is what would, doubtless, have alarmed many even of its martyrs in the past had they but seen it, or is what they could scarcely have believed as of the progress of the truth. And what hath been so achieved, may also teach us our own incapability *even* of conceiving what will be the greatness of the changes or its ultimate triumphs, ere *there be nothing to hurt or destroy*. All that has been achieved may well be estimated as but an earnest of what shall yet be effected, or as the

sure precursor of a thorough or literal fulfilment, of such passages as that to which we have referred.

As the Gospel has already effected so much, what it has yet to accomplish, ere what is so predicted can be literally fulfilled, may be well viewed as less than what it has already achieved—the past thus tends to illumine the future and may well assure us of it. Since the Gospel has already effected so much—while still but partially known, imperfectly understood, and proportionably weak in influence—what will it not effect when it becomes universal and supreme—When “the Earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea,” and when “the mountain of the Lord’s house shall be established in the tops of the mountains !”

(2.) As the Gospel extends in sway, not only will our social and political condition so change as to furnish all with the means of earning, with ease, an honest and an abundant maintenance, and thus tend to erase the curse ; but, we are induced to believe, that there will also come to hand such powers as shall remove the burden of labour as regards production, or such agencies as shall enable man, with little application, to produce an abundance for the needs and comforts of life. When men, in consequence, will have the leisure, the means, and the spirit to exercise their powers in regard to higher objects ; and be induced to follow a course of life more attendant with blessings to

others, and hence more elevating to themselves—abounding more with the true and the blessed.

The discoveries of Science would seem the harbingers of such a period; and to be pointing to it. Though, meanwhile, the agencies thus brought to light would seem more the chaotic in relation to what we specify. Though, at times, they rather seem to confuse labour; and, in some instances either deprive of it or burden more with it, still, they show what may be put into order, and ultimately, rendered ineffably serviceable to man. As now coming into view, they may well appear such powers, as would have been in full application, had sin not entered and distracted the world.

Had the world not been disordered by sin, we may well conceive, that the agencies which are now coming into view—and many more of vastly greater efficiency—would have been in thorough operation, or under the wise, easy, and safe control of man. We may infer so even from Experience. For it is only, as the world is in the enjoyment of peace that one great discovery becomes the stepping stone to another, or that one is but the unfold of another still greater—that one discovery so succeeds another as to make us feel that the light, which is to reveal the powers or agencies all around, is yet but dawning. And what would have been, had the world from the beginning been under the sway of perfection, is truly the inexpressible; but is still, as truly, that in which the richest imagination may luxuriate.

It may be affirmed that the hitherto moral condition of the world could not have borne what recent years have set in light. The powers or agencies now known, would not have been blessings to a world full of hostility—would have been wielded by our race more for mutual destruction than for mutual benefit—would have been turned by man into his own scourges, or blasting and extirpating curses. And how truly of Divine goodness, that they were kept in darkness—that the state or moral condition of man, which would have rendered them scorpions or destructive wrath to man, was made that which hid them from view !

Now, however, that the Gospel seems destined to bring, ere long, the world more extensively and thoroughly under its benign influences—Now that power, as possessed by man, seems destined to be, ere long, more employed for the good of all ; so now those mighty agencies which have ever been of our being, or with which the world has ever been full, seem gradually, yet guardedly, coming into light. Having been hid, in mercy, during the long reign of hate—which has so distracted this earth, and which, but for power, would have for ever ruined the world—they are now coming out of darkness, as if ready to aid man in his work of benevolence. As now coming into light, they seem as but waiting to aid in the amelioration of man's condition ; and that as soon as his change of character will make their presence or possession man's blessing and not man's curse. Thus, their present aspect would seem the ushering in of a better condition, or the dawning of a new and blessed era.

It is probable that the world is not yet competent to bear a thorough knowledge of the full power of what is even now known. As nations still "Learn war," and as the despotic can still bear sway, so it would probably be still made serve injustice and oppression more than righteousness and mercy. But as the Gospel extends its sway, and as under its divine influence they "Beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning-hooks." So Science will doubtless take her high place, or assume her destined sphere as the handmaid of religion, and far exceed in range and power all that has yet been known, or that meanwhile can well be anticipated.

As Religion renovates and elevates man's character, so Science may be seen as ready to become a powerful auxiliary in erasing the curse—in simplifying and in augmenting productive power, and thus still more dissolving the connexion which subsists between man's existence and exertions for its maintenance—in giving scope also, as well as means and vigour, for the higher pursuits of knowledge, and for the noble purposes of Christian benevolence. And as the highest is inclusive of all, so "They shall teach no more every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord; for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest of them; for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more."

With the light of science which is now enjoyed, there can certainly be nothing marvellous in believing, that much will yet be manifested and experienced as beneficial for

life, which is now thrown aside as waste or treated as noxious. Also, that agencies will yet come to hand, which shall, in effect, root up the *thorn* and the *thistle*, or make them subservient to important ends as regards life; and by which man shall also easily reclaim the desolate, or make the barren yield abundantly; and hence “The wilderness and the solitary place shall be glad for them, and the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose.”

(3.) That, along with the above, such influences will come into operation as shall tend greatly to increase the average length of human life, or that there is literal import in the prophecy—“There shall be no more thence an infant of days, nor an old man that hath not filled his days; for the child shall die an hundred years old, but the sinner *being* an hundred years old shall be accursed”—is what we may readily infer.

We might speak of physical causes, as brought to light, which may likely co-operate in effecting this—in neutralizing the power of disease—in imparting strength to the human frame—in promoting health and in maintaining fresh vigour. Still these will be results of the spiritual or moral, and the moral will not only guard, direct, and aid their power and thus give them efficacy; but the moral itself will also so act, in direct influences, as the most powerful cause; for as all wickedness deteriorates and shortens human life, so all that belongs to righteousness tends to purify and lengthen it.

SIN SHORTENS LIFE, "The years of the wicked shall be shortened." "Envy is the rottenness of the bones."

All immoral or vicious states of mind, prey upon the human constitution, tend to its general weakness, and hence, to the shortness of man's life. All cruelty, fraud, and the like have a powerfully deteriorating influence upon the vigour and length of life; and in consequence, "Bloody and deceitful men shall not live out half their days." And from the same cause, all that is of depravity, or all its inordinate states—such as *adultery, fornication, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, envyings*, and all of a kindred character—prey upon the human system, and tend to curtail the period of man's existence.

Hence, in all immoral circles, life is brief, while, its average length increases as man's moral condition improves. Nor, can there be a doubt, but the prevalence of irreligion and of immorality—with all their vicious, oppressive and disordering concomitants—act so upon the human frame as to impair, universally, its strength and durability, and thus shorten the period of life. Consequently *even* in regard to this world "Sin reigneth unto death." But an important change will take place, as the reign of wickedness is overthrown by that of righteousness; or as the truth prevails and brings all more under its gracious and healthful influences.

RIGHTEOUSNESS TENDS TO LENGTHEN LIFE. "The fear

of the Lord prolongeth days." "A sound heart is the life of the flesh."

As the Earth becomes full of the knowledge of the Lord, not only will the present external burden of calamity and grief, as caused by man to man, give way—which so tends to shorten man's period of existence; but the states which will remove such, shall also have so great a direct influence as to show—even as regards the present—that "righteousness reigneth unto life."

Then *love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance*, and all their invigorating results, will come into active and extensive sway. *And against these there is no law.* In these all is perfect freedom. Nothing in these is forbidden. In these no indulgence can ever become excessive or vicious. The more we abound in these the better do we become, the greater is our happiness, and the more removed are we from evil, or from what can harm either soul or body. In these we cannot, by possibility, exceed what is right; but, as we abound in these, so we advance in the knowledge and grace of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. And the *very* intensity of these is what best purifies, feeds, and strengthens the whole man. Hence, these operating more and more upon the human frame, from generation to generation, will act powerfully in neutralizing its distempers, or in destroying the seeds of disease; and, also, in promoting its strength and durability; and thus from age to age, still tend to stretch gradually out the average length of human life.

The sway of these pure and blessed states of mind will be the removal of the moral cause of life's present brevity, as well as the removal of the present connexion between existence and exertions for maintenance.

As the world comes under the healthful influences, which we have specified, there is nothing unreasonable in believing that the period will eventuate, when—in consequence of the increased average length of man's life—not *merely shall the child of a few days old be reckoned an infant, but the young shall still be estimated as such though years old, when the infirmities of age shall belong but to those who are well advanced in years, and when one dying an hundred years old shall be viewed as cut off in his prime.*

The sinner, however, though partaking, then as now, in the general strength and durability of the human frame, shall not thereby be so benefited. His course will be more the withstood, the ignominious, and the lonely. An old sinner will then be, truly, a much more wretched and painful object than now—the pitied yet the shunned. His length of days, from continued conflict with righteousness, shall but tend to sink him deeper in depravity and more load him with guilt. From all circumstances, external and internal, his length of days will but augment his misery, or “The sinner being an hundred years old shall be accursed”—shall be so in himself, and more seen to be so by others.

It would seem to be in consequence of this increase to the average length of human life, that it is affirmed

“They shall build houses and inhabit them, and they shall plant vineyards and eat of the fruit of them,” which we feel as importing much in regard to the matter on hand. It appears to be in contrast, not only, to the brief term of man’s existence on earth—which may be thus designated, “One soweth and another reapeth”—but is, also, what seems to imply a thorough change in our social and political condition; and that specially as regards the way in which the earth or land is, meanwhile, held or possessed.

With the Earth or land as meanwhile possessed by the privileged few, any increase to the average length of human life could never admit of *even* the general fulfilment of predictions such as “They shall sit every man under his vine and under his fig-tree; and none shall make them afraid.” “They shall build houses and inhabit them, and they shall plant vineyards and eat the fruit of them.” With our present social and political condition—in relation to how the land is possessed—any increase in the average length of man’s life would rather produce the reverse of the above.

Meanwhile, it is but the few who can get that on which to build; while, with the many, to attain anything like an advanced age, is but to multiply the instances of others inhabiting what we built, or of others eating the fruit of what we planted. We cannot, however, despair in regard to the truth, as all competent to achieve what it so predicts. Hitherto the liberty which it has secured has but pointed to greater liberty still to be attained—what


now is but points to what is still greater ; nor can what we have be held, unless, we thereby seek what is still the greater. And looking at the truth—at its first principles in regard to man as related to man, we feel that it cannot long have progress, and these kingdoms not be moved by a question of vital importance —by a question respecting the rights of the many and the time-honoured, yet now somewhat time-worn, privileges of the few—by a question which regards right in relation to all as against what has been the work of conquest, and which has still the baneful relation of that got by mere might ; and till such a question triumphs there can be no thorough peace upon earth, nor good-will and lasting prosperity among men.

We are aware of the difficulties which attend a literal rendering of such passages as those to which we have referred, still we are unable to understand them otherwise. The truth is all competent to accomplish such. It would also, so seem of the truth's first principles in regard to man as in relation to man, as well as of its predictions, that we are unable to understand how it can prevail—how, to any large extent, it can bring under its enlightening and regenerating influences without so consummating what it announces. And we doubt not but that in proportion as man becomes fit, by its power, to enjoy what is so predicted, so it will attain a full or literal fulfilment.

It may be said that we must also give a literal rendering to similar passages of Scripture, such as "The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf, and the young lion, and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them."

This, however, only makes us feel that we are but on the confines of the province which we have entered—on that Pisgah which sets in prospect what yet awaits man on earth. This but constrains us to believe that man will yet be in possession of agencies which shall enable him to reclaim, in every sense, all the wastes with which we are, meanwhile, surrounded, whether of soil, of vegetable, or of animal—which shall enable him to render all animal power subservient to his purposes, as well as to make the "Desert rejoice and blossom as the rose"—When the powers with which he will be armed shall easily, in his hand, subdue the mightiest, and when his own benignant sway shall gradually tame the fiercest. As this shall be of the triumphs of righteousness and mercy here below—can but be effected by the progress of the truth, so we may well desire the truth to have free course, "the mountain of the Lord's house" to "be established in the top of the mountains," *that His way may be known upon earth, His saving health among all nations.*

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